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Harry F. Sunn illc, Jr., PRO SK 
#17265 
c/o Utah Stale Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
Ham F. Sunhille, Jr. 
Defendant Appellant 
\s. 
Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the 3 District Civil Court 
Case # 080903840 
Judge Kate A. loomey 
Appellate Case No. 20090398 CA 
Comes now the Defendant and Appellant in the above-notated case, Harry F. Suniville, 
Jr., PRO SE« to respectfully submit to this honorable Utah State Court of Appeals, this following 
BRIEF OF APFF LI ANT in my Appeal 1 am appealing the final decision of the Honoiablc Judge 
Kate A. Foomev in the above-entitled action, the MhMOR \NDUM DhClMON >\M) ORDKR, entered 
in this matter on April 6. 200c), but not actually recehed b> mc until c\cning mail call on 
4; 10 '00. M\ No i ICL Of APPEAL in this case was mailed to all respective parties on Ma\ 3, '09. 
Now. regarding this Court's jurisdiction. I have just recently recehed a letter from the Supreme 
Court oi Utah, dated May 13. "09. and it tells me that this Appeals case of mine will be 
transferred back to this Utah State Court of Appeals for disposition within twenty daj s which 
transfer I am not opposed to. 
Mj appeal is taken from the entire judgment 1 believe that error is apparent upon the 
fact of the iccord, and that the crror(s) are a matte i of substance. Specified!}, I belies e that the 
\erdict is not responsive to the issues in this case as are established b\ the contested facts and 
evidence that I pie\iousl\ submitted to the lower couit. 1 also believe that when one takes a hard 
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and honest look at the evidence previously submitted by me and that the lower court has 
apparently chosen to ignore - that surel} this higher Court will see that this evidence casts 
serious doubt of credibility upon Plaintiffs disingenuous and suspect allegations that are 
genuine!}, and material!}. contradicted by this evidence of mine. 
Moreo"\ ei\ 1 further contend that it is I, not the Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union, that has 
been the greath more injured and grievously harmed of the two of us. and that the facts and 
circumstances of this case will support the same conclusion on appeal: that I was egregiously 
\ictimized h\ the Plaintiffs breaching the spirit of (and yes, even also the letter of,) the Contract 
in question here, which actions of theirs, (most of it self-described,) can, at every step along the 
way, only be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, hasty and recklessly negligent, not to mention 
purely incompetent, and that the resultant collateral asset deficiency damages the} claim are 
consequently self-inflicted damages and mistakes that 1, their much-abused loan customer, 
should not be asked to pay for. 
Kirthenriorc. I belic\e that the lower court erred in its failure to consider my contrary 
e\ idence. and I also believe that it is an issue of appeal, the fact that despite my several requests 
for a fair, and "level playing field1" - that is, for legal assistance and'or & postponement of these 
proceeding? until such time as. outside of these very much handicapping conditions of zero legal 
resources while I remain in prison, and b} which I might otherwise help myself, (that is, until 
March, 2010. when I could then seek out real, authentic legal representation, the better to defend 
m} self) - the lowei court has additionally failed to consider these realities, too. 
NATURE OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
Previously I filed with the Utah Court of Appeals a PETITION FOR R F VIEW, AND 
MEMORANDI M IN SUPPORT, and this Motion, the same as my NOTICE OF APPEAL, was put into 
an outgoing mailbox on May 3rd, '09. In fact, all of these iollowing Post-Judgment Motions that 
I have listed here were mailed out on Ma} 3ld. with courtesy copies sent to 3rd District Court, and 
to the opposing attorneys, as well as to this honorable Utah State Court of Appeals - except for 
m} Motion and Supporting Affida\its for Waiver of Court Pecs, and these (owing to the extreme 
difficulties that I face getting any kind of Xerox copies made on a timely basis,) were mailed to 
the honorable Judge Kate A. Toomey. alone, on May 11th, '09. 
Accordingly. 1 ask lor a supersedeas (if that is the correct term for me to use here.) to 
ensure that the issuance oi an Execution ol Judgment be stayed . . . for an ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT, staging the issuance of such an execution of judgment. 
Finally, please direct the Third District Court to send up a complete record of the 
proceedings in the cause so that these certain alleged errors may be reviewed - particularly and 
especial I) the Original documents, such as the Sheriff-prepared Impound Tow Receipt, and 
other ielated evidence attached to the pleadings which went to Judge Toomey* in order that their 
authenticity could be more easily determined. M\ pre\ iouslj-filed REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 
asked only for a transcript ol the testimony at the Court Hearing held before Judge Toomey on 
March 2nV09. 
Having already filed with Third District Court the May l5t, prison-prepared MOTION AND 
AFFIDA\ IT FOR W A I \ ER OF COURT FEES, and AFFIDAVIT OF iMPECUNiosm by Inmate Funds 
Accounting staff, I pray for this Court of Appeals to permit myself, as the Petitioner and 
Appellant, and because I remain indigent, to PLEASE allow me to proceed without prepayment 
of costs, fees, or other assessments (including transcripts of records of proceedings which are 
relevant to this cause of action.) until such time as these issues have been fully adjudicated on 
appeal Thank Yon! 
INTRODUCTION 
A concise suiopsis of my main Issues for Review that I bring before \ou with this 
appeal are these: 
A.) The lower Court erred in failing to consider, as "untimely" my Defendant's 
REFL\ MEMORANDUM; [This Opposing Response and Reply Memorandum of mine was 
actually mailed to the lower Court on December 4th, *08 not on January 5lh. *09, and as Judge 
Toomey as mistakenly declared.] 
B.) Inadequate legal resources and assistance of counsel for defense: Forced to 
defend mj self PRO SE while incarcerated, I was held to impossible, unrealistic, and 
unreasonable standards when holding this case in suspension until my release from prison 
would have been more fair; 
C.) Pivotal and key Evidence has apparently been ignored, (including signed and 
notarized affidavits, and two poJice-geiienilfd doismieuK* r./..*ardin»i *he w-Ur. 'l •:-"-. 
condition of my car at issue; 
D.} Plaintiff victimized me, their customer, by breaching the "spirit" of our 
Contract, as well as the letter of this car loan Contract at issue; My car never should have 
been repossessed in the first place; 
and.!:.» After repossession, Plaintiff failed So mitigate their alleged damages when 
they sold my MUMJO.OO Keih Blue Kouk valued car to e sahajiv yard for onh ^JJUlXC 
The factual circumstances of my ease will nn\\ follow. suaed in the; terms and eonteM of 
these primary Appeal issues. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff jne! i entered into a Loan contract for purcnuse >i a ~eewe :via^uoi^ii; t.cupse in 
which $12,829.°° was the total amount financed, (zero down payment.) and the car itself serving 
as collateral asset security. Then for over two years, I made all of my car loan payments on time, 
like clockwork, while simultaneously living up to all other of my obligations implicit to this 
Contract. For example, when once Plaintiff requested, that I re-write my auto insurance policy to 
beuer prolcct 'hem with*' lesw deducirk, > promptly complied in changing my insurance 
policy 10 the higher-priced premiums in order to also meet these lender expectations. 
Then, I was arrested on December 3, '07, and my car was impounded by the arresting 
S.L. County Sheriff deputy who had pulled me over while driving my car; Notice of this was 
sent to Jordan Credit Union, (the Plaintiff,) natural!} enough, because the} were the iien holder 
in this automobile registered iu me. Ana, it p: unclear vdi\ the} (Plaintiff) reacted as ihe} T.d in 
the sequence of choices that followed. It would appear that the\ panicked. Kit their stated 
reasoning (which appear to be more like :iftcr-the-facl excuses and pretext to me.) n- that by this 
fact alone - my car's temporary storage at an inipounci lot - they had the right, "on the good faith 
belief" that suddenly I would be unable to meet my obligations to them, to repossess my car, 
which they hastily did, 7 days later, reporting this fact, (it: a siimk uneertiivcL plain envelope 
letter v^>u:k f^ - rv^neeMx ma;ie f
 t- nh mother^ h >use where: a went unread. \\< reason i > 
suspect dire urgency needing prompt action,) as a "done deaf5 and an accomplished fact, with the 
entire balance of the loan now7 suddenly accelerated and due immediately. Incredibly, this one 
feeble attempt at communication with me, and which I never even saw until, out of jail in 
January, (roughly six. weeks later, and please consider I might just as well, as easily, have been 
out of town on. extended holiday vacation,) "was their only attempt.,, ever, at any kind of notice at 
all regarding an impending sale of my car and even though the State's Notice of Impound itself 
suggested I was in jail They might easily enough done much more to ensure that such a 
momentous letter was actually received by the party to whom it was intended. For example, they 
certainly could have contacted my mother's bank: for over 2 years every single one of my on-
time, like clockwork, monthly car loan payment.1-- pmi to .-nrdan Credit Union had been paid 
direct from the bank to them. Neither did they ever pick up the telephone to call either of the 
two 'Suniville' listings found in the Salt Lake City directory. 
The end result was that upon my release from jail in January - and myself fully prepared 
to retrieve my car from die impound lot where it was being safely stored, fully prepared to v^y 
out-of-pocket the towing and storage fees incurred at the tow/impound UA xvac •^•J-
dismayed and shocked to learn, that not only had this Plaintiff repossessed in) car KV 
unwarranted, and specious reasons, then they had, with cavalier and capricious, completely 
improvident and reckless incompetence, sold this $9,000.°° Kelly Blue Book-valued, (and very 
much prized) sports car of mine for only $200.00 to a salvage yard! Up until then, ray car's true 
and actual resell value had been keeping pace "very nearly with the outstanding car loan balance 
(approximately $8800.°° owed to them at: this time.) This lawsuit that I am herein appealing is 
their subsequent attempt to paint this ludicrous transaction as a fair, responsible and reasonable 
one, with myself left, liable to continue paying for a car I no longer have since they took it away 
from me for no good or justifiable reason, and then proceeded to flush all. but $200.°° of the 
$9,000.u0 collateral asset value down the drain. 
Harry K Sevi l le . Jr. PROS!: 
5/30/09 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All of my Issues for Review and presented by this Appeal can readily be discerned from 
the record of briefs and pleadings previously filed in this case. My appeal basically seeks a 
simple review of all that went before - but with thorough and conscientious, fair and unbiased, 
consideration of this record's evidence. 
What follows here is a statement of facts material to the consideration of the questions I 
have presented by my 5 separate, primary Appeal Issues. Specifically, I believe 
1. The lower Court erred in failing to consider as "untimely" my Defendant's 
REPLY MEMORANDUM. 
Judge Toomcy's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, dated April 6,2009, (received 
by me at evening mail call 4/10/09,) and that I am appealing states, UURCP requires Opposition 
to a motion to be filed within ten days of service of the motion. Mr. Suniville filed his objection 
on January 5, 2009, over six weeks from the date JCU filed its motion. Mr. Suniville's 
opposition is untimely/5 
However, Judge Toomey is clearly wrong in this assessment because my Motion that she 
is referring to, MEMORANDUM AND REPLY (SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS, 
AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT,) AND, As AN OPPOSING 
RESPONSE IO PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT , . . henceforth referred to as my 
Defendant MEMORANDUM AND REPLY; was mailed to her Court on December 4th. 2008 - not 
January 5,2009. as she states. My Defendant MEMORANDUM AND REPLY was an Opposing 
Response and Reply to PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND PLAINTIFF 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS (which two filings also 
included an additional "AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE ROGERS," and "DECLARATION OF KEN 
MARTINEZ." [ received all of these documents at my evening mail call on Tuesday night, 
November 25th. 
f very well know that my Defendant MEMORANDUM AND REPLY was timely filed 
because this required me to work on my Opposing Response and Reply all through the 
"ihanksghing Holiday until ] was finally able to put in into the prison's outgoing mail box on the 
Thursday night of December 4th, breathing a sigh of relief at the time that J was thereby safely 
within the parameters of an accelerated 10-day window of response time prescribed for me to file 
mv reply to a MOTION I OR SUMM \RY JUDGMENT, and which had also required me to seek out 
special fa\ors and accommodations from prison staff when I stretched and scrambled to meet 
this hard deadline from the very difficult circumstances of a prison incarceration. 
Proof of these facts can readily be seen from elsewhere m the lecord, if not from 
elsewhere within Judge Foomcy's own records in the matter. Please note that Plaintiffs 
REQUEST IOSUBMII K>R DECISION: PLAINTIFFS MOIIONM>R SUMMARY JUDGMPNI, and which 
was dated December 18th, acknowledged my Memorandum in Opposition as having already been 
filed (mistakenly they credited mine as 11/25/08, not 12/4'085 and they also filed with the trial 
court a Plaintiff REPLY AND OBJECTION, along with a 2nd Affidavit from Michelle Rogers, on 
December 16. 2009. In Michelle Rogers* 2nd Affidavit she recants her testimony from the first 
such "affidavit" of hers with regards to the date alleged to be the actual sale date in which she 
sold m} $9,000.°° Kelly Blue Book-valued cai for only S200.00 to a salvage yard - and this 
"Oops. Sorry" correction of hets was obviously made to address particular and specific questions 
that my own Defendant MtMORANDUM ANDREPL^ had raised in the very same Brief that Judge 
Toomey mistakenly asserts was not filed until January 5th- 2009. Moreo\ei\ these same Plaintiff 
REFL^  \ \ D OBJLCI ION filings that are dated December 16th, 20(R urge the original 3rd District 
trial court to please disregard all but 5 pages of my arguments (for lack of brevity,) that Judge 
Toomey has claimed was not recen ed until January 5th into the next year, and hence "untimely" 
filed. 
As a more careful scrutiny of the records in this case will clearly show. 1 expressed strong 
objection to this Plaintiff REPLY AND OBJECTION - which urged the Judge not to read oi consider 
any but 5 pages of im arguments and Jwidence, for lack of brevity - and for good reasons, too. 
which I explained to the Court in a supplementary rebuttal argument J titled DEFENDANT 
OBJLCIs io PLAIN ni r \ OBILCIION, (and which, interestingly >iat filed on January 5, 2009.) 
\ careful reading of these pleadings, back and forth between Plaintiff and I in 
chronological order of their filing, should be all that is required for die honorable Utah State 
Court of Appeals to see the rightness of my claims and issues upon appeal and also that Judge 
loomcy *s lower trial court has obviously failed to consider all of the evidence in this case of 
mine and that will upon your close examination of these records and evidence in the matter, 
probahh lead you to an opposite conclusion. Given the lower court's error just described, 
evidently a careful reading in the matter has yet to occur in this case, 
2. Inadequate legal resources and assistance of counsel for my defense: Forced to 
defend myself PRO SE while incarcerated, I was held to impossible, unrealistic, and 
unreasonable standards, when holding this case in suspension until my release from prison 
would have been more fair. 
Judge Toomey's ruling that I bring to you on Appeal stales, among still other errors, that 
my arguments in defense 'lack proper titles, form and content, both procedural and substantive"; 
and that they are '"hearsay, unsubstantiated opinions and irrelevancies"; or '"not in proper form, 
not adequately supported." Yet, please consider: several times throughout the course of these 
proceedings 1 have complained of my lack of legal assistance or adequate legal resources needed 
to guide me in my own defense. The prison has done away with a law library, and all other legal 
research resources, in lieu of assistance by ''Contract'* attorneys, but their contract covers onh 
criminal law and this translates into a hard reality that they will not so much as answer a simple 
question when it comes to a lawsuit such as this one brought against me. Twice I asked the 
lower court to address the lack, but her subsequent ruling states that I was not entitled to Court-
appointed legal representation, nor pro bono assistance referral, either. When I asked her at the 
March 2nd Hearing about a postponement of these proceedings until such time - after m\ March 
23. 2010. release from prison, which release would then allow me to seek out the legal advice, 
resources, and representation I so sorely need. Judge Toomcy answered that m\ request to hold 
the Court proceedings in suspension, pending my release from prison, "came too late; was not 
requested until sometime after the scheduling of the Court Hearing I was then attending." 
However, here again she was in error, because my previously-filed MOTION FOR COURT-
APPOINTED COUNSEL, AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT REQUEST FOR RULING suggests "hold 
these proceedings in suspension," written in big, bold ink for emphasis on the last page; and, 
because it was mailed to the Court on December 28th, it pre-dates by more that a week the 
Court's NoncbOh COURT-SCHEDULED HEARING. 
I assure this higher Court that no one is more acutely aware than 1 am of my awkward 
and stumbling pro se ignorance of the law, and its protocols and language. The old adage that 
* anybody choosing to act as his own attorney has a fool for a client* could not be more true as it 
applies to mc, 1 know. And yet, I have not deliberately chosen to defend myself in this lawsuit. 
Rather, it has been thrust upon me, incredibh' enough while I find myself in prison and otherwise 
unable to mount a defense oi'any kind, (except by the light of my own ignorance,) against these 
bogus and unwarranted claims brought against me on this \ery uneven playing field. Hence, at 
the Healing of March 2nd itself, I found myself shackled hand and foot, unable even to refer to 
my notes that were wrapped up in a plastic bag beside me from where they had been placed by 
the two unsympathetic armed prison guards transporting me to the hearing, and where they 
remained, for all practical purposes, inaccessible to my hands that were bound behind m> back. 
Naturally enough, I was hesitant to argue too vehemently under those conditions the issue 
which came first: my request for a suspension, or Judge Toomey's scheduling of the Hearing that 
she claimed made suspension, postponement problematic - did not wish to make the Judge mad 
at me because common sense seemed to suggest my interests would be better sen ed b> a 
deferential attitude, no matter the seeming rush to judgment at the hands of a greedy Plaintiff and 
their high-priced.'fancy pants' lawyers on this very unfair, and uneven playing field. Given the 
trial Court's stated objections to "proper titles, form and content, and other procedural errors"; 
4
*not in proper form/* and "not adequately supported/* it would appear ] ha\e been held to 
unreasonable standards, and unrealistic expectations, given my very handicapped conditions of 
confinement and total lack of access to legal resources of any kind, including adequate legal 
ad\ ice and representation. 
3. Pivotal and key Evidence has apparently been ignored, (including signed and 
notarized affidavits, and two police-generated documents,) regarding the actual, true 
condition of my car at issue: 
Consequently, 1 now ask this honorable Utah Court of Appeals to review this case in light 
of all the contrary evidence on my side of these issues and that seem to ha\c been up until now 
ignored. At the March 2nd Hearing I heard Judge Toomey assure the Plaintiffs attorney that she 
would not be considering the evidence I presented to her which was a signed and notarized 
affidavit from the wife, business partner'owner, and office manager of Mirror Image Auto Body 
and Paint: which is an automotive body shop personally familiar with my car's real, true and 
actual condition of repair - and an Affidavit that clearly contradicted Plaintiffs assessment of 
same. When I asked Judge Toomey at Hearing why this would be so, she said my Affidavit "had 
problems" (unspecified,) and I did not dare then press her on the issue because, here again, I was 
afraid to make her mad at me at that critical juncture in my case. 
And yet. given this judge's characterizations in this MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
that is here brought to you on appeal, that I haven't '^demonstrated a genuine issue of material 
fact," but only "hearsay, unsubstantiated opinions and irrelevanciesr then Evidence overlooked 
because "untimely" (when it really wasn't "untimely", at all) or otherwise ignored, is surely 
critical to this case at issue. In fact, this is the nuts and bolts, and the very heart itself, of my 
appeal.,. 
§ Rule 402 regarding Rules of Evidence - Utah Code Annotated*, as you no doubt know, 
says "All relevant evidence is admissible" and "relevant" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the decision of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" .. . and appreciable probative 
value would be anything rationally tending to persuade people of the probability or possibility of 
some alleged fact... (* Please see Determinative Law, attached) 
The real, true and actual condition and state of repair of my car is key and pivotal to this 
case. Ever since this case began, I have contended that Plaintiff utterly failed to mitigate these 
collateral asset deficiency damages that they allege. Plaintiff, on the other hand, would have you 
believe that my car was in terrible condition when they so arbitrarily and capriciously decided 
(for no justifiable reason whatsoever, none that stands up to scrutiny,) to repossess this car of 
mine while 1 was in jail, and the car temporarily stored at the impound lot that it had been towed 
to at the time of my arrest. They have alleged egregiously exaggerated damages, and then 
further allege that the car would not start in order for them to advance their ridiculous notion 
(and after-the-fact excuses, more like,) that it was an entirely reasonable and prudent business 
decision for them to sell my $9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car - a car that was deemed 
sufficient security collateral for a 'zero down payment" car loan that started out at $12,829.°° 
total amount financed (after fees and sales tax were added on) - and a car loan, I might hasten to 
add, that was for the next 25 months paid down by 25 monthly auto loan payments, each and 
every one of them made reliably on time, like clockwork, by my mother's bank. In other words, 
my car's resell value was keeping pace with the loan's outstanding balance, and if Plaintiff 
Jordan Credit Union had only treated my much-prized sports car with the respect it deserved, had 
they only not squandered my/their collateral asset value after it was back in their hands (owing 
to their needless and hasty decision to repossess.) then there would be no collateral asset 
deficienc} damages for us to argue about today. 
Sadly. however, they not only chose to repossess my car for bogus and unwarranted 
reasons, saying that the) suddenly had "good faith belief that he [I] would be unable to make the 
required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the 
Collateral" -then, incredibly they chose to sell m> $9,000°° Kelly Blue Book-valued 2003 
Mitsubishi Eclipse to a salvage yard for only $200.001 
So. since obviously the true and actual condition of my car is of such critical importance 
to this case, I pray that this Court will take into serious consideration the fact that Plaintiff-
having chosen to repossess my car by tow truck from off the impound lot where it was at that 
time being held for me never had a working computer-chip coded ignition key that would have 
been necessarily required to start my car that they now are claiming was "not operable*' and 
"wouldn't start," In fact, these keys cost in excess of $125.00 to be duplicated by a locksmith 
because these kc} codes must come direct from Mitsubishi Motors, and the only such key that 1 
had went to jail in my pocket with me. Neither this Plaintiff nor am one else connected to them, 
has yet declared the cost of key duplication expense. Additionally, please consider that though 
an uo-coded key will open the doors of my car. only the coded-ignition keys will start the car and 
keep it running; without such a key, the engine turns over and then quickly sputters off But, 
regardless what one ultimately comes to believe regarding whether or not Plaintiff ever 
possessed a working key. it is curious, also, that Plaintiffs "mechanic" reports the odometer 
mileage ol my car when he had it as 40 miles more than the odometer mileage reported by the 
S.L. Count) Sheriff deputy when he put it on the tow truck. This begs the question: was my 
''inoperable" and "'would not start" cai driven 40 miles aftci Plaintiff repossessed it from off the 
impound lot or is this discrepancy just another typically characteristic and sloppy. "Oops, 
Sorry,'" mistake by a "mechanic" pricing auto body replacement parts which are not e\cn 
missing, and when he can't e\ en correctly name the model year of the car for which his repairs 
are being estimated? 
Moreover, as soon as I was out of jail and trying to re-negotiate, buy back my car from 
the salvage yard owner who purchased it for the bargain-basement, 'fire sale' price of 200.00, 
(also trying to locate all of my valuable property from inside the car: clothing, CDs, tools, etc.. 
all of it by then lost or stolen,) he understandabl) enough refused to reverse his lucky-buy 
windfall with a re-sell back to me for anything less that its actual Kellj Blue Book value... but 
he M>as asking me for a working, coded-ignition key - which he said he did not have! 
Additionally, another '"factual contention likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery" (Please see Determinative Law, 
attached.) is the fact that m> car had just barely passed all the required safety and emissions 
certifications required by the Utah State Depl. of Motor Vehicles in order for them to have just 
barely renewed this car's licensing and registration at end of October - only one month prior to 
the ear's impound on Dec. 3, "07. This, loo. is another fact easily confirmed and verified by 
outside sources - in this case by State DMV. records. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, relies upon a signed "Declaration^ from a so-called 
'"mechanic.'" Ken Martinez, (whose "estimate" for mostl} imaginary repairs doesn't even start 
out with the car's model year right.) to advance their bogus and disingenuous allegations 
regarding my car's condition, but a close examination of this fcdeclaration' will show it to be 
riddled with holes, and conflicted with itself as well as with the plain truth in the matter of my 
car's condition. (Please read my Defendant MEMORANDUM AND REPLY for a more detailed 
analysis of this ludicrous 'declaration*, particularly (a) § #4, #6, #79 #85 #9, #13). 
But also, perhaps most important!} of all Please note that his greatly exaggerated claims 
regarding my car's condition are directh contradicted by the police report document which 
clearly proves the car to be running just fine when the arresting officer pulled me over for 
allegedly "driving erratically'* on the c\cning of December 3rd, '07. Then, when he decided to 
impound my car. this same Salt Lake County Sheriff deputy assisted in preparing a tow receipt 
record that itemized all pre-existing damages to my car as it was put on the tow track to be 
driven to the impound lot. This towing receipt and itemization clearl) shows Ken Martinez, the 
Plaintiff'"mechanic" to be lying about "extensive body damage," the same as the "would not 
start or run" part of his testimony. 
Moreover, now please note that the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint Affidavit which 
Judge Toome) v cozies up to' Plaintiffs Attorney about, assuring them in open Court at the 
March 2nd Court Hearing that she's intending to ignore this evidence of mine," shows more of 
the same thing: that is - bearing in mind that apparently, when deciding the merits of a motion 
for summary judgment, the "Court shall draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable 
to the non~mo\ing party/4 fie. me,) - 3 f three) critical pieces to this puzzle, all of them evidence 
that plainly shows Plaintiff to be lying about the true and actual condition of my car, fthc signed 
and notarized copy of the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint Affida\it, the Adult Probation and 
Parole Post-Sentence ln\ estigative report prepared by them for the Utah State Board of Pardons, 
and taken from the arresting Sheriffs deputy police report, and then, finally, the subsequent 
itemization of pre-existing damages to my car as it was put onto the tow truck,) have all \ery 
clearly been ignored in order to arrh e at the fault}7 conclusion characterized as "Mr. Simiville 
has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact.*' My Affida\ it from Mirror Image Auto 
Body and Paint is an affidavit of automobile expertise from people personally familiar with my 
car's real and actual condition of repair, providing signature foundation to the formal estimate 
for repair of the pending, minor body shop work needed to restore my car to an impeccable, 
"show room' -quality condition of maintenance and repair. Their affidavit substantiates the 
Exhibit C formal estimate of repairs, ($51 L°°, only, required to fix my car, which Estimate, 
obtained in October, was just prior to my car's December 3ld Impound,) that was first submitted 
to the lower Court m my MOTION TO DISMISS on November 4th. *08; and, given its significance 
to disputed material and substantive facts at the heart of this case in dispute, this Affidavit should 
not has e been casually dismissed by the lower Court. 
4* Plaintiff victimized me, their customer, by breaching the "spirit" of our 
Contract, and express lender obligations by the 'letter of this auto loan Contract at issue, 
also; My car never should have been repossessed in the first place* 
I always took good care ol my car, and complete service records, (unavailable to me here, 
in prison,) would further pio\c this to be so Accordingly. I believe that I was entitled to 
expectations of reasonable and responsible courtesy, and respect for my inherent and legitimate, 
vested property rights: to be treated in harmony with customary, accepted and established 
standaids of normal business lender bcha\ior. and in accordance with this Lender's own implicit 
obligations to our '2-way street5 Contract. 
Instead, these facts alone, (most of them self-described by Plaintiff themselves.) tell a tale 
of shabb}' mistreatment, and arrogant victimization of their up-until-then completely trouble-free 
and faultless, reliably on time with every single auto loan payment -kind of customer. Plaintiff 
has self-characterized their own hasty, and improvidently reckless decisions the 'less 
burdensome" route; like their after-the-fact excuses and pretext couched in terms Q[U good faith 
belief" theii \emaeular speaks more eloquently of an evident attitude more like "'we can do 
an} thing wc want to do." including run rough-shod over my legitimate rights, and reasonable 
expectations, with arrogant and cavalier disregard for ail of my interests in the matter. On closet 
examination, "good faith belief* and "not in possession" can be seen for what they are: specious, 
and hugely presumptive, reasoning and pretext. 
Sadly for me. I last sav\ my car atop the tow truck engaged to take it to the impound yard. 
This is standaicl practice when one is placed under arrest because of liability issues incurred by 
leaving a vehicle parked on private property, or on a public street Yet, never in my experience 
before had this circumstance been a problem to me: it never had, for one thing, prompted 
repossession; lathei. I simply had to paj for the tow and daily storage fees accrued to the tow 
truck impound yard. And. of course, in all the previous times this car had been impounded, they 
- meaning the arresting officer alongside the tow truck driver - make a careful inventory of all 
pre-existing damages to the vehicle, lest the owner be able to come back at them dishonestly 
blaming liability for damages already there before the low. I'm guessing Plaintiff didn't expect 
me to be able to produce such a significant evidentiary proof of their disingenuous exaggerations 
from my handicapped conditions of incarceration when they submitted their "Declaration of Ken 
Martinez" into the record. Nowhere on this tow receipt prepared by Salt Count) Sheriff Deputy 
is there any mention of broken headlights. (Ken Martinez* testimony stated two. ^$265.00 each 
for replacement costs.) broken tai[lights, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids. etc.. all of 
which "auto mechanic" Ken Martinez has fraudulently declared in Plaintiffs subsequent 
arguments. And. while it's surprising foi the lower Court to have seemingly ignored this critical 
and highly significant evidence of mine, we should here remember that the ORIGINAL cop\ of 
this tow receipt and suhstanti\ e, material document was my Exhibit A attached to Defendant's 
MEMORANDA n\i AIND REPLY the \ ery same as Judge Toomey mistakenly characterized 
"untimely filed/* Additional!}7, please consider that were my "non-starting inoperable" car really 
being driven with broken headlights and broken tail lights, then most likely these would ha\e 
appeared on the Sheriff deputy's citation (the same one as started out with "driving enatically^ 
allegations to prompt me being pulled o\ er in the first place,) as equipment/safety violations (in 
the same manner as he did write me up for "failuic to install an ignition interlock device on my 
\ ehicle," and which, for the record. 1 never ha\ e been required to have installed on any vehicle 
of mine,) I would urge this honorable Court to additionally please consider the 'Big Picture' 
here at stake, and the precedent being set if a Lender like this Plaintiff were encouraged to just 
'iess burdcnsomely" run rough-shod over the rights and vested property interests of other 
customers who might choose to finance their purchase of a car. Personal I), 1 feci like m> car 
was "stolen'" from mc. and [ feci like this is understandable when it's your own prized sports car 
and investment property taken away from you for no justifiable reason, and without even the 
barest, minimal courtesy of communication. Please consider how you would feel, personally, to 
be so shabbily mistreated b) a consumer credit lender! 
I previously posed the rhetorical question, "were they acting like prudent and responsible 
business people when they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand." Plaintiff argued 
back, k*lt didn't matter; they don't have to'* which seems to me like implicit admission they were 
not, on the seeming assumption that 1 could be made to pay under the terms of the contract no 
matter how7 irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary, capricious and incompetent their own actions in 
regards to it. Right up until the day Plaintiff decided to repossess my car I had been a good 
completel} trouble-free kind of customer who had always and reliably made his car payments 
exactly on time. Then, without so much as a courtesy phone call this Plaintiff suddenly wants to 
willy-nilly declare the loan Contract null and void, car already repossessed when their one feeble 
and ineffectual letter goes out advising me of this, all because they suddenly had a "good faith 
belief* that I would be unable to continue meeting my obligations to them? That being the case, 
evidently "good faith belief with them is an oxymoron with a meaning closer to something like 
4\\c can do anything wc want to do, regardless how disrespectful or arbitrary, malicious e\cn" 
and if 1 ever hear these words from Plaintiff again. Il l immediately be holding on to my wallet! 
And that, in mv humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious "Breach of Contract" by 
Plaintiff, to be herein considered. 
Judge Toomey \s ruling states that Plaintiffs inadequate notice to me regarding the sale 
of my car was "harmless" error but so was the precedent fact of the car's impound, and 
temporary storage at a tow lot, a similarly "harmless" circumstance initially
 ? even though the 
hasty, (malicious, even) over-reaction by Plaintiff set into motion this whole fiasco that followed 
in the wake of that initially harmless circumstance. 
It is my contention here that 'what is good for the goose is. or should be. good for the 
ganclei/ and if being temporarily and harmlessly "not in possession" can become grounds for 
Plaintiff to arbitrarily repossess my car and accelerate the entire outstanding loan balance to due 
immediately, all at once... if they can capriciously and arbitrarily ignore the well-understood, 
common sense reality thai car maintenance is by its very nature an ongoing "work in progress* 
proposition . . . if they can wilh-nill\ declare "not in possession'* to be a cause for repossession 
despite the fact that many cars financed may, at one time or another, be driven out of state, 
driven by insured dri\ ers other than the debtor to the auto loan contract, or left in the possession 
of auto repair businesses for the purposes of that car's ongoing, and continually evolving, 
maintenance and upkeep, . . then surely, at their instigation of this entire fiasco, and their 
subsequent utter and miserable failure to 'mitigate their own, self-inflicted collateral asset 
deficiency damages \ then surely they, themselves, must be held to the same standards with this 
one. only, misaddressed and feeble attempt at communication with me. As I have pointed out 
previously: even a car loan customer delinquent in his auto loan payments would have received 
more diligent Plaintiff communication, more 'Notice' than was sent to me. Moreover, this very 
same Utah Court of Appeals has previously held the requirement of an adequate notice [to me] 
before disposing of my'our security collateral at sale to be absolutely vital, (prescribed by law,) 
and Plaintiffs Notice failed even to meet the standards of time frame window prescribed by the 
Loan Contract itself. Given all that has followed, their inadequate notice was very far removed 
from ''merely" harmless, particularly so since nit-picky and willy-nill) application of small print 
provisions from this \ er> same Contract have been used against me as a pretext to tr\ and justify 
the impetuous repossession that set into motion all that followed. Doesn't it seem the paramount 
importance of such a letter as this one in question might have merited an envelope marked 
"Urgent - Reply at Once 1 and/or for the mailing of it. (and for only a couple dollars more 
expense,) that it come to me "Certified Mail - Return Receipt Requested " ? so that the lender 
could better ensure that his obligations of communication not go unnoticed, and also so that, 
should the required recipient of it. perchance, be temporarily unavailable to receive such an 
important Notice, then sender would know of it? I think that "Notice" in mv case fell far short of 
its mark, and c\ en fell short the provisions of Contract, as well as Law, itself.., For that matter. 
I believe I might even ha\e been entitled to the simple courtesv of a phone call before they 
initiated repossession (or. at least, a courtesy call to the bank that had reliahh made each and 
every one of some 26 monthly car payments up until that time!)... Too, I believe it is a pretty 
telling and illustrative fact of their incompetence generally, and at every subsequent step along 
the way, that their only attempt at communication also advised me that my property from inside 
the car was in jeopardy by 12/02, instead of 12/20/07. 
And finally, 
5- Plaintiff failed to mitigate their alleged damages when they sold my $9,G00.00 
Kelly Blue Book-valued car at a salvage yard for only $200.°°. 
At this point a very critical and material fact in deciding this issue pivots upon your 
assessment of my car's condition at the time of repossession. Even if one were inclined to accept 
those preceding and obvious exaggerations ad^ anced by this Plaintiff regarding the true and 
actual condition of my car - exaggerations placed into genuine and material dispute by the 
contradictory Evidence I submitted - still, the arithmetic advanced by Plaintiff when they 
Motioned for Summary Judgment is transparently false because it just doesn't add up. 
Their stated and inflated, exaggerated, cost of repair, ("well in excess of $3,000.°° to 
fix,") are further misrepresented when it is applied to dated and after-the-fact automobile 
valuations that are more than a year or two newer - hence a year or two lesser valued- than the 
"blue book" valuations that were in place when my car was actually sold! Of course, they chose 
the newer book valuations for illustrative arithmetic to better make it superficially appear the 
sale of my S9.000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car for a mere $200.00 seem speciously 
"reasonable" and responsible. (Please see # 2 5 , #26 @ my Defendant MEMORANDUM AND 
REPLY,) 
CONCLUSION 
M\ car was not sold for a fair price, and all notice, all attempts to communicate with me 
(there was one, onh) were weak, feeble and ineffectual. An auto loan customer delinquent in his 
loan payments would have received far more honest attempts at Notice and communication than 
did I with this one, single, mis-addressed letter reporting, after-the-fact, the unwarranted 
repossession of my car as an accomplished fact, already done. 
Then the fact it was clearly sold for a pittance of its real true and actual value has further 
exacerbated the injury that "less burdcnsomely" victimized me when this highly-prized sports car 
of mine was repossessed for no justifiable reason whatsoever, (only "good faith" presumptions 
and pretext,) after over 2 years of timely car payments that represented an investment of time and 
money - hence vested property rights and interests, also. All of these were run over with rough-
shod arrogance by an impetuous, recklessly improvident and incompetent auto loan lender, and 
for them to now pursue me for additional monies after having flushed all of mine/our collateral 
asset \alue down a drain is outrageous. 
When it is said that upon their receiving no bids at auction, they then "had no choice but 
to cut their losses by selling to a salvage yard " (for $200.°°.) isn't this just a little contrived an 
answer, not to mention a rash, hast) and improvident decision, beside the fact that not even then 
did they attempt (for what would have been only a second attempt,) to contact me to explore the 
possibility that it could be sold back to me for multiple monthly auto loan payments of $226.°° 
each??? Moreover, selling my car at auction not only subjugates its inherent resell value to 
wholesale, the auction markets needn't necessarily be relegated to a once-only, one-time, then 
give up -kind of attempt. Of course, this might have been slightly more rather than "less 
burdensome" an alternative - but it seems obvious to me. at least, that this Plaintiff ought to at 
least have tried, for merely a second time, to contact me and inform me what was going on with 
my car and before these reckless and hasty, rush-to-desperation decisions had progressed past the 
point of no return and rectification; it would certainly have sa\ ed us all a whole lot of trouble 
afterwards. Too. I also think that it is a very telling fact beside these questions, to also consider 
that by the time Plaintiff had actually sold my $9,000.°" car for only $200.°", they had by then 
continued to recehe. and pocketed, two of my $226.°° month!) car loan payments! These 
payments (for Dec. '07, and Jan. *Q8) continued to be paid to them automatically by my mother's 
bank - because the bank, same as k remained in the dark all this time owing to this Plaintiffs 
inadequate notice.) 
So. finally, I would here and last of all ask that you please consider the bad precedent 
being set were I really to remain Court-ordered to continue paying for a car I no longer have 
when the circumstances of this individual case suggest such an egregious scale of incompetent 
and improvident lender mistake side~by~side with a cavalier disregard of their own obligations in 
the matter - mistakes I certainly should not be asked to pay for. Plaintiffs after-the-fact excuses 
notwithstanding, to attempt to paint these things as reasonable practices among dealers, either in 
consumer credit or automobiles, is purely ridiculous. Police-generated reports and documents, 
and other credible evidence surely casts substantial doubt upon Plaintiffs version of these events 
and ought persuade one towards a dismissal of this Plaintiffs suspect, and evidently bogus, 
disingenuous and hugely exaggerated claims brought against inc. Too, it might also cast some 
light upon why the Original Complaint's 2-only 'cause of action' allegations, (subsequently 
switched up after proven to be false,) didn't start out with alleged collateral asset deficiency 
damages at all. . . 
My 25-plus genuinely disputed, and key material facts - when not ignored, but instead 
considered in the light of supporting and credible evidence - would certainly seem to me, at 
least, to permanently retire from any further or serious consideration, their newest, revised, 
allegations, also. As [ said, a careful and thorough attention to all of the Court pleadings already 
filed in this case will likely persuade you to the same conclusion - even if all these intrinsic 
truths, and important pieces of the puzzle, have not been told by me in a fashion completely 
acceptable to this Court. At least my story has the shining virtue of being the truth - plain, and 
unvarnished truth, consistently told - and much of it easily corroborated by credible, and 
verifiable, sources upon further discovery. In one of her earlier rulings this lower trial Court 
denied my MOTION TO DISMISS for "having failed to provide a legal basis for relief" but my 
grounds for relief are pure and simple Equitable grounds, and based on a fair, and thorough 
interpretation of existing law and factual circumstance apparent upon the record. Thank You 
for these considerations! 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
I really mostly just want this case and all its aggravations to plain go away * - dismissed 
with prejudice, the same as that earlier, November 4th MOTION TO DISMISS asked for. But, to 
reiterate what [ previously asked for then, I think that car payments paid after repossession, and 
all ray property lost or stolen from my car after this same repossession (including expensive 
clothes, and tools, and CDs) should more fairly be compensated for, along with whatever cost 
and punitive damages that this Court feels appropriate to award me as reimbursement of all my 
time, trouble and aggravation in having had to defend myself against these bogus and completely 
unwarranted claims b> Plaintiff 
ADDENDUM ~~ NOTICE TO COURT 
Where does the quality of thorough lea\e off and *no longer concise begin?' Unable to 
answer that question to myself, one possible answer that occurred to me as I initially labored 
over a DOCKETING STATEMENT foi my Appeal, was to combine what 1 imagined a Docketing 
Statement's separation of issues from factual circumstances would entail, and since this no 
longer made for an exactly concise explanation of the disputed, and most important facts in the 
matter, to then call the emerging document an Appellant's Brief combined with an initial 
Docketing Statement - which is, more or less, what this document (as a summarization of all my 
arguments.) has evolved into. However, in an effort to be less taxing to your patience. I have 
repeated some of what I imagined a concise Docketing Statement would look like, with a more 
thorough explanation of my primary issues, told within the context of the essential story behind 
those issues, then called this, in its entirety, my APPELLANT'S BRIEF, even though a shorter 
version of the same was initially used as a DOCKETING STATEMENT, and already mailed to you as 
such. Now, I can only hope that no surprises develop between now and the deadline for me to 
file my Appellant's Brief, (this, which you now hold in your hands,) because the Utah State 
Prison's Con-Quest Drug Program where 1 am currentl) housed has taken away all further access 
to the computers, effective immediately upon my completion of this one. last document: and that 
is why I ha\ e attempted to effectively summarize all of my arguments for Appeal herein - out of 
a more economical use of this Court's time and eyesight straining, and now, while I still had this 
last, and limited opportunity to type these pages. ] hope this can be seen as an acceptable 
deviation from \our rules 
Similarly, along with re\ ocation of any further computer privileges at this prison facility 
where I am currently housed, the limitations imposed upon me by my confinement make it 
impossible for mc to get this document copied Ten Time (2 to the opposing attorneys,) and 
then Velio-bound with double-sided printing, as the Supreme Court's letter that I have received 
seems to indicate (Checklist for Briefs - Rules 24. 26. and 27) are required. Of course, I do not 
wish to lose this case for simple formatting protocols: and this begs the question, can this 
Appeal of mine be postponed or held in suspension long enough for me to be released from 
prison on March 23, 2010, and then resumed at a time soon after, which would allow me to 
seek out and obtain the legal advice/representation I so sorely need, along with the freedom 
and related wherewithal to more perfectly comply with this Court's expectations of me 
pursuant to Court rules and procedure? Please try to understand that I am doing the very best 
I possibly can here with the limited resources available to me, and also, that I am sorry for any 
inconvenience that this may cause you. 
If this Court's clerk can help me remedy the deficiency at a monetary cost, then tell me 
how much I owe for the extra Xerox copying, and I will pay monthly installments on these costs, 
or maybe even just try to borrow this extra expense money from my mother in order to reimburse 
the Court's cost of this all at once? . . . In any case, Thank You, also for these considerations! 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Rules of Evidence - Utah Code Annotated 
Rule 402* UA1I relevant evidence is admissible55 
"relevant" means evidence having any tendency to make the decision of any fact 
this is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable that it would be without the evidence. 
ie. Appreciable Probative Value: that is. rationally tending to persuade people of 
the probability or possibility of some alleged fact. 
Rule 20L (Judicial notice of adjudicative facts) 
"A judicially notice fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that 
it is either (1) generally known within the tenitorial jurisdiction of the trial court, 
or, 2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. '* 
Rule 803 (8) (B) Hearsay Exceptions: (ie. not excluded by the hearsay rale:) "matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a 
duty to report" 
Rule 902. (Self-authentication, Generally.) hxtrinsic c^  idence of authenticity as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following*': 
(a; 12 (A) "these records were made at or near the time of the occurrence of 
the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by a person with 
knowledge of those matters." 
Rule 11 (b) (2) "The claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law*,f 
Rule 11 (b) (3) "the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support, or if 
specifically so identified are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery." 
Mitigation of Damages doctrine: "The principle requiring a plaintiff after an injur}7 or 
breach of contract, to make reasonable efforts to 
alleviate the effects of the injury or breach." 
Note: This Notice appears at the bottom of my car loan contract in big, bold letters: ANY 
HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED 
PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF*. 
Also, Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (Appellant's Brief,) 
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for 
Appellate Case No. 20090398 (Which is an Appeal from 3rd District Civil Court, Judge Kate A. 
Toomev, Case #080903840,) 
TO: Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Appellate Clerk's Office 
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
DATED THIS Jffr day of S^P/bn^f* , 2009. 
BY: 
Harry F. SiuyVille, Jr., PRO SE 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ATTACHED AS 
EXHIBITS 
NOTICE TO TIPS COURT REGARDING EVIDENCE ALREADY SUBMITTED: 
At the very least, I'm hoping that this honorable Appeals Court will review the record of 
all the Court Pleadings, back and forth, from both sides, with a critical and discerning eye 
focused on discovering the truth - because the truth is really on my side here, no matter how 
inexpertly I might present these arguments and supporting evidence. It was a sudden and 
adamant refusal by prison staff to make 6 Xerox copies for me that then in turn required me to 
mail the Original signed and notarized Affidavit page from Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint 
Affidavit direct to Judge Toome\ - this in turn then forced me to have to ask the Third District 
Court*s Clerk to accept my $5.00 reimbursement payment to copy this page 2 times, (for the 
benefit of courtesy copies to the opposing attorneys, and back to me for file copy purposes.) 
irregular as this was to ha\e to ask them for. Similarly, if my Neu Evidence submission in late 
February somehow got separated from the corresponding signature foundations of same, this 
awkwardness in the second ADUI/I PROBATION AND PAROLE DOCUMENT (that was itself taken 
from the actual police report, to establish the fact that at the initial arrest on 12/3 07* the arrest 
which precipitated my car's impound that same night, and proving thereby, given that the traffic 
stop allegation of "'driving erratically/' this supposedly (according to Plaintiff) ";ww-
star ting/inoperable " car of mine in question here - in direct refutation, AGAIN, of Plaintiff s 
bogus and disingenuous allegations regarding this cm- of mine that they would have you believe 
it was ""inoperable and wouldn't start*'. . .then that awkwardness, too. should rightfulh be 
attributed to the limitations of a PRO SI* defense thrust upon me in the middle of a prison 
incarceration. 
Of course, it would have been less irregular to have had the 2 principals of Mirror Image 
Auto Body and Paint both sign in front of a notary public the Affidavit from this business which, 
from man and wife co-owners* Dick and Shannon Weirick, we originally intended . . . In the end, 
my Affidavit (which was prepared without benefit of telephone calls between us, only 
correspondence, my phone calls being limited) was signed and notarized at the banlv by Shannon. 
alone, who is also the office manager there, no doubt because Dick was unable to tear himself 
away from the painting booths come the time for this to be done; it already was being rushed to 
get to me before the March 2nd Court Hearing, and I would not have wanted to impose on these 
kind people that have always treated me professionally, helpfully, and fairly in more than this... 
Again, it is the limitations imposed upon me by my present incarceration that prevents me from 
more smoothly managing and presenting my evidence, but still, that shouldn't really make 
testimony from the Mirror Image wife, business partner/co-owner. and office manager of an 
automotive business that was personally familiar with the true, and actual condition of my car 
any less credible regarding the same. Please remember what relatively minor damage that was 
pending, and only partially begun at the time their formal Estimate for body work and painting 
was done, (just shortly before this Plaintiff took my car away from me,) was a fact of which they 
were personally familiar regarding the actual and true condition of my car: personally familiar 
first-hand from the perspective of automotive expertise, personally observed, since that is the 
only way a formal Estimate for pending repair work can be done... 
And also, please consider; if these circumstances make my evidence somehow less 
credible (trying to forestall here, whatever Judge Toomey's unspecified problems with it could 
be.) couldn't somebody from the Court simply pick up the phone and call these people to satisfy 
that both principles at Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, believe their collective business 
statement and testimony to be true? (Dick and Shannon Weirick, co), phone # (801) 748-4993) 
which business of automotive body shop and painting expertise know my car by personal 
familiarity, know that they already had installed the bumper support, and as the formal Estimate 
for pending repairs that was early submitted by mc shows, that the only repairs of any kind that 
my car was needing - io be restored to a mint, show-room quality of appearance - would have 
necessitated (in October, less than two months prior to Plaintiffs lies,) $51L00 total repair 
expense. 
This, like so many other things in this case of mine, could be. upon further discovery 
opportunities, completely verified, and for as little trouble as a phone call or two, perhaps made 
by your Court clerks in a research capacity? Because everything here, (and that I have ever said 
to either of the Courts,) is the plain unvarnished truth of the matter, every single one of my 
contentions could be further corroborated and verified beyond a shadow of a doubt, for this 
Court's full satisfaction. If I were not in prison at this moment I could further come up with 
photographs of my car just prior to its repossession, depositions from other people than just 
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint personally familiar with my 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse in 
question here, along with complete service records for as long as 1 owned this car. 
Plaintiff is telling greatly exaggerated lies about my car's real and true condition of repair 
when, they repossessed it, because that is the only possible way for them to now7 try to justify the 
fact that my 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse, with a Kelly Blue Book resell value at the time of some 
$9,000.00 was sold for but a fraction of its real, true value - at great negligence, and purely 
reckless incompetence, and not in any manner that can really, except superficially, be made to 
seem reasonable or responsible, instead of purely rushed and hasty, first in its initial and 
unnecessary repossession, and secondarily, even more so in the manner by which they then sold 
it to the salvage yard. The Sheriff deputy's towing receipt is a direct contradiction of such lies as 
these submitted to the Courts by Plaintiff. All of my evidence so far and just to this point, should 
clearly show that I was treated very shabbily by this Plaintiff, and anything but a complete 
dismissal in the case would be a ; green-light' message to this Plaintiff to 'just keep doing what 
you're doing, because you can always lie and exaggerate about it later.' 
Myself, personally, I Thank You, again, and sincerely, for these considerations! 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. CASE NO. O0Oq<O384O 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, 
Defendant 
On November 21, 2008, Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union ("JCU7') submitted its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Defendant Harry Suniville filed an opposition and JCU responded. 
A hearing was held March 2, 2009, and the Court took the matter under advisement. The 
motion is now ready for decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 5, 2005, Mr. Suniville signed a Retail Installment Contract and Security 
Agreement ("Contract") with JCU for the purchase of a car. Mr. Suniville borrowed 
$12,829.00 and agreed to make monthly payments, using the car as collateral. The 
Contract provided that Mr. Suniville would keep the car in his possession and in good 
condition and repair. It also provided that default would occur upon failure to perform a 
contractual obligation, or when JCU, "in good faith, believe[s] that you cannot, or will not, 
perform the obligations you have agreed to in this Contract/' The Contract provided that 
upon default JCU could accelerate the entire debt, repossess the car, and initiate legal 
action to collect the amount left owing after the car is sold, plus collection costs, attorney 
fees, court costs, towing fees, repossession costs, repairs and storage costs. 
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On December 3, 2007, JCU was notified that Mr. Suniville's car had been 
impounded. JCU deemed this a default under the Contract and repossessed the car. On 
December 11, 2007, JCU sent a letter to Mr. Suniville's address of record notifying him that 
it was repossessing the car, but that in the alternative Mr. Suniville could pay off the 
balance and impound fee by December 20, 2007 and retain the vehicle. Mr. Suniville did 
not respond within the given time period. 
JCU attempted to sell the car at auction but found no buyers. JCU's mechanic 
found that the car required about $2600.00 worth of repairs, excluding necessary engine 
work, but even then the car would likely sell for about $3500-$4000, yielding a slim, if any, 
profit. JCU opted for the less burdensome route and on January 23, 2008 sold the car to 
a junk yard for $200.00. JCU moves for summary judgment on its claims of breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment, requesting the Court to order Mr. Suniville to pay $8778.12 
in unpaid principal, plus impound fees, interest on the loan, and attorney fees and court 
costs. 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 7(c)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires an opposition to a motion to 
be filed within ten days of service of the motion. Mr. Suniville filed his objection on January 
5, 2009, over six weeks from the date JCU filed its motion. Mr. Suniville's opposition is 
untimely. The Court affords pro se litigants "'every consideration that may reasonably be 
indulged.'" Thompson v. Dep't of Corrections, 2007 UT App 97, *1 (unpublished) (quoting 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)). Nevertheless, "[a] party who 
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any 
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qualified member of the bar." In re Cannatella, 2006 UT App 89, fl 5, 132 P.3d 684 
(citation omitted). Mr. Suniville's motions and oppositions filed with this Court lack proper 
titles, form and content, both procedural and substantive. 
Even if Mr. Suniville had filed a timely opposition, his objection is substantively 
lacking. He has not demonstrated an issue of material fact as required to defeat a motion 
for summary judgment. His submissions are based upon hearsay, unsubstantiated 
opinions, and irrelevancies. Mr. Suniville argues that he never missed a car payment, so 
he has not defaulted on the contract. However, JCU based its determination of default on 
the fact that the car had been in impound for a week before JCU was notified by the 
impound lot and that JCU did not receive any response to the letter it sent Mr. Suniville. 
That Mr. Suniville had diligently paid his monthly payments for over two years is irrelevant; 
JCU reasonably concluded that Mr. Suniville had defaulted under the terms of the contract. 
Mr. Suniville argues that the $200.00 JCU recovered from the sale of the car was 
below its actual value and that JCU failed to mitigate damages. JCU complied with the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code in its reasonable attempt to sell the repossessed car. The 
statute allows a creditorto sell collateral in a "commercially reasonable manner," meaning: 
(a) in the usual manner on any recognized market; 
(b) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the 
disposition; or 
(c) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices 
among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the 
disposition. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(2). The Utah Court of Appeals held that the sale of a 
repossessed car is commercially reasonable it: ( i j the lender does not engage in self-
dealing, (2) the debtor is given notice of the sale, and (3) the lender advertises the sale and 
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gets a fair price. Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 539-42 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Here, JCU sold the car to a junk yard, so it did not engage in self-
dealing. It also gave Mr. Suniville notice by letter that it was repossessing the car and 
would sell it unless Mr. Suniville paid off his loan within a given period of time. While JCU 
gave Mr. Suniville one day less than the 10 days notice required by the Agreement, the 
error was harmless because even if the letter had given Mr. Suniville another day, Mr. 
Suniville would not have received the letter in time because it went to his mother's house 
and he was incarcerated. As the court in Chrysler Dodge found in a similar fact-situation, 
"there is no evidence that [the creditor] was injured by lack of notice." Id. at 541. Lastly, 
JCU was required to sell the car through advertising and for a fair price. Id . The Utah 
Court of Appeals held: 
It is the duty of the secured party to obtain the best possible 
price for the benefit of the debtor. However, the secured party 
does not have to use extraordinary means. . . . There is no 
requirement or prohibition that the dealer must sell at 
wholesale or retail, but only that the secured party obtains the 
best possible price under the circumstances "Of prime 
importance, are the secured party's attempts to obtain a fair 
price for the collateral by advertising the collateral or otherwise 
notifying potential buyers that the collateral is for sale." . . . 
Public advertising is not mandatory, however. 
Id. at 541 (citations omitted). JCU attempted to sell the car at auction and got no bidders. 
It could have put a considerable amount of repairs into the car, but there was no guarantee 
that it would recoup its investment. Underthe circumstances, JCU decided to cut its losses 
and get the $200.00. 
Mr. Suniville argues that there is an issue of material fact regarding whether tne car 
was in running order at the time of impoundment on December 3, 2007. He submitted an 
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unsigned affidavit from his prison caseworker, who speculates that the car must have been 
functional since Mr. Suniville was arrested while driving the car. JCU's mechanic's sworn 
declaration stated that the car was not running. His testimony is based upon personal 
knowledge, unlike the conclusory statements submitted by Mr. Suniville. 
JCU was within its rights under the Contract to find Mr. Suniville in default. A court's 
determination of commercial reasonableness is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
See Chrysler Dodge, 782 P.2d. at 541. This Court has discretion to consider whether 
JCU's sale of the car was reasonable. JCU had previously attempted to sell the car at 
auction but had no bidders. The sale of the car for $200.00 was a fair attempt to mitigate 
damages. 
ORDER 
As required for a motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Employing these standards, 
the Court determines that Mr. Suniville has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material 
fact, and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court GRANTS 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this [0 day of April, 2009. / A V " T ; X V 
Judge Kate A. Toomey -\. 
District Court Judge 
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PROSE 
ill 7265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
Harry F. Suniviile, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent NOTICE TO COURT, 
AND TO PLAINTIFF, 
vs. REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE 
Jordan Credit Union Case # 080903840 
Plaintiff 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
Comes now before this Court, Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE; and as the Defendant in 
the above-notaled action, hereby respectfully submits to this Court my NOTICE TO COURT, 
AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE, that I am hereby introducing into 
the record. 
New Evidence has recently become available to me, but it is evidence that primarily 
serves the purpose of validating and authenticating certain contentions of mine already and 
specifically stated previously by me in both of my previous answers to this Court. In fact, this 
newest Affidavit/Declaration by the owners of Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint simply 
provides some signature authentication and foundation to the document already provided by 
them - a formal estimate of needed repairs - which was attached as an "Exhibit C" to my 
November 4t!\ '08, filed MOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT. In both this initial pleading, (Answer to the 
Original Complaint,) and in my second that was tiled to this Court on December 4th, '08, entitled 
(MEMORANDUM AND REPLY SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN OPPOSING 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,) 1 have already, and always, 
attested to my car's real and true condition of repair as being quite different from Plaintiffs 
bogus and disingenuous allegations, and similarly I have always insisted and contended that my 
car was running just fine right up until my arrest on Decembei 3rd, '08, ^lilu lib t>ub&equeiii 
impound by Officers of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. 
Since both of these issues directlj and relevantly support a key fact and point of mine that 
Plaintiff recklessly, improvident!}', and utterly failed to mitigate the damages incurred to them 
(and to me, also.) by their impetuous, arbitrary and capricious decision to repossess my car right 
out from under me for no legitimate reason whatsoever, (none that stands up to close scrutiny,) 
both of these enclosed Affidavit/Declaration documents are made available for this Court's 
consideration in support of my previously stated position. And, while there has been a Hearing 
scheduled in this matter for March 2nd, '09, it is my understanding that in offering these two 
documents into evidence, it is my obligation to also make these two records ''available for 
inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a 
fair opportunity to challenge them." Accordingly, they are hereby being shared with Plaintiff, 
also. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (NOTICE TO 
COURT, AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE) was sent to the 
following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for Case 
#080903840. 
TO: Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 " 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
DATED THIS ££rtk d a y of t&frSfa'Pf1^ 
0 
2009. 
|Hap7 F. 'Sunivi 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
Exhibit B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent 
vs. 
Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff 
AFFIDAVIT / DECLARATION 
FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO 
BODY AND PAINT 
Case # 080903840 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Dick and Shannon jj/t^/R I fc _, do solemnly state as follows: 
1. I am/We are over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts 
set forth below. 
2. I am a certified mechanic (or wife and business partner) and I have worked in the 
automotive repair industry practically all my life (for ,%Q number of years). My main areas 
of professional expertise are auto body repairs and painting. 
3. I/We derive our income from a business centered around that same expertise, and we 
call our company Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint. Our business address is currently located 
at 608 W. Center Street, Midvale, UT. 84047. 
4. We are both well acquainted with Harry F. Suniville, Jr., because on several occasions 
in the past we have been asked to perform inspection, estimation, and auto body jepairs, plus 
painting services, on a succession of different Mitsubishi Eclipse automobiles owned by him, 
starting with autumn, 2003. 






 ")nm mnHpi vpar Mit^nhishi Frlinse and to nrovide a renair estimate for the work 
enough to pay for an after-market front fiberglass bumper panel, and for the painting which 
would be required to fix his front end entirely; and these repairs were put on hold and left 
pending at customer's request, until such time as he could come up with the money required to 
pay for the newest repairs (to his front fender.) At that time, it was our plan that then all of the 
needed auto body repairs could be made at once and simultaneously. This is always the better 
plan because then all required auto body painting can be flawlessly matched. 
7. At the time of this, the last estimate on record at our shop, it is my belief, and my 
strong recollection, that for the final estimate price of $511.8I, (body work parts and labor,) 
Harry's car could have been fixed up and made cosmetically (from an auto body and paint 
perspective,) "good as new" - that is, restored to a 'showroom quality' condition of repair. We 
have submitted a true and correct copy of this formal Repair Estimate, and it is attached to this 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
8. Furthermore, I know for a fact that Harry's front bumper assembly, although broken 
off in places at the bottom, needed no new front bumper support, (a $95.00 part,) because Harry 
had already paid for a new front bumper support: one which we previously had installed for him 
as a cash purchase, and because he wanted to ensure himself- while replacement of the broken 
fiberglass front bumper panel remained in limbo - that all the other extrinsic and attached parts 
of the bumper assembly, and that didn't need repair, nor replacement, as they were already "good 
as new" (that is, reflector plastic, turn signal lights, and both front headlight assemblies) could 
stay solidly affixed - without shake or rattle. In other words, his broken front bumper fiberglass 
was previously, at our shop, and by one of our mechanics, firmly tied down to a brand new, 
replacement, front bumper support. 
9. Now, I have had opportunity just recently to read a document submitted to this Court 
by Jordan Credit Union titled "Declaration of Ken Martinez" and it is my honest opinion: freely 
submitted here in consideration of "front bumper support," falsely alleged as needed, and many 
other seeming inconsistencies, also, but mostly based upon my/our own personal knowledge and 
recall - and especially submitted in the interest of simple justice - that he (this "Ken Martinez") 
is plainly lying with regards to the state of, and condition of repairs on Harry's car. 
10. For one thing, I have already stated what I know about the front bumper support. 
And I want to personally contradict the testimony of this "Ken Martinez" relative to same, 
because we know by our own shop's records, and personal knowledge, that this front bumper 
support allegedly needed had already been replaced! 
11. In truth, I/we find this "Declaration of Ken Martinez" plainly laughable and 
ludicrous, because by professional experience, nobody can accurately price anything (neither 
after-market used parts, nor new, factory/replacement parts,) without first knowing the exact 
model year of the car to which estimates are being made. Additionally, it is plain to me that this 
is a fraudulent and greatly exaggerated assessment of the true condition of Harry's car, and I/we 
base this opinion on personal knowledge of Harry's car as I/we last saw it in October '07. 
12. Accordingly, I now have had occasion to read Harry's answer to the lawsuit 
complaint to which he has subsequently been forced to defend himself. Specifically, I/we have 
now have had an opportunity to actually read parts of Harry's answer to this lawsuit, and the case 
he makes therein (called MEMORANDUM AND REPLY SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN OPPOSING RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) @ §3, §5, §6, §8, §9, § 10 on Pages 4-7, AND, 
based upon my/our personal and professional knowledge of this car in question, particularly in 
regards to this car's actual and true condition of repair - as we personally know and recall it to 
be in October '07 - we both wish to weigh in and hereby attest and testify under oath that to the 
very best of our knowledge and belief, Everything that Harry has told this Court and stated 
therein is factually true. 
13. Moreover, based upon my own professional knowledge and experience, when an 
automobile's car ignition system requires a computer chip ignition key to operate, and as Harry's 
2003 Mitsubishi required, that car will simply not start and run for more than a second or two, 
until, with a computer code supplied only by Mitsubishi Motors, a new computer chip key has 
been made to order by key-code specifications. It is an expensive proposition then to duplicate 
such a key; and locksmiths typically charge $125.00 and more to duplicate an ignition key that is 
capable of operating the car. 
14. Also, based upon my professional experience, if everything wrong with Harry's car 
were really true - all that this "Ken Martinez" has alleged - then there is not a mechanic in this 
world who would have passed the car for safety and emissions testing and certification, as I 
personally know would have been required for Harry's mandatory, by end-of-October deadline, 
in order that the current registration be renewed with new current-registration (October) stickers, 
as required by the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles. In fact, we both do actually recall 
that the expense of this was one of the reasons why our own Mirror Image body shop repairs 
were left pending and in climbo' at that time, back in October when the last formal Mirror Image 
Estimate of Repairs was deferred and postponed pending the availability of the last $500.°° or so 
required with the plan being that, then, all of the then-pending repairs required to perfectly 
restore Harry's car to a showroom quality of repairs could be made all at once, then 
simultaneously painted, all at once. Certainly, official records at the Utah State Department of 
Motor Vehicles could confirm mid verify, corroborate, the accuracy of this par', of our statement, 
regarding these October vehicle registration - and prerequisite safety and emissions testing 
certifications. 
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SAITH NAUGHT. 
EXECUTED ON Feb , /Q , 2009. 
BY 
BY 
STAfE n F T TTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this 
("0 day of _ _ J E k k , • 2009> by $Wv\4h UJciVts<U£. & 
_____ __rrrrTTirZ7_. - signer(s) of the above instrument, who duh acknowledged to me 
that he/she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires ffi - > ^ ^QO^ Notary Seal 
Dick 
nt 7 ^ 
^^ZfflgrikHk 
Declarant 
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint 
608 W. Center Street 
Midvale. UT 84047 
MIRROR IMAGE 
AUTO/BODY & PAINT 
608 W. CENTER STREET 
MIDVALE, UT 84047 
Date 
| 10/9/200* 





2003 MITSUBISHI ECLIPSE 
Description 
1 REPLACE RH FENDER 
| LABOR 
| REPAINT RH FENDER 


















 $32 81 
T o t a l $511.81 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document 
(AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO BODY AND PAINT) 
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for 
Case #080903840. 
TO: Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
DATED THIS •^Q-fa day of _ /<$fHZ\. 
Harry F. Sevi l le , Jr., PRO SE 
#172/5 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
Exhibit C 
w OH - m SENTENCE MEMORANDUM 
TO: BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE R E C E ! V E D 
FROM: ERJC BARKER, INVESTIGATING OFFICER \££ fl 3 2008 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, SALT LAKE IIGARCWF PARDONS 




THIRD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY CASE#: 071909070 
OFFENSE: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
Per the request of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the following is submitted for your 
consideration: 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendant was originally charged with: 
Count 1. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony. 
Count 2. Possession of a Controlled Substance, Third Degree Felony, 
Count 3. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 4. Ignition Interlock Violation, Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 5. Driving on a Denied License, Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 6. Improper Backing, Infraction. 
Thru plea negotiations the defendant pled to: 
Count 1. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony. 
Count 2. Dismissed. 
Count 3 Dismissed. 
Count 4. Dismissed. 
OFFICIAL VERSION: 
On December 03, 2007, Officei Barrett from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office observed the;/*,' 
defendant, Harry Suniville driving in an erratic way. Officer Barrett initiated aTxaffic stop on the \' 
vehicle the defendant was driving. Upon speaking with the defendant, Officer Barrett observed *" ~ ' 
the defendant's slurred speech and inability to complete ordered tasks., The*defendant had \ „ - * 
several warrants for his arrest and was driving a vehicle on a denied l i c e n s e ^ ^ i f e v ' , /> 
ScerBanSttsea^ 
•esiduc inside it •^ a_.we-lL -^c-:^:u:--J-1 " 
Exhibit "A" 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: 
iThere:is no; victim ih this case, 
RESTITUTION: 
SThere Tsitid restihltibh deteimm 
CUSTODY STATUS: 
Judge Atherton from the Salt Lake Third District Court sentenced Mr. Suniville to "the Utah State 
Prison on October 10, 2008, for a term of 0-5 years for case #071909070, Mr. Suniville is 
currently serving this sentence. 
CIUMINA3D HISTORY UPDATE: 





:-Salt Lake County Sheriff 
OFFENSE 
WA- Theft, Felony •* 
WA- Possession of a Controlled Substance, Felony-
WA- pUI, Felony 
•Adult Probation and Parole ' BW- Possession of Drag Paraphernalia 
DISPOSITION 
No Disposition •-• 
Justice Court'Warrant'"' 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: 
Mr. Suniville was first placed on supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole in 1983, 
after completing a diagnostic evaluation. Mr. Suniville successfully completed this probation in 
1984. After this date, Mr. Suniville acquired numerous charges and served substantial amounts . 
of time at the Utah State Prison and granted numerous opportunities to comply witlf pa i^&'MP 
Suniville's parole was revoked or terminated as an inmate case on several occasions. 
On April 21, 2008, Judge Skanchy in the Salt Lake Third District Court placed Mr. Suniville on 
36 months probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case #071902846. Mr. Suniville 
acquired case #071909070 prior to being sentenced on this case. 
Mr. Suniville failed to initiate the terms of probation set by Judge Skanchy's Court. Mr. 
Suniville has had the opportunity to complete probation as well as parole with Adult Probation 
and Parole stemming back to 1981. Several of these opportunities were terminated as an inmate 
case. 
Mr. Suniville was sentenced to probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case # 071902846. 
Due to violations of the terms of probation the defendant's probation was terminated 
unsuccessfully. 
PENDING CASES: 
According to a search of the Utah State Courts X Change System, the defendant has no pending 
cases. 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: 
Mr. Suniville has been placed on supervised probation as well as supervised parole with Adult 
Probation and Parole on numerous occasions. Mr. Suniville has displayed a history of non-
compliance with the conditions set by the courts as well as the Board of Pardons. Mr. Suniville 
has had the majority of his supervised cases terminated unsuccessfully and parole being revoked 
and terniinated as inmate cases. Adult Probation and Parole believes the defendant has a lack of 
desire to comply with these conditions and shown this inability throughout the past two decades 
of supervised probation and parole attempts. 
On the Level of Service Inventory, an internal assessment tool, used by this agency to determine 
the level of supervision and the risk to reoffend, the defendant scored in the High Risk category 
with the following areas identified as his highest areas of need and risk: 
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Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
PROSE 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent 
vs. 
Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff 
MEMORANDUM AND REPLY 
(Submitted in SUPPORT OF 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
[Original] COMPLAINT), AND AS AN 
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case # 080903840 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
Comes now before this Court, Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE, and as the Defendant in 
the above-notated action, hereby submits this MEMORANDUM AND REPLY (In support of 
my preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs [Original] Complaint,) 
AND which is also hereby respectfully submitted in Opposition Response and Reply to 
Plaintiffs OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Here it may now be required or appropriate for me to point out that my MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, (the pleading that I 
filed with this Court November 4th, '08) is not, (as Plaintiff asserts,) really a "renewed" 
MOTION TO DISMISS, insomuch as it was the only argument (besides this one you now hold 
in your hand,) so far submitted by me in answer to Plaintiff's Original Complaint - since this 
Court set aside the Default Judgment against me in its MINUTE ENTRY dated October 8th, but 
allowing, nonetheless, an open window for Plaintiff to start the proceedings anew by mailing me 
a copy of their original Complaint, which I did not have, up until its receipt by me on October 
21, the benefit of having anytime ever before then received. 
Now, Plaintiff has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with their 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in 
Opposition to Defendant's "Renewed" Motion to Dismiss [Henceforth referred to as Plaintiffs 
new Memorandum. . .] - And this is my Opposing Response and Reply to that. 
Quite frankly, I continue to be astounded at Plaintiffs impudence in continuing to pursue 
this lawsuit even after the egregious abuse and mistreatment of me as their used-to-be car loan 
customer is brought to light, and when their apology would seem, to me at least, to be the more 
deserved and appropriate response under these circumstances. 
Now replying to these newly-filed Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and In 
Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, both of which were delivered to me at 
evening mail call on Tuesday night, November 25 ,1 will follow Plaintiffs example, in order to 
avoid unnecessary duplication and in consideration of a more economical use of the Court's 
time, by requesting that these facts and arguments offered herein in reply, and in support of and 
favoring my MOTION TO DISMISS, to also appropriately be considered as my address of, and 
my Opposition Response to, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (along with its 
Supporting Memorandum). I believe these facts and arguments presented herein also, and 
accordingly - including some 25 material disputes as to genuine issue of fact - support a Court 
denial of said Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Memorandum starts off by saying my Motion "raises no new issues or presents 
any new and relevant facts to be addressed . . . Plaintiff objects to the entirety of Defendant's 
motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists of nothing more than 
baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a single piece of relevant 
and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible evidence for the 
Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be denied." (Pg. 2, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities) 
However, the Original Complaint filed against me was based entirely upon an alleged 
failure by me "to make payments when due pursuant to the t^erms of the loan agreement" {Their 
words: See #7, First Cause of Action); and in the Complaint's Second [and only other] "Cause 
of Action," (@ #14,) it is based upon the unfounded and redundant allegation that, "Defendant 
has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to them [him?] without 
compensating Plaintiff.. ." Moreover, both the supposed "Breach of Contract," and "Unjust 
Enrichment," which are the First and Second {and only) Cause(s) of Action, as named in this 
Complaint, individually and collectively pivot upon this key point: an alleged failure of me to 
make my car payments [plural payments] on time. Accordingly then, in my Defendant 
MOTION TO DISMISS, I effectively showed, supported by notarized affidavit from U.S. Bank 
Private Client Group Vice President Michael Poulter, and other evidence(s) as well, that these 
Plaintiff allegations, which were the very foundation of their Complaint against me, was a 
foundation made of sand: that their case against me must necessarily fall, and fail, once the 
foundational basis crumble and is proven to be false - which it was. 
Now, it is almost laughable for Plaintiff to go backwards and try to clean it up, to switch 
up/change the foundational allegation by now saying (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, @pg. 
9,) "Defendant failed to make the required payment" [singular payment] and "This claim is 
based on the fact that the debt was accelerated by Plaintiff following default and pursuant to the 
Agreement." 
One has to interject the question, here directed to Plaintiff, how is a notarized affidavit 
from Jordan Credit Union Collection Officer Michelle Rogers any more credible than a notarized 
statement from my mothers' bank Vice President, and why, if my Motion and evidence really 
"raises no new issues or presents any new and relevant facts to be addressed," has it required you 
to change your entire story in pursuit of these bogus claims? 
Fortunately, I have faith that this Court will give impartial and even-handed consideration 
to the true facts of this case - will throw the lawsuit out of court if such is the appropriate relief 
and remedy when one party changes their whole story mid-stream, or submits pleadings and 
argument so transparently 'squirming' and disingenuous as has this Plaintiff Jordan Credit 
Union. 
Moreover, since this case at issue also pivots upon this loan contract here at issue, I 
would hope and pray for this Court to furthermore bear in mind the intrinsic 'Big Picture' here at 
stake. That it will reinforce my faith and belief in the fairness of Courts generally, by 
considering the precedent being set if a lender like Jordan Credit Union is allowed to just run 
rough-shod over the rights and legitimate property interests of those who choose to finance their 
purchase of a car. 
Please consider how you would feel, personally, to be so shabbily mistreated by a lender; 
and how nobody in his right mind would dare to finance a car if these kinds of lender behavior 
(as characterized by the words and actions of the Plaintiff themselves,) were the norm. 
Please consider that in big bold all capital letters near the bottom of the Loan Agreement 
and Contract are the words: "NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS 
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." Also, 
that even though I am, in my stumbling and awkward pro se ignorance, at a loss to know enough 
to specifically invoke what surely must be inherent Consumer Protections written into laws and 
regulations like Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, (Article 9, and elsewhere,) and in 
the Courts' precedent interpretations of same, to be used in my defense - that doesn't make these 
claims, protections and defenses any less real or relevant to this case at hand. Finally, I would 
hope and pray this Court to pay special attention to the Plaintiffs own words in their version of 
the foregoing events, and of Plaintiff s actions that their own words describe with this central 
question always in mind: were they acting like prudent and responsible business people when 
they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand, or could their preceding actions more 
properly be regarded, (and as I would certainly characterize them,) as arbitrary, capricious, hasty 
and reckless? 
Sometimes the truth, or more of it than a dissembling person would choose to tell, will 
inadvertently slip out; I believe Plaintiffs choice of words, (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, 
[and version of events] @ Pg. 12,) "Plaintiff... in the end opted for the less burdensome route" 
is a poignant case-in-point because it is an unintended but succinct self-described summarization 
and revelation of Plaintiff s impetuous and callous disregard of me, and of my own inherent 
property rights in the car loan collateral/asset and vehicle (my car!) here at issue. They made 
absolutely zero effort at any step along the way to treat either me, or my/their collateral asset 
property, with any respect whatsoever on the assumption that I could be made to pay under the 
terms of this contract no matter how irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary and capricious, their own 
actions in regards to it. And that, in my humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious 
"Breach of Contract," by Plaintiff, to be herein considered. 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Once again, freshly stated anew, these are some of the disputed material facts in this case. 
In plain language. I strongly dispute Plaintiffs allegations regarding my car's condition. I 
believe and assert that my car was kept in reasonably good condition and repair for the 2+ years 
that I faithfully made my car payments on time to the Plaintiff. In Plaintiffs most recent 
rendition of their story, (their latest Memorandum of Points .. .) they allege it was not, and they 
attempt to partially explain their decision to repossess my car from off the impound lot where it 
was being temporarily stored as being based on this disputed allegation that it, (my car) was not 
kept in good condition. Interestingly, Plaintiff in their own latest Memorandum of Points, can be 
seen to contradict themselves: 
"At the time of the initial [only] notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues 
related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known." [Emphasis added] (See Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points... Pg. 5 @ f 12; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ 1[ 14). Remember, 
this notice of repossession mailed to my mother's house - the only notice they ever bothered to 
send anywhere, and not received by me until January 17th, the day I got out of jail - was dated 
12/11/07, and it informed me, (See Exhibit C, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers,) "On 
12/10/2007, Jordan Credit Union repossessed the 2003 Mitsubishi used as collateral on the above 
loan." 
However, these statements of theirs are contradicted elsewhere, (See Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points... Pg. 3 @ |4 ; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ f7) where they 
allege, "While the Collateral remained impounded... Plaintiff learned that the vehicle had 
extensive body damage and would not start. [Emphasis added] On the good faith belief that he 
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and 
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or 
about December 10, 2007." 
2. What's more, I dispute both parts of this allegation (extensive body damage and 
would not start) regarding my car's true condition of maintenance and repair. And, I assert that 
it can only remain an undisputed material fact - one that directly contradicts Plaintiff allegations 
- that this car was running just fine right up until the traffic stop by S.L. County Sheriffs that 
resulted in my arrest and the impound of my vehicle. This begs the question: Where does this 
falsely alleged and non-existent, so-called "engine problem" come from? 
Were I not so handicapped of resources like unlimited phone calls, or access to legal self-
help and law books that many people not presently incarcerated might tend to take for granted -
particularly were I not so pressured by time restraints in keeping to Court-filing deadlines - there 
are several relevant issues come immediately to mind as screaming for more extensive scrutiny 
by means of discovery. 
3. First, I have previously stated, in my first Defendant response to this original 
Complaint (my Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs [original] Complaint,) 
that there were some admittedly then-pending body damage repairs that needed to be made on 
my car when it was impounded. I also provided this Court an Exhibit C, therein, which was a 
previously obtained formal Estimate for all of these needed repairs, dated October 9, 2007, from 
Mirror Image Body and Paint. It is where I get all of my body damage repairs made - both 
previously on this very same car in question, and on cars that I have owned before this one -
especially my 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse that I sold when I upgraded to this newer 2003 now at 
issue. I go to them because they, (owners Dick and his wife Shannon, who over time have also 
become my friends,) do first-class, excellent showroom quality work at a fraction of the cost 
some other body shops might charge for the same amount of work. As an example, when my 
previous car, (before this one at issue, the 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse,) was "run over" by a large 
semi-truck, crushing a comer of its roof, in turn shattering the front windshield and drivers' side 
window, with extensive door and quarter panel damage, too, the first estimate for body damage 
repairs I obtained was in excess of $4400.00, the second one came in closer to $4800.00, and 
then my very expert auto mechanic (Lynn's Auto, Murray, where all my cars get very expertly 
mechanically-maintained,) recommended I take it to Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint: and 
there it was fixed for cgood as new' at a cost of only $1500.00 (approximately). We 
subsequently hung before-and-after photos of my car, and of their extremely professional repairs, 
on their office wall to advertise for future, quality-seeking customers! 
4. Now consider this Plaintiff-submitted "Declaration" of Ken Martinez whose name and 
business appear nowhere on any on-line directory, in any capacity as an auto repair business (at 
least none that my prison caseworker could find when he 'surfed' Google and Dex, and other 
directories looking,) and whose credentials are stated to be, "I have been asked on several 
occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair services on vehicles repossessed by 
Jordan Credit Union." In this "Declaration" he further asserts, u8. Jordan Credit Union declined 
to have the repairs made because the cost was greater than what the car would sell for at 
auction." Doesn't such a statement seem just a little contrived, and coached, and self-serving, 
coming as it does from a "several occasions" in the past mechanic for a financial institution like 
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union? - particularly if the sale of a $9,000.00 car for only $200.00 was 
really an "arms-length" transaction, as Plaintiff alleges? 
5. When I contacted the salvage yard owner who ended up buying my 2003 Mitsubishi 
Eclipse in my efforts to try and reverse the outrageously ludicrous transaction whereby my 
$9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car had been sold to him for only $200.00, he refused, not 
surprisingly; and, he asked me to provide him a key for my car because the necessary computer-
chip key, (with codes available only from Mitsubishi: my car had a keyless entry and ignition 
lock system which made duplicate keys very hard to come by, or at least expensive, since by 
personal experience, key duplication cost in excess of $125.00,) - that is, the only key then 
existing, had stayed in my pocket when I was taken to jail. And this, of course, in turn then begs 
the question: what was Ken Martinez using for a key when he was determining my car "would 
not start"? Too, does this help to explain all his confusion about windows supposedly broken? 
6. Moreover, I question, and I dispute, altogether, and most firmly, many more aspects of 
this "Declaration's" assertions as well because I believe it is a deliberate exaggeration and 
distortion of the true condition of my car now belatedly, and at second-hand, alleged by Plaintiff 
solely to strengthen their bogus claims in this matter. 
Next consider this: in his so-called inspection and estimation of repair services, this self-
described "mechanic" [notice: not auto body mechanic] identified my car as a "2002 Mitsubishi 
Eclipse"- and with the model year wrong, (mine was a 2003,) how can he possibly, and 
accurately price replacement parts? 
7. Additionally, there was nothing at all wrong with either headlight assembly, though 
his greatly exaggerated Estimate lists them both as needing replacement at a cost of $265.00 
apiece. His same estimate invoice says a Passenger Window was broken, and a taillight, and that 
a right front tire was "flat." Now, if the car had truly lacked both headlights, and a taillight, 
doesn't it seem likely that the Sheriff who cited me for not having an "Ignition Interlock 
Device," (which I never have been required to have on any car of mine, and who also cited me 
for DUI even though my breathalyzer testing at the time of arrest showed 0.00, and blood testing 
at the scene of arrest also resulted in 0.00 blood toxicology,) - would then overlook such basic 
vehicle equipment violations as these would be? 
8. Now taming back to his written testimony, (See "Declaration", @ 6) he states "body 
damage to the entire right side of the vehicle," in addition to both front headlight assemblies, 
passenger window broken,... broken tail light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition, the 
vehicle would not start." (I ask again, what ignition key was he using?) And, here, different 
from the written and itemized Estimate, (See Attachment to his written "Declaration(s)") my 
"driver automatic window" also turns up to be allegedly, "non-operating," and yet, it is the 
Driver Door Glass which he says needs replacement on the left side, bottom, of his formal 
Estimate of Repairs - and it is the Passenger Window broken on the right side of his itemized 
Estimate of Repairs! With window replacements priced at $420.00 this is not an insignificant 
discrepancy, and he has told three differing accounts on only two pieces of paper! Moreover, 
when I last saw my car, no window was broken, and my Exhibit from the Impound Tow Truck 
driver will prove this to be so. 
9. Furthermore, on this "Declaration's" attached itemized Estimate of Repairs, note that 
the gas lid is listed at a replacement cost of $45.00! Additionally, that the alleged replacement 
cost of a bumper support is listed at $95.00: Yet, Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint would tell 
you that we had already replaced the front bumper support preparatory to the complete, then-
pending (at the time of repossession) body shop repairs that would have rendered my car 
cosmetically to a "good as new" state of repair. 
10. In November/October of '07, the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint formal estimate 
of pending repairs (and which I previously submitted to this Court in my most recent pleadings 
as an Exhibit C,) priced all of my then-pending and needed repairs at $511.81 - and these 
included repairs to the front fiberglass bumper, which we 'jerry-rig' and temporarily repaired by 
tying down the old, broken one to the newly-installed bumper support, with arrangements then 
made for a new front bumper cover (already paid for in advance, early October) and that was part 
of the final and complete repairs which we at that time put on hold for the remaining $500.00, 
(earmarked from my Christmas money,) to be paid. Then, and that way, everything needing the 
slightest bit of attention to keep this prized sports car of mine a 'hot' car could all be painted at 
once. Hence, and in short, this temporary, 'jerry rig' repair of the broken front bumper - tied to 
the newly-installed bumper support, so that all adjacent parts could be held in place securely, not 
to rattle around, possibly fall off- could not have been made at all except that the bumper 
support that Ken Martinez has alleged was needed was already installed and in place. 
Here, I suppose I have raised questions by herein admitting that there were, in fact, some 
automotive body shop repairs then pending for this car here in question and that it would have 
been "less burdensome" or more convenient to ignore altogether. Except that I have faith that 
even a simple man telling the simple truth can prevail in our Courts if the unvarnished truth of 
things supports such a verdict. In life, sometimes the truth can be messy, maybe inconvenient, or 
at least complicated. Too, as I write this, I am also now remembering that some of these then-
pending auto body repair charges were being deferred and juggled against other expenses, and 
these other expenses, necessarily put first, included the annual licensing and registration, 
complete with complete safety and emission testing that always has been due on this particular 
car of mine before the end of October. Certainly, anybody who has ever owned a car will 
appreciate the fact that car maintenance is usually a 'work in progress.' I still have a full set of 
service receipts and records on this car which would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that all 
routine and preventative mechanical maintenance and repairs were always made on time for as 
long as I had this car under contract of the Loan Agreement. Similarly, when this credit union 
lender first asked me to ensure that the full insurance which I have always carried on this car -
including comprehensive and collision insurance coverage - was renegotiated with my insurance 
carrier to include a higher-priced policy of less deductible on the comprehensive and collision 
insurance parts of my coverage package, I readily and promptly attended to that responsibility of 
mine, also. 
Still, because the cost of all the then-pending body damage repairs on my car were less 
than the deductible, it remained for me to do this as I could afford to, ie. with Christmas money 
from my mother. It was by far the more prudent and economical of choices regarding same for 
these repairs to the front end (requiring a new fiberglass bumper cover @ $235.00,) and to the 
passenger side front-fender panel (@ $125.00 as itemized by Ken Martinez; $175.00 @ Mirror 
Image Auto Body and Paint,) because it is far easier and better to paint everything all at once, 
besides being less intrusive to the car's normal, day-to-day usage. 
One other consideration also played into this minimal delay of mine in getting everything 
fixed for good as new, with my car restored to an excellent, almost 'mint' condition of 
maintenance and repair with Christmas money, and that was the circumstances of my apartment 
complex neighbor, next door to me in Apartment 4, having made October arrangements with me 
to compensate me in $50.00 installments out of his weekly paychecks as a means of paying for 
the approximate $250.00 in damages to my right front fender when his drunken and uninsured 
girlfriend hit my car with her own when sloppily parking her car in the stall immediately 
adjacent to my #5 apartment parking stall. I agreed to this arrangement - in the interest of 
neighbor relations - not to file an insurance claim because these repairs were only half the 
amount of my deductible, and thus would have represented an out-of-pocket expense anyway, 
(given her uninsured status,) figuring that $250.00 in installments was better than nothing 
coming from her non-existent insurance coverage. They were a purely cosmetic dent damage 
anyway, a dent that did not affect in any way my headlight, nor my wheel. 
I apologize to this Court for all these many words: but at least they have the virtue of 
being unvarnished truth, even if somewhat complicated to explain - and with the advantage that 
every aspect of these circumstances surrounding the roughly $500.00 then pending to complete 
all repairs can be completely confirmed and verified by all these other persons, and facts, 
involved. 
11. Since obviously, taking all of these facts and circumstances and arguments of mine 
into consideration, into account, there remains a lot of controverted material facts relative to 
Plaintiffs allegation that my car was in terrible condition when they arbitrarily decided to 
repossess it - particularly since, depending upon which version of their story one chooses to 
believe regarding my car's true and actual condition, its condition after impound is being used as 
a justification for their capricious decision to accelerate the loan payments and to repossess this 
loan collateral. Perhaps even more importantly, the true condition of my car has a very direct 
bearing on my own argument that they failed miserably to mitigate their alleged collateral 
deficiency damages by selling my car - the collateral asset - for a mere pittance of its real and 
true, actual value. 
12. Because this is a core issue at the heart of this case, I inquire of the Court, "What 
would it take to depose these 2 witnesses from "Ken Martinez" and from Mirror Image Body and 
Paint, respectively? To depose other witnesses I might call in my defense to set the record 
straight regarding my prized sports car service and maintenance records, or the neighbors and 
friends who would not hesitate to confirm my story that this car (regardless some relatively 
minor and pending, purely cosmetic repairs to the front bumper and passenger-side (right) front 
fender,) was always kept in a reasonably good condition and state of repair? How can I, without 
Court extensions of filing deadlines, introduce into the record photographs of my car to lend 
better credence to these assertions of mine, and to my side of these very substantial, and 
significant, disputed material facts? 
13. Meanwhile, I wish to now introduce into the record my Exhibit A, Attached -
which is the Vehicle Impound Report issued by Guillermo Blanco Towing at the date and time of 
my arrest and the subsequent decision by S.L. County Sheriff to impound my car. (Please Note 
that with all or nearly all of my Exhibits herein, including this one here at hand, and previously 
too, I am sending the OriginaL and not a copy, to this Court.) This Vehicle Impound Report, 
issued by the arresting officer and Guillermo Blanco Towing necessarily addresses the condition 
of the vehicle being impounded with some small thoroughness, lest the owner of the vehicle 
when coming to the impound lot to reclaim the vehicle try to blame them for pre-existing 
damages. This, very sadly for me, turns out to be the last time I ever saw my car, (though I had 
already been hauled off in handcuffs before this Report was ever written,) - and that's because 
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union interjected themselves between myself and Blanco Towing by 
maliciously and capriciously repossessing my car from off the Blanco Towing Impound Lot. 
And, a close examination directly contradicts the greatly exaggerated claims of damage alleged 
by Plaintiff to this car at issue. 
Nowhere does this Vehicle Impound Report's list of pre-existing damages list, for 
example, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids, nor broken headlights, broken taillights -
all of which the itemized Estimate and "Declaration" submitted by Plaintiff- now obviously 
fraudulently - does allege! Furthermore, when one compares the reported odometer reading 
between this Vehicle Impound Report and the Itemized Estimate submitted by Plaintiff, it would 
appear either he or the repossession company drove my "non-starting" car an additional 40 
miles! 
14. Given all of these contradictions that are clearly evident throughout Plaintiffs 
contentions that my car was not kept in an overall and reasonably good condition of repair, as I 
believe, and testily that it was, their contention that $2665.00 would be required to fix my car, 
not including engine repairs (as declared by their affidavits), or "well in excess of $3,000.00 to 
make the car saleable," (See new Plaintiff Memorandum of Points... @ Pg. 11) there probably 
exists right here, alone, grounds adequate enough — if not to throw their case out of Court in its 
entirety - then to at least dismiss their Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of all these 
disputed material facts? 
II. PLAINTIFF IS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Plaintiff is in Breach of Contract: both the 'letter' of the Loan Contract Agreement has been 
violated by them, along with and as well as its 'spirit'. 
«15. I dispute "reasonable notice," as Plaintiff has asserted. Plaintiffs new Memorandum 
of Points... places much of the emphasis and focus of their arguments upon the Loan Contract 
Agreement that I signed at the time I purchased my car, and a copy of said Contract is submitted 
by them as an Exhibit A, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers. Then they have repeatedly 
asserted that I "was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action." 
(See new Plaintiff Memorandum, @ pg. 10; also as a so-called Fact #8 @ Pg. 4; and in Michelle 
Rogers' Affidavit @ #11, also.) 
Yet, the letter that they sent to me at my mother's house OH December II t h , (See 
Plaintiff Exhibit C, Attached to Michelle Rogers' Affidavit) and which they freely admit was 
their only outgoing attempt at any kind of communication with me throughout the course of this 
entire fiasco, very clearly says, "Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in cash or 
cashier's check by 12/20/07, the credit union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids. 
We will then sell the collateral to the highest approved bidder... A sale may take place at any 
time without further notice to you. If you need more information about the sale you may write 
us or call us." Finally, from the last paragraph of their letter, "Personal belongings must be 
claimed by 12/02/2007, or they will be disposed of." This last is a pretty telling representation of 
the 'sloppy' work that characterizes Plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious, reckless, hasty and 
arrogant, most of all incompetent, actions for every step of the way henceforth forward - the sale 
of my car, particularly. 
But, anyway, back to the heart of this argument: By far more importantly, turn now 
back to the Loan Contract in question (See my highlighted Exhibit B, Attached). "You agree 
that if any notice is required to be given to you of an intended sale or transfer of the Property, 
notice is reasonable if mailed to your last known address, as reflected in our records, at least 10 
clays before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such other period of time as is required 
by law)." Because 12/11 is 9, not 10 days' notice before the intended sale of 12/20/07, Plaintiff 
is clearly in default of their own obligations to this 'two-way street' Contractual Agreement! 
And thus contradicting their very own alleged material facts re. Reasonable notice by the very 
evidence they have themselves provided! Very clearly, "Reasonable Notice" never was provided 
in this case at issue. 
16. Perhaps even more importantly and central to my primary argument, they have 
themselves also breached the essential spirit of this Contract, as well as its letter. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit B, submitted in their newest pleadings, is the Notice of Impounded 
Vehicle sent to Jordan Credit Union as the title holder of my car by the Utah State Tax 
Commission advising them that my car was impounded to Blanco Towing's Impound Yard. 
Note that the only thing 'scary' or irreversible about this notice is the advisement that towing and 
daily storage fees will be required to get the car out of impound, and that "Failure to claim 
vehicle listed above within 30 days may result in the sale of the vehicle at public auction," and 
dated December 3rd. Presumably this letter triggered all of Plaintiff s behavior that followed. 
According to Michelle Rogers, (See her Affidavit @ f 7; also, Plaintiffs newest Memorandum, 
Pg. 3 @ f4) "Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's 
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement." 
The Contract Agreement does have a provision that says "You will keep the Property in 
your possession in good condition and repair... Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the 
Property will be located at your address..." But, it also says, "By choosing any one or more of 
these remedies, we do not waive our right to later use another remedy. By deciding not to use 
any remedy, we do not give up our right to consider the event a default if it happens again." 
[Emphasis added] In other words, lender, (in this case Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union,) reserves 
the right always to make subjective judgment regarding same, and exercise these rights to default 
and to the full extent of the law and this contract, //the situation seems to call for such dire 
measures, seems to present a problem that places in jeopardy the lender's security interest in the 
collateral (car) purchased with the proceeds of the car loan they elected to accept. 
People financing a car enter into these kinds of agreements with their eyes open (one 
would assume or hope), certainly: For example, everyone knows that if they fail in their primary 
and most important obligation - namely, their agi cement to make all of their agreed-upon car 
payments on time, they will very soon afterward lose the car. Similarly, that the lender's 
security interest in the vehicle collateral must be protected at all times - meaning full insurance 
to the lender's complete satisfaction, and the car commensurately and also kept in good 
condition and repair-or again, they should not be surprised to soon lose lli« n < m In IC)HISM S^ IUH 
if they fail in these primary obligations and responsibilities to the lender. 
However, and nonetheless, the Contract is a two-way street, and the borrower, as the 
registered owner of the vehicle in question has his own vested property rights and interests at 
stake in his purchase of it, and thus is surely entitled to reasonable assurance and expectations 
that the lender will accordingly respect his own property rights, and treat him fairly and in 
accordance with, and in harmony with, reasonable and responsible, acceptable and established 
standards of normal business lender behavior not willy-nilly considering him in default at the 
slightest deviation from the "fine print', surely In other words, provided he has met all of his 
most important obligations to the lender, the registered owner of the vehicle is surely entitled to 
just a little leeway with regards to where he parks his vehicle: different from his home if he's 
sleeping over at a girlfriend's house, or on vacation out of town, for example. Provided he has 
insurance policy coverage on the vehicle that allows it, (and no jeopardy to the lender,) perhaps 
he's not constantly and technically "in possession" of the vehicle at all times because some other 
licensed driver has been given permission to drive his car; or as another example, perhaps he's 
not constantly and technically "in possession" if the car's been left overnight at the service 
mechanic's shop.. . Yet, despite these small Tine print' deviations from the "in possession" 
clause, is there any reasonable-thinking person who would really and truly consider him to be "in 
default" of the car loan contract? \nd, certainly, if his important obligation to keep his car in 
reasonably good condition of maintenance and repair has been met, if all the important 
mechanical maintenance, preventative maintenance, upkeep and repair has been satisfied, and 
evidences diligent care and concern for the legitimate property interests of the lender, then "in 
good faith" nearly everyone would have an unstated understanding that inevitably sometimes a 
needed repair is on pending status while waiting for parts, money, time enough, etc. and surely 
that person is not then "in default" if his car has been allowed to go unwashed, say - or in my 
case, if pending cosmetic repairs have been temporarily postponed until all the money to make a 
pending repair had become available. (Remember, my car had just finished passing safety and 
emissions testing that were required for the car's annual registration and licensing obligations, 
and that were renewed for another year by State of Utah's October Renewal,) 
These are only common-sense exceptions to the rule - but in retrospect, conunon sense 
has become to seem a very rare commodity in Plaintiffs 'scheme of things' because they have 
used the term "good faith" to mean "we can do anything we want - regardless the vested rights 
and interests of the car loan customer." In Plaintiffs vernacular, the term "good faith" has 
become an oxymoron because they use this term to justify the most arrogant, disrespectful, and 
malicious of behaviors on their own part - and if I ever hear the term from them again, rest 
assured, I'll be holding on to my wallet. Without reservation, I adamantly dispute the so-called 
material "facts" as alleged by them whenever and wherever they have used the term in their 
explanations for all that herein follows the triggering event, which was the car's impound and 
temporary storage at the tow yard 
Plaintiff tells us, (Please see plaintiffs newest Memorandum... ^4, Michelle Rogers' 
Affidavit @ f7) "On the good faith belief that he would be unable to make the required 
payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the Collateral, Jul dan 
repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about 12/10/07." 
And, (@ Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... <|5, Michelle Rogers' Affidavit (a) f8,j on the good 
faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be performed is considered a 
default," , .Except as prohibited by law. [Emphasis added]. 
18. it is not very hard to see that this was a yen large assumption {presumption, more 
like,) for them to be making on the basis of so little information. It is also yet one more of thai 
so-called "material facts" that I vigorously dispute because on the basis of these flimsy 
presumptions, Plaintiff accelerated the loan's entire outstanding, unpaid balance; and then they 
repossessed my car right out from under me - from my rightful partial ownership, established by 
2+ years of monthly car payments already paid to them, on time, like clockwork, each and every 
month - when they just up and decided, (without one iota of attempted communication with me 
their December 11th letter, and the only notice they ever evm bothcied to send, reported my ear's 
repossession as a "done deal' and an accomplished fact; and by then, my car had already been 
repossessed when they mailed this letter to me,) to take it from me and from off the impound lot 
where it was temporarily stored! I believe this decision made by them was entirely impetuous 
and imprudent, as well as malicious, arbitrary, and capricious - coming at me as it did without 
the slightest attempt, or courtesy whatsoever, to try and talk to me first, seemingly with zero 
regards for the uncontroverted fact that 1 had been for them, up until the impound and their 
subsequent decision to repossess, an entirely trouble-free, steady and reliable with my on-time, 
every-time car loan payments, kind of car loan customer. Talking to me first, or through my 
family, would most certainly have put all their collateral security-based cares and concerns (read 
after-the-fact excuses, more like,) to rest. 
19, I mean, Does it really seem to be prudent businc 11 • ion-making at wo: MI 
they stoop to say, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... @ Pg. 9) "Plaintiff i 
knowledge at that the time that Defendant's situation was any different from the nui ij \ (lier 
cases in which debtor's [debtors] simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their 
obligations." ? This after 2+ years of making every single one of my car loan payments on time? 
ill. Plaintiff s weak, ieeble, and ineffectual efforts lo eoinimimodlc with me were 
ineffective and not at all reasonable given that they surely must linvi by then known where these 
monthly car payments were coming to them from: ie, niy mother's bank (I) S, Bank Private 
Client Group). Moreover, there are (and always have been) 2 Salt Lake City telephone directory 
phone book listings for Suniville; both are family members, and both would have immediately 
intervened to protect both mine, and the Plaintiffs interests in my car, if only the problem had 
been ie any way communicated to anybody. 
With such momentous news as this to communicate their single Notice of Repossession 
letter, dated December 1 l!l and which was their only effort to communicate with me in any 
way whatsoever - sent as a Certified- Return Receipt Requested Mail or even as a telegram, 
would have been far more reasonable. Obviously, even a delinquent car loan customer would 
have received more and/or different mail than did I. 
Morcovei, the Impound Notice mailed to them as the title holder by the Utah State Tax 
Commission made it evident, as well very likely, that 1 was in Salt Lake County Jail -put there 
by the S.L. County Sheriffs Office (the same as my car was impounded,) as a result of an arrest 
for DDL One single telephone call to the jail would have confirmed this. It would also, by far, 
have saved everyone concerned a great deal of trouble because J, or my family acting in my 
behalf, wouid have immediately taken steps to protect my car from such dire and unexpected 
response precipitated by Jordan Credit Union. My point bears repeating, I think: even a 
delinquent customer, behind on his car loan payments, would have received more notice than 
was sent to me. 
Plaintiff has tried to argue that it was I who had a "duty to communicate," that I was 
given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action (which is itself 
predicated on false presumptions, and hardly a reasonable amount of notice, clearly contradicted 
even by the terms, and requirements of the Loan Contract Agreement itself, (and as I have 
already shown to be clearly defined therein.) fhen, Also: that, "After receiving no 
communication from Defendant," (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum.. . @ Pg. 6, f B , 
Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ ^ [15) "Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the 
only offer received which was for $200.00"! How could I possibly be expected to remedy 
what I didn't know was happening? Please consider: I might just as easily been on an 
extended vacation out of town,, and inaccessible to the reach of ordinary mail. Isn't it far' more 
"reasonable" an expectation that before entering into a transaction that obviously represented 
such a "bath" and egregious loss for them, as well as for me, that in the interests of pure common 
sense, as well as prudent business practices, they might have tried just a little harder to contact 
me first? Wouldn't this have been, by their own words, the by far "less burdensome route"? 
if only to explore the potentiality by at least somehow attempting to assure themselves that 
their single letter had actually been received? 
Quite easily, I could have refinanced the accelerated loan balance with some other 
financial institution, (and been done with Jordan Credit Union once and for all,) for the out-of-
pocket additional expense of repossession (stated to be $869.00, according to the one, only, 
Notice of Repossession, which was ineffectually mailed to me after the repossession had become 
accomplished fact) - and which presumably, mostly, represents the charges incurred at Blanco 
Towing which I was intending and prepared to pay anyway. 
Reversing or reconsidering the default decision might have kept me in the loan with 
payments of $226.00 paid to them,, monthly for a long time afterwards (according to the terms of 
our Loan Contract Agreement.) So isn't it logical then, to at least wonder why they made not the 
slightest effort to somehow at least explore the barest possibility of that before they next 
proceeded to just flush all of mmdand their collateral asset straight down the drain by accepting 
a single, one time payment of only $200.00? 
In fact, every other decision and action taken by Jordan Credit Union in response, and 
which, step by step, in turn precipitated all these problems that followed, seems rushed, hasty, 
and ill-considered, (as well as mean-spirited, malicious even) but mostly, reckless, capricious 
and arbitrary. . . One almost has to wonder whether they already had a pre-conceived agenda 
they were putting into momentum - almost as though they hoped that I wouldn't step up to 
salvage the loan, and save my car? 
21. So here I must now ask this Court another critical question: How can a deposition be 
arranged to be taken from whichever Jordan Credit Union loan officer was in charge of my car 
loan when all these preceding and critical decisions were being made? Plaintiff has introduced 
into the record an Affidavit from Michelle Rogers - but v^  as it actually she who was in charge of 
these reckless decisions at the time? Here is why I am starting to speculate and wonder about the 
worst: 
j n m eariier pleading to this Court, I once stated that every time Plaintiff" Jordan Credit 
IJnion has filed a new piece of paper, I learn something new about my car. In Plaintiffs newest 
Memorandum. it is stated that my car was "sold for $200.00 to Midvale All Small Auto, Inc. • 
on January 23rd, W. Plaintiff mailed this Court an Exhibit A on September 18th that was 
attached to the Memorandum in Opposition (before this Court's Decision and Minute Entry that 
set the default judgment aside.) It was a notarized record of S.I County Jail Records, and it 
shows that I was first released from jail, (following the December 3r arrest that resulted in the 
temporary impound of my car,) on January 17, '08. My own Verizon cellular phone records 
confirm and verify what I also remember: that from my very first communication with Jordan 
Credit Union, (talking to someone whose name I do not exactly remember, except that it was the 
person I was told that I must talk to because she was in charge of my loan account, and car - I 
wrote it all down, of course, but I do not have those notes with me here,) always,'from the very 
first conversation, the sale of my car was being reported as a 'done deal' and accomplished fact. 
I remember asking her incredulously, "You sold my $9,000.00 car to a salvage yard for 
$200.00!" "Yes," she answered, "it had some front end damage and we couldn't get the car to 
start.".. . Incredible! 
But here's my point, which is a huge question: Out of jail, wrhich was not until about 5pm 
on January 17th, which was a Thursday, too late to call anybody then, I began my calls to ail-
importantly retrieve my car, on the following morning, Friday, 1/18/08 - and I was told that the 
girl I needed to talk to at Jordan Credit Union was unavailable to talk with me until that 
following Monday, which would have been January 21, '08, Now learning that the sale of my 
car did not take place, according to Plaintiffs newest Memorandum , until January 23 rd, then I 
was either being lied to when I talked to her, or she avoided all of my telephone calls for three 
days while she made the final aiTangements that sold my car for a mere pittance of its actual, real 
and true value! 
Apparently there is a law already in place that is meant to ensure that the sal-' of a 
repossessed vehicle does not involve any self-dealing (by proxy, or otherwise, presumal* • 
Given the very fishy smell emanating from this transaction, especially in light of my own 
inquiries being stalled and/or avoided for 3 long days before - by Plaintiffs own admission 
this sale had been finalized, completed on January 23rd, I think it would be very interesting 
indeed to get both these parties in Court:, or before a Deposition Hearing? 
22, So, here again, I most vehemently dispute everything about the so-called material 
"facts," as characterized and alleged by this Plaintiff, regarding both the "reasonable" and 
adequate Notice provided me, the customer, by Plaintiff- along with nearly everything else 
about the sale of my car by them, and which I, in turn, must instead characterize as arbitrary and 
capricious, especially hasty and recklessly impetuous, as well as mean-spirited and malicious, or 
worse, . . There was no adequate or reasonable Notice provided me, nor was this car of mine 
sold for a fair price. 
23. I have already shown how, by far, the best pru ,- Plaintiff could have received for the 
collateral asset would have been simply to have left me *,?• k.:p\ the loan,, alive, and thereby 
received every last penny as we originally contracted between us by the terms of the Contractual 
Loan Agreement It would appear they very arrogantly and cavalierly assumed (presumed) that 
my mother's bank would compensate them for the entire amount of any collateral deficiency 
owing, regardless how reckless and impetuous their own failure to mitigate the collateral 
deficiency damages. It would appear they just didn't care, in their rash to find the "less 
burdensome'" n.'-uie. Unfortunately for them, neither my mother nor my bank has the slightest 
>i TL nor inclination, to continue to help me pay for a car I no longer have. Sadly, I have 
oeen sent to prison ten times over the last twenty-two years, and haven't a single valuable or 
worthwhile asset to my name, nor do I have any marketable job skills or prospects, either. Still, 
if this Court, should decide no[ to rale in my favor, it will be a shame for my credit to have been, 
fruitlessly ruined by the egregiously remiss and unfair treatment of me by this Plaintiff. . , and 
for the bad precedents being set, to the detriment of everyone else behind me who might be 
considering to finance a car - particularly from this Plaintiff whose bad behavior would then 
have been encouraged, rewarded and protected, no matter that they have demonstrated a callous 
indolence and disregard for my own rights and reasonable expectations in this matter. 
24. It is my contention that Plaintiffs Notice of Repossession, dated 12/11/07 - which 
was their only attempt at communication with me - and which said, (see Plaintiffs Exhibit C) 
"A sale may take place at .any time without further notice to you. If you need more information 
about the sale you may write us or call us," was a most inadequate notice which not only violates 
the Loan Contract itself, (and as I have already shown, please see #15, herein,) which required 
10, not 9 days notice between December 11th and December 20t!; it also seems to fall far short of 
the 'reasonable notice of the sale' required to be given to the debtor, as proscribed by law. 
25. Neither was Plaintiffs decision to sell my/their collateral asset, (my car!,) to a 
salvage yard for a mere pittance of its real, true and actual value a "commercially reasonable" 
decision. Just now please consider that when the original Loan Agreement and Contract was 
made and accepted by this Plaintiff (October 2005,) my car's retail value was accepted to be 
worth $11,500.00 which was the amount of the loan, zero down payment required, (the amount 
financed being $12,829.00 after fees and sales tax were added on.) This car was also accepted to 
be, at that time, an adequate collateral "uffici.:n!)y er^-r.^- ^ n™-?* -heir ow^ ^mritv ;r the 
amount loaned to me. 
Now, only 25 months later, (25 monthly payments later,) they 'stretch and scramble' to 
make the sale of this collateral seem more reasonable in their arguments, by purporting that its 
value had sunk to a mere (See Plaintiffs new Memorandum. .. @ Pg. 11) "wholesale price of 
the vehicle . . . between $3200.00 and $4400.00" However, this is a wholesale Trade-in value 
and it is one year more dated (Kelly Blue Book, 10/28/2008) than when they actually sold my 
car for $200.00, as evidenced by their self-serving Exhibit CD' (attached to Michelle Rogers' 
Affidavit) which, being a year, different, newer, of course places less valuation on my car than it 
was worth in December, 2007. 
26. Even still, their own Suuiiii;. • • ^comiiigyet one more disputed-so-
called material "facts" in this case. Firs: i... .-i .,d. * - ause, as I have already shown, their 
allegation that my car needed $2600.00 for enormoush in Hated and exaggerated costs of repair, 
additional to an undiagnosed engine problem, and as decided by Ken Martinez, lacks credibility, 
(to say it kindly.) 
Moreover, even if this Court were accepting of that testimony despite its contradiction of 
record by both Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, AND by the tow and impound receipt 
showing no broken windows, headlights, taillights, etc. . , the math is still 'wrong insomuch as 
$4400.00 (disputed) less greatly exaggerated costs of repairs @ $2600.00 (also disputed,) leaves 
a collateral asset amount of $1800.00, not $200.00. Furthermore, what prudent and responsible 
business person would ever loan at retail, and sell for wholesale? Other credit unions sometimes 
park their repossessed automobiles outside the business with FOR SALE signs in the window, 
presumably to best recoup their money in loans gone bad, ie. when a loan., customer fails to make 
his promised payments. Jordan Credit Union seems not to care about any of that: it was far 
easier for them to hastily sell my car willy-nilly for any old price so long as it was quick and 
**•»'
;
 'Mess burdensome," and because they figured I could be made to pay for their improvident 
akes, no matter how badly they behaved, As such, for egregious and. cavalier FAILURE TO 
MITIGATE THEIR. DAMAGES, one might almost regard, this resulting collateral, deficiency a s 
their just and deserved 'rewards'. Most certainly, this disposition of collateral has not been made 
•' -r ,-onformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers," and. as Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code proscribes. As 'the Utah Coui. ^ • :\r- previously ruled, the 
vehicle must be sold for a "fair price," (sans self-dealing. 
CONCLUSION 
I lad I been .* my ^wn
 %. .; au ,;e sold it for its true worth, retail to a 
private buyer, and had money leu over after \M\ ing off my loan completely, like as not and this 
more closely approximates what any "reasonable commercial practices among dealers" would 
similarly dictate under these circumstances, 'vol. the "less burdensome" route? Less burdensome 
would have been to take a few extra minutes to try and communicate to me, Plaintiffs steady 
and reliable customer for over 2 years. It was also a cuurtc:;\ that I had every right to expect. 
They loaned for $12,000.00, then sold for $200.00: no wonder they lost money and there's a 
collateral deficiency let over once the smoke from their rash and hasty, arrogant and arbitrary 
caprices clears the air. 
Accordingly, 1 pray for this court s rem -uu ^ u ^ i claims Ariu. . 
additionally argue that 1 should my f^1^- »^ ^ •. • the pockets of this Plaintiff 
(who, in their original Complaint, a . argument against their pre* ;ousi 
obtained judgment by default against m^. too - were seeking to \sup' a default judgment through 
which would have been a judgment obtained for exactly double thi mn<>unt tkev *?r*v are more 
modestly alleging their collateral deficiency to bel) 
I hereby seek compensation for the full 2 months car loan payments accepted b> 
after they already had repossessed my car, and also for a fair and modest $250.00 replacement 
costs borne by me when all of my personal property inside the vehicle turned up missing, which 
included a sizeable amount of expensive, as well as sentimentally-valued and irreplaceable 
clothing, (and which included my Flame-In-Go's Prison Firefighter 'Hot Shots' crew sweatshirt.; 
Additionally, I pray this Court's relief for any other punitive cost relief and damages which this 
Court feels it to now be appropriate to award me. This has been an entirely unwarranted 
Complaint since its inception: one neither I, nor this Court, should ever have had to waste its 
time with. Thank You for these considerations. 
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amounl will cum l in incu chaiqes Irom the dam paid al Ihe pu^t 
malunly n l c I ILUUI IM d in thu PROMISF TO PAY AND PAYMEN 
''"E <Mj st Liicir ui 11 prt a tn lull 
O B L I G A T I O N S I N D E P E N D E N T Earh person who siqns U\ 
Contr icl agroes In pay this Cnnlran ncroiding lo it1" lerms Tf 1 
means Ihe lollowmq 
A You must pay this Conlracl even il someone else has al 
signed il 
B Wc may release any co buyer or gi arunt) ind yo will slill t 
obligated lo pay this Contrac' 
C Wo may roll as»> Rny security and you will still be obligated Ic 
pay Ihis Conlracl 
D II we give up any of our nghls it will not allecl your duly lo pay 
this Conlracl 
E If we extend new credit or renew thJ* Conlrarl 11 w II n if id * 
your duty lo pay Ihis Conlracl 
W A R R A N T Y Wananty information Is providod to you soparatety 
WAIVER To the exlenl permitted by law you agroe to give u| 
your r igh ts lo m q u l m u i to do cer ta in t h i n g * Wo are no l 
required to (1) demand payment ol amount! duo (2) glvo notice 
that amounts due have not betin paid or have not been paid in 
the appropriate amount Jimr or rnanncrr or (3) give notice that 
we Intend to makir or are making th l i Conlracl Immediately due 
"HHIRD P A F T X A G R E E M E N T 
By signing bolow you agree 1c give us a secunty Interest in the 
Property described In the SALE section You also agree to the 
lerms of Ihis Contract irtcluding the WAIVER section above 
except that you will not be liable lor the payments it requires Your 
interest in the Proper ly may be used to satisfy the Buyer s 
obligation You agree that we may ronew extend change thlE 
Conlracl or release any party or property without releasing you 
irom this Conlracl We may lake lf"ese steps without nollce o 
demand upon you 
You acknowledge receipt ol a complBlBd copy ol this Contract 
Signature Date 
NOTICE ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT 
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER 
OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR 
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY 
THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY IMF 
DEBTOR HEREUNDER 
IF V 0 U A a E BUYING A USED V P H J C E THE INFORMATION 
YOU SEE ON THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS 
PART OF THIS CONTRACT INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW 
FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN IMF 
CONTRACT OF SALE 
icupl tor iht) application 0! my nwimilaciurer B rebate 1 
ASSIGNMEhTT BY SELLER 
sells •<! I—inn the R( UH H M tflirmni Cnnirnrl and Vainly Agmomont (CondHcl) 10 thu A«-siynrm lib successors and assigns Including all its rigfilE 
KJ irrtunsl ir Ihis Contract and ai^ yumunlut. oxuculod HI conoecllcm with INs Contiucl btllei gives /Usigrmt lull power wlhoi in its own nunw or in 
s name lo I iko nl) lo^pl nr other ac ionn which SuHur could havo Uiken undor this Tontract (SEPARATE AGREEMCNT II this AB3«gnmenl |B n w k undw 
ms ol a sofMiHle uyicnrrxiil HS mrircaliid on puge 1 1l»c lunns ol thu. naaiqnminl
 J ( 0 doo-ribod in i sopnrato wnllng(c) wxl not as prowled below ) 
Hor wtirrunt«; 
s Contract represents H salu liy Sdler lo Duyor 011 0 Unit pnec bajiu ond nol on .1 cash basis 
L u iiumunK ccinlrnriHil in thic Conunct art) Hue ond correel 
0 down payni^nl was made by Hie Buyer in the rruiniw slalotl on paga 1 ol Ihn Conu«*ci ami 1 
1 nl tho down pn^mrnt war. lonni d or piid to tho Duycrby GcKor or Sailor's roprosontalivns 
s 5 1I0 wns comptaled m accoidance wilh all applicabk. ledorol and slutc laws ninJ rcyuialion^ 
s Contract i~ VUIHJ dnd enlorccabtc in accordnnco with Us kirms 
c noinos und siyn-ilurefi on the. Contract ero nol lorood llctltiouo 01 ucsuine'd and nrp Irue and corr»»cl 
is Conlracl Is viblud m llio irtter lino ol all IMIHS IS not subduct to any claims 01 dolunsos ol the Buyoi and rn ty bv solti i assigned by Ihe >t (tor 
omplololy tilltd in copy of Ihis Conlrucl was delivered ID thofluyor ol Ihe tin*. 0/ o»oculion 
L Vehicle has been f^ Iwerod lo tho Buyer n good condition and has been accaptod by Buyer 
liar has ot will parted a socunly Inlt rcsl in the Property In lavor of the Assignee 
ny ol tl»cs^ womintiac Is brearhed or unliue Sftllnr will upon As-jign^c s demand purchase this Conlracl Irom Assignoe Tha purdiaee shall b« ir ui«-h 
amounl of Ihe unpaid balance finrkidmq finance choroes) plus Hit costs and oxpenac^ of Assignee including urlomeys. IBBS 
Her v/ll nikmniy A-^Hjnoc Irv flin loss winlauwd by it bacaurse ol |uo.c«| set o»( or as tho rosuh ol a rocovery made dyamil Assiomo a«; a res j | 1 
x delense Buyer h i» ogams! Soller 
IHJ wruvDs, nollcp 0! live Hccntilnnre ol ihis A-wignmonl nonce ol non-paymonl or non portormanco and nollco c> any othor lemedwu available lo 
-a-jiiix may wrthout IKIIICL lo StHnr atrti wilhoul allncliny UIH Imhiity ol Smioi undor this AryQnmorrt compound o» roloaaa any rights ayainsl and giant 
Jnn' nl limn liw piymunt 10 bo rmde to Buyer ai>d ony olhor person obhoatod unoor this Contiucl 
ss OTurnwt ,E IMITJC/>TLD ON PACE 1 TI its ASSFGNMEKT ib WITHOUT FIECOURSE 
nt ( n t i n r r II » A ngnnonl r mujL with recour u ua mdtuilud u tMi^ I A-^ynuL Ukos Ihi^ AswyiMHoiil vilti certain tights ol iccuurse jyamsl 
U l INSTALLMENT CONTRACT 
W SECURITY ArREFMFHT . 
l « / « 3 / 8 3 
Seller 
ACCESS AUTO 
" W L " and us rruwn Ihe Salter above its 
successors and assigns 
Buy or 
SUKIYILUL HAHRT 
Z233 DALLIK ST 
SALT L A i d C I T T , uT * 4 1 W 
"You and "your* mean each Buyer above and 
guarantor Jointly and individually 
You iQree to puc luso Irom us on a bme basis subject to too torms and conditions o( this contract and socunty agreement (Contract) the 
chide (vehicle') and services desenbod below The Vehicle Is sold m its piesont condiltott togother with the usual accossonos and anachrnenls 
2 0 « 3 >tlon ol Year 
/ehick. Make g I T S U B I S H I 
sed Modol , C C L I f S E 
Lie NoTYear 
D N e w ^ U„od 
4 A 3 A C M r » i l F t 1 TTZf i 
Hon of 
Tlllt 
RITY To secure your payment and porioimunce under the terms ol this Contract you give us a socunty interest In the Vehicle all 
ions attachments accessories and equipment placed in or on the Vehicle together called Properly and proceeds ol the Property 
»o assign to us ind gi\o us a <»ecuniy interest m procouds and pfumium refunds of any insurance and service contracts purchased wiU 
ntract 
USE T O PAY A N O P A Y M E N T T E R M S You promise la pay us the principal amount ol S __X2A2SJ&. pfus lina* t 
s accruing on th t unpaid balance ai the rate ot V TiMi *%, per year Irmn today s dale until maturity Finance charges accrue or i 
c t u m l 3fc*^ toy basis Ahet maturity or alttn vou dclault and we de mind payment wo will oarn Itnance charges on UK. unpaid 
D at 3^34W»~ * - P*r yoar You agree to pay this Contract acrordimj lo the paymanl .chodule and late chargu provisions shown n 
UTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES You i lso agree lo pay my additional amounts according lo the terms and conditions ol Ihe Cont/ecl 
OPTIONAL F I N A N C E C H A R G E You agruo lo pay an additional finance charge ol 5 I / A that will be C~) paid in cast 
eri (i the Casn Price Q pa<d piupornonully with ouch payment You agfae that $ 1 /A ol If o prepaid 1 nance c fu 
nonit I jnddble I you puy this Conn i d in fuS before the motunly datu 
4 P A Y M E N T You also agroc to pay or apply lo Die Cash Price on ui boloro todays dale any cash rebate and net trade in value described 
TEMIZATION Of AMOUNT FINANCED O You agree to make deferred payments as part ol the cash down payment as reflected ir 
ayrnnni Schedule 
T R U T H IN LENDING D ISCLOSURES 
A N N U A L 
R E N T A G E R A T E 
cost ol your credit as 
a yearly rate 
3 . 3 0 * % 
F I N A N C E 
C H A R G E 
The dollar amouni the 
credit will cos! you 
AMOUNT HNANCED 
The amouni ol credit 
provided to you or on 
your behalt 
c 1 2 8 2 9 « • 
TOTAL OF PAYMENTS 
The amount you writ have 
paid when you huve made 
oil scheduled payrnonts 
$ 1493^.52 
TOTAL SAefc PRICE 
7 ho lotal cost of your puichus* on 
credit, riduding your down paymer* d 
* TC93BT32 
merit Schodule 
ber ol Payments 
K 
Your payment schedule will be 
Amouni ol Paymenls | When Payments Are Due 
Z2£ 22 HOmiLT WOX1XIBB 11/19/H5 
ur i ty You are giving a socunty interest m tfx) Motor Vehicle purchasod 
nte Charge II a payment its more than 
3 1 o l t b » d c l i i ^ M M i i 
_ days tale you wiU be charged 
~ * j > * M d a i l a 
j a y m e n t If you puy off this Contract early you will not have lo pay a ponafly 
D 11 you pay off tb<«j Contracl early you may be antitled to a refund of part of the Additional Finance Charge 
trBCt P r o v i s i o n s You can see the terms ol this Contract lor any additional information about nonpayment default any required 
ytnent belore the scheduled date and prepayment refunds and penalties 
Dn I N S U R A N C E Credit fife credit disability (accident and 
\) and any other Insurance covorage quoted below are not 
od to obtain credrt and we will not provide them unless you srgn 
rec to pay the adri l lona pror-lurn If you want such Insurance obtain it for you (rf you qualify lor coverage) Wo ere quoting 
ONLY the coverages you hove chosen to purchase 
I T E M I Z A T I O N O F AM 
Vehicle Pnco (incl sales tax ol J _ 
Service Coniract Paid to 
vsmr®". 
t Ltle Insurod 
>mglo O Joini Prem S _ 
t Disabi l i ty Injured _ 
"~¥?X" 
Manufacturer's Rabato $ _ 
Cash Down Payment I _ 
Deferred Down Payment $ _ 
)5_ 
' 5 . 




rfngle D Joint Prorn $ , / A i i r 
a Total Cosh/Rebate Dowr; 
Trade-In Allowance S 
Less Amouni owing 5 
Paid to (includes I ) 
R/A 
I7T~ 
signature below means you riant (only) tho insurance cuvei iya(i>j 
d abo 'e If none arD qix)ied you have dDclmed any coverages we 
d Nei Trade In (b minus c ) % _ 
B Net Cash/Trade In (a plus d ) $ _ 
~K7T~ 
~rmr 
r d/o/b Buyer d/o/b 
ROPERTY INSURANCE You mubl insure the Properly sccunng 
x n i r a d You may purchaso or provide the Insurance through any 
ince company reasonably acecpiable lo us The collision coverage 
M>A 
I Amount to Finance line e (it e is negative) 
Down Payment (a disclose as SO il negative) 
Unpaid Balance of Cafh Prlcn 
Paid to Public Oflicials Filing Fees 
Insurance Premiums 
Additional Finance Charge(s) Paid to Seller 
clible may not excoed % _ 
oi through us you will pay $ _ 
H/A 
piuiniurn is calculated as follows 
M/A Deductible Collision Covorage 5_ 
U^ Deductible Compcehcnsive Cov S _ 














Tirw T M 
K/A 
re-Tlipfl and CombinBd Additional Coverage J _ 
S _ 
•l l l ty i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e l o r b o d i l y In ju ry a n d m o t o r 
c le d u m a g e c a u e o d to o t h e r s Is no t I n c l u d e d in th is 
t ract u n l e s s c h e c k e d a n d Ind i ca ted 
. I N G L E I N T E R E S T I N S U R A N C E You must purchase 
e Inlorest insurance as pan* of this sale transaction You may 
iase the coverage from o company of your choico reasonably 
ptable to us II vou buy the coverage liorn or through us you 
>ay $ n / k lor 
of coverage 
E R V I C E C O N T R A C T With yovi purchase of the Vehicle 
agrup lo purchaso a Servicu Contract to cover 
Total Other ChargeuMmounts Pd lo Oth»m 
•Less Prepaid Finance Chergo i 
Amount Financed 
*We may retim reruive i portion o' this amount 
~*7i 
171 
This Service Conlrucl wiH be in 
NOTICE TO BUYER 
(1) Do not sign this agreement before you reed it or if 
it contains tiny blank spaces (2) You are entitled to a 
completely fll)cd-)n copy o/ this agreement (3) Under 
the law you have the right to pay off in advance the 
full amouni tlue and undar certain condition*; to 
obtain B partial refund of tho finance charge 
BY SIGNING BELOW BUYER AGREES TO THE TERMS UN 
PAGES 1 AND 2 OF THIS CONTRACT AND ACKNOWLEDGES 
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS CONTRACT 
J I G N M E N T This Coniract and Socunty Agreement is assigned 
the Assignee phone 
This assignment is mudo Q under the terms 







tte number v ^ / 1^1 u inumDer s ^ ^ <«- I U I CApi iauui i 
nere was vehicle 
noved from7 JZya£" 1&&C/S 
ime and address 
yard &u.t//&/~*jcJ fibbed Y&id/Ate 379&S tsag Yard * < v ' / C v number 0 &*? ^ 
, , ^  sason for impound ^ /
 a ^ ^ I / ' / / / / ^ / / 
Must be expired 3 months ™ *> * ^ ' V 
for impoundment j ^ J * ^ ^ 
-4 r - r ^DUI • Abandoned • Reported theft •jPossibleJthft 
T 
-sr" —"fan ' r—*—L— 
wner/ t] 
ssee * / t o /-/r =^M MAX (VI* la tub Address iver's 
ame &&<<**& 
•*y ^ Address ffig/^% 
ccessones orv vehicle " , 
7f j a p d e / C D 0 Hub caps/Special rims 0 Mirrors 0 Mats' ** Q Other (see^A; 
1 vehicle^ 
l S * f'^cXtdf £^i>e^ $A/U2*<r V / B / U J^X^^^ PcfjAJT* 'DdAjT^ /cf/AJS* 
Remarks / fJ^i / S 7 V 
- y 
Officers M"y/ f j ' f IAgency Q- / <Cy~) |ORl 
signature x n ^ J / ^ ^ 4 d ^ I O /JO L^ [number 
I I Do not release frofri impound without authorization fronumpounding agency/ 
WHITE Motor Vehicle Division 210 North 1950 West SLC Utah 84134 (801)297 7780 YELLOW* Irnpound Yard PINK Driver of vehicle 
m 
mi ^r-TTtttf, 
GOLDENROD Irnpound officer s record TC 540 ReV 4/03 
J , 1 
/&* m^M^L tt&r&tf tote wf fWuvwf ^Lr/ (/ain^r^ 
/
' Jntr WJi*< 
attested to m> car's leal and true condition of lepair as being quite different tiom Flamtitt b 
bogus and disingenuous allegations, and similaih I ha^e al\Aa>s insisted and contended that my 
car was tunning ju&l fine light up until m> aixesl on December 3rd. '08, and its subsequent 
impound b> Offieeis of the Salt Lake Count) Sheriffs Office 
Since both of these issues directl} and iele\anth support a ke> fact and point of mine that 
Plaintiff leckiessh impicn ideutl) and utterh failed to mitigate the damages inclined to tnem 
Ham F. Simi\ille, Ji. 
PROSE 
//17265 
c'o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent NOTICE TO COURT, 
AND TO PLAINTIFF, 
vs. REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE 
Jordan Credit Union Case # 080903840 
Plaintiff 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
Comes nov\ before this Court. Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE. and as the Defendant in 
the above-notated action, hereby respectfully submits to this Court my NOTICE TO COURT, 
AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE, that I am hereby introducing into 
the record. 
New Evidence has recently become available to me. but it is evidence that primarily 
serves the purpose of validating and authenticating certain contentions of mine already and 
specifically stated previously by me in both of my previous answers to this Court, In fact, this 
newest Affidavit/Declaration by the owners of Mirror Image Auto Bod) and Paint sirnph 
provides some signature authentication and foundation to the document ahead} provided by 
them - a formal estimate of needed repairs - which was attached as an "Exhibit C" to my 
November 4th, m filed MOTTON TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT. In both this initial pleading, (Answer to the 
Original Complaint,) and in my second that was tiled to this Court on December 4th, '08. entitled 
(MEMORANDUM AND R E P L \ SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN OPPOSING 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMAR\ JUDGMEN r,) I have ahead}, and always, 
attested to my car's real and true condition of repair as being quite different from Plaintiffs 
bogus and disingenuous allegations, and similarly I ha^ e always insisted and contended that my 
cai was running just fine right up until my arrest on Decembei 3rd. '08, and its subsequent 
impound b> Officers of the Salt Lake Count} Sheriffs Office. 
Since both of these issues direct!) and relevant!) support a key iact and point of mine that 
Plaintiff reckiessiv impiovideiitK> and utterly failed to mitigate the damages inclined to them 
j to me, also.) by their impetuous, arbitrary and capricious decision to repossess my car right 
from under me for no legitimate reason whatsoe\ei\ (none that stands up to close scrutiny,) 
froth of these enclosed Affidavit/Declaration documents are made available foi this Court's 
consideration in support of my pre\iously stated position. And, while there has been a Hearing 
scheduled in this mattei foi March 2nd, '09, it is my understanding that in offering these two 
documents into evidence, it is my obligation to also make these two records "available foi 
inspection sufticiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a 
fair opportunity to challenge them/' Accordingly, they are hereby being shared with Plaintiff, 
also. 
Rjit 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereb} certify that a cop} of the foiegoing and attached document (NOTICE TO 
COURT, AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE) was sent to the 
following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for Case 
#080903840. 
TO. Richard C Terr} and Douglas 0\ iatt 
Attorneys foi Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 " 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
DATED THIS J-C^ day of / ^ V > ^ / ^ ^ , 2009 
Harry F.Suniville, Ji., PRO SE 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 




Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff 
AFFIDAVIT / DECLARATION 
FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO 
BODY AND PAINT 
Case # 080903840 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Dick and Shannon [{JfZ / / ? / u/ , do solemnly state as follows: 
1. 1 am/We are over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts 
set forth below. 
2. I am a certified mechanic (or wife and business partner) and I have worked in the 
automotive repair industry practically all my life (for c*jQ number of years). My main areas 
of professional expertise are auto body repairs and painting. 
3. I/We derive our income from a business centered around that same expertise, and we 
call our company Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint. Our business address is currently located 
at 608 W. Center Street, Midvale, UT. 84047, 
4. We are both well acquainted with Harry F. Suniville, Jr., because on several occasions 
in the past we have been asked to perform inspection, estimation, and auto body icpairs, plus 
painting services, on a succession of different Mitsubishi Eclipse automobiles owned by him, 
starting with autumn, 2003. 
5. On or about October 9,h, 2007, we were asked by Harry F. Suniville, Jr., to inspect his 
cayenne red 2003 model year Mitsubishi Eclipse, and to provide a repair estimate for the work 
that would be required to fix a dent on this car's passenger-side front fender. I believe he might 
have explained at that time that this newer dent on his car had been caused by a drunken 
apartment-complex neighbor. 
6. At the time of this estimation for new repair services required, there were then 
pending between us, by previous verbal contract and understanding, some as-yet-unmade repairs 
enough to pay for an after-market front fiberglass bumper panel, and for the painting which 
ivould be required to fix his front end entirely; and these repairs were put on hold and left 
pending at customer's request, until such time as he could come up with the money required to 
pay for the newest repairs (to his front fender.) At that time, it was our plan that then all of the 
needed auto body repairs could be made at once and simultaneously. This is always the better 
plan because then all required auto body painting can be flawlessly matched. 
7. At the time of this, the last estimate on record at our shop, it is my belief, and my 
strong recollection, that for the final estimate price of $511.8i, (body work parts and labor,) 
Harry's car could have been fixed up and made cosmetically (from an auto body and paint 
perspective,) ccgood as new" - that is, restored to a 'showroom quality' condition of repair. We 
have submitted a true and correct copy of this formal Repair Estimate, and it is attached to this 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
8. Furthermore, I know for a fact that Harry's front bumper assembly, although broken 
off in places at the bottom, needed no new front bumper support, (a $95.°° part,) because Harry 
had already paid for a new front bumper support: one which we previously had installed for him 
as a cash purchase, and because he wanted to ensure himself- while replacement of the broken 
fiberglass front bumper panel remained in limbo -that all the other extrinsic and attached parts 
of the bumper assembly, and that didn't need repair, nor replacement, as they were already "good 
as new" (that is, reflector plastic, turn signal lights, and both front headlight assemblies) could 
stay solidly affixed - without shake or rattle. In other words, his broken front bumper fiberglass 
was previously, at our shop, and by one of our mechanics, firmly tied down to a brand new, 
replacement, front bumper support. 
9. Now, I have had opportunity just recently to read a document submitted to this Court 
by Jordan Credit Union titled "Declaration of Ken Martinez" and it is my honest opinion: freely 
submitted here in consideration of "front bumper support," falsely alleged as needed, and many 
other seeming inconsistencies, also, but mostly based upon my/our own personal knowledge and 
recall - and especially submitted in the interest of simple justice - that he (this "Ken Martinez") 
is plainly lying with regards to the state of, and condition of repairs on Harry's car. 
10. For one thing, 1 have already stated what I know about the front bumper support 
And I want to personally contradict the testimony of this "Ken Martinez" relative to same, 
because we know by our own shop's records, and personal knowledge, that this front bumper 
support allegedly needed had already been replaced! 
11. In truth, I/we find this "Declaration of Ken Martinez" plainly laughable and 
ludicrous, because by professional experience, nobody can accurately price anything (neither 
after-market used parts, nor new, factory/replacement parts,) without first knowing the exact 
model year of the car to which estimates are being made. Additionally, it is plain to me that this 
is a fraudulent and greatly exaggerated assessment of the true condition of Harry's car, and I/we 
base this opinion on personal knowledge of Harry's car as I/we last saw it in October '07. 
12. Accordingly, I now have had occasion to read Harry's answer to the lawsuit 
complaint to which he has subsequently been forced to defend himself. Specifically, I/we have 
now have had an opportunity to actually read parts of Harry's answer to this lawsuit, and the case 
he makes therein (called MLMORANIHJM AND RLPLY SUBMIIIKD IN SUPPORI o* MOIION 10 DISMISS 
AND DLFENDANI'S ANSWER io PLAIN IJNM'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINI, AND AS AN OPPOSING RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) @ §3, §5, §6, §8, §9, §10 on Pages 4-7, AND, 
based upon my/our personal and professional knowledge of this car in question, particularly in 
regards to this car's actual and true condition of repair - as we personally know and recall it to 
be in October '07 - we both wish to weigh in and hereby attest and testify under oath that to the 
very best of our knowledge and belief, Everything that Harry has told this Court and stated 
therein is factually true. 
13. Moreover, based upon ray own professional knowledge and experience, when an 
automobile's car ignition system requires a computer chip ignition key to operate, and as Harry's 
2003 Mitsubishi required, that car will simply not start and run for more than a second or two, 
until, with a computer code supplied only by Mitsubishi Motors, a new computer chip key has 
been made to order by key-code specifications. It is an expensive proposition then to duplicate 
such a key; and locksmiths typically charge $125.00 and more to duplicate an ignition key that is 
capable of operating the car. 
14. Also, based upon my professional experience, if everything wrong with Harry's car 
were really true - all that this "Ken Martinez" has alleged - then there is not a mechanic in this 
world who would have passed the cai for safety and emissions testing and certification, as I 
personally know would have been required for Harry's mandatory, by end-of-October deadline, 
in order that the current registration be renewed with new current-registration (October) stickers, 
as required by the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles. In fact, we both do actually recall 
that the expense of this was one of the reasons why our own Mirror Image body shop repaiis 
were left pending and in climbo' at that time, back in October when the last formal Mirror Image 
Estimate of Repairs was deferred and postponed pending the availability of the last $500.00 or so 
required with the plan being that, then, all of the then-pending repans required to perfectly 
restore Harry's cai to a showroom quality of repairs could be made all at once, then 
simultaneously painted, all at once Certainly, official records at the Utah State Department of 
Motor Vehicles could confirm and \erify, corroborate, the accuracy cf this pari of our statement, 
regarding these October vehicle registration - and prerequisite safety mid emissions testing 
certifications. 
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SAITH NAUGHT. 







Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint 
608 W. Center Street 
Mich ale, UT 84047 
^TA'HP H I TTTAT4 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALI' LAKE ) 
fO da\ of 
Subscribed, sworn to. and acknowledged before me on this 
F^b>. . 2009. by SWyv*h UJaVi^L & 
_, signcr(s) of the above instrument, who duh acknowledged to mc 
that he she executed the same. 
M) Commission Expires ffi > ^ Q^Q^) Notarv Seal 
KAREN FREHNER 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
My Comm. Expires Aug 28, 2009 
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2003 MITSUBISHI ECLIPSE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document 
(AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO BODY AND PAINT) 
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for 
Case #080903840. 
TO: Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
DATED THIS ^ f V ^ > day of 
Harry F. SiMiiville, Jr., PRO SE 
#17205 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
OH -10/59-o 
SENTENCE MEMORANDUM 
TO: BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE R E C E I V E D 
FROM: ERIC BARKER, INVESTIGATING OFFICER QQ~ 0 3 200B 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, SALT LAKE JBO^ BOKDF PARDONS 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
DATE: 12/02/2008 
OFFENDER #:8481 
RE: SUNIVILLE, Hany F 
THIRD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY CASE#: 071909070 
OFFENSE: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
Per the request of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the following is submitted for your 
consideration: 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendant was originally charged with: 
Count 1. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony. 
Count 2. Possession of a Controlled Substance, Third Degree Felony. 
Count 3. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 4. Ignition Interlock Violation, Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 5. Driving on a Denied License, Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 6. Improper Backing, Infraction. 
Thru plea negotiations the defendant pled to: 
Count 1. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony. 
Count 2, Dismissed. 
Count 3. Dismissed. 
Count 4. Dismissed. 
Counts. Dismissed. 
Count 6, Dismissed. 
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I There is no victim in this case. 
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PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: 
Mr. Suniville was first placed on supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole in 1983, 
after completing a diagnostic evaluation. Mr. Suniville successfully completed this probation in 
1984. After this date, Mr. Suniville acquired numerous charges and served substantial amounts 
of time at the Utah State Prison and granted numerous opportunities to comply with jparbl^Mi^ 
Suniville's parole was revoked or terminated as an inmate case on several occasions. 
On April 21, 2008, Judge Skanchy in the Salt Lake Third District Court placed Mr. Suniville on 
36 months probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case #071902846. Mr. Suniville 
acquired case #071909070 prior to being sentenced on this case. 
Mr. Suniville failed to initiate the terms of probation set by Judge Skanchy's Court. Mr. 
Suniville has had the opportunity to complete probation as well as parole with Adult Probation 
and Parole stemming back to 1981. Several of these opportunities were terminated as an inmate 
case. 
Mr. Suniville was sentenced to probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case # 071902846. 
Due to violations of the terms of probation the defendant's probation was terminated 
unsuccessfully. 
PENDING CASES: 
According to a search of the Utah State Courts X Change System, the defendant has no pending 
cases. 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: 
Mr. Suniville has been placed on supervised probation as well as supervised parole with Adult 
Probation and Parole on numerous occasions. Mr. Suniville has displayed a history of non-
compliance with the conditions set by the courts as well as the Board of Pardons. Mr. Suniville 
has had the majority of his supervised cases terminated unsuccessfully and parole being revoked 
and terminated as inmate cases. Adult Probation and Parole believes the defendant has a lack of 
desire to comply with these conditions and shown this inability throughout the past two decades 
of supervised probation and parole attempts. 
On the Level of Service Inventory, an internal assessment tool, used by this agency to determine 
the level of supervision and the risk to reoffend, the defendant scored in the High Risk category 
with the following areas identified as his highest areas of need and risk: 
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Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
PROSE 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent 
vs. 
Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff 
MEMORANDUM AND REPLY 
(Submitted in SUPPORT OF 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
[Original] COMPLAINT), AND AS AN 
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Case # 080903840 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
Comes now before this Court, Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE, and as the Defendant in 
the above-notated action, hereby submits this MEMORANDUM AND REPLY (In support of 
my preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs [Original] Complaint,) 
AND which is also hereby respectfully submitted in Opposition Response and Reply to 
Plaintiffs OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Here it may now be required or appropriate for me to point out that my MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND DEFENDANT 'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF 'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, (the pleading that I 
filed with this Court November 4th, '08) is not, (as Plaintiff asserts,) really a "renewed" 
MOTION TO DISMISS, insomuch as it was the only argument (besides this one you now hold 
in your hand,) so far submitted by me in answer to Plaintiffs Original Complaint - since this 
Court set aside the Default Judgment against me in its MINUTE ENTRY dated October 8th, but 
allowing, nonetheless, an open window for Plaintiff to start the proceedings anew by mailing me 
a copy of their original Complaint, which I did not have, up until its receipt by me on October 
21, the benefit of having anytime ever before then received. 
Now, Plaintiff has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with their 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in 
Opposition to Defendant's "Renewed" Motion to Dismiss [Henceforth referred to as Plaintiffs 
new Memorandum. . .] - And this is my Opposing Response and Reply to that. 
Quite frankly, I continue to be astounded at Plaintiffs impudence in continuing to pursue 
this lawsuit even after the egregious abuse and mistreatment of me as their used-to-be car loan 
customer is brought to light, and when their apology would seem, to me at least, to be the more 
deserved and appropriate response under these circumstances. 
Now replying to these newly-filed Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and In 
Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, both of which were delivered to me at 
evening mail call on Tuesday night, November 25th, I will follow Plaintiffs example, in order to 
avoid unnecessary duplication and in consideration of a more economical use of the Court's 
time, by requesting that these facts and arguments offered herein in reply, and in support of and 
favoring my MOTION TO DISMISS, to also appropriately be considered as my address of, and 
my Opposition Response to, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (along with its 
Supporting Memorandum). I believe these facts and arguments presented herein also, and 
accordingly - including some 25 material disputes as to genuine issue of fact - support a Court 
denial of said Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Memorandum starts off by saying my Motion "raises no new issues or presents 
any new and relevant facts to be addressed . . . Plaintiff objects to the entirety of Defendant's 
motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists of nothing more than 
baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a single piece of relevant 
and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible evidence for the 
Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be denied." (Pg. 2, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities) 
However, the Original Complaint filed against me was based entirely upon an alleged 
failure by me "to make payments when due pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement" (Their 
words: See #7, First Cause of Action); and in the Complaint's Second [and only other] "Cause 
of Action," (@ #14,) it is based upon the unfounded and redundant allegation that, "Defendant 
has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to them [him?] without 
compensating Plaintiff..." Moreover, both the supposed "Breach of Contract," and "Unjust 
Enrichment," which are the First and Second (and only) Cause(s) of Action, as named in this 
Complaint, individually and collectively pivot upon this key point: an alleged failure of me to 
make my car payments [plural payments] on time. Accordingly then, in my Defendant 
MOTION TO DISMISS, I effectively showed, supported by notarized affidavit from U.S. Bank 
Private Client Group Vice President Michael Poulter, and other evidence(s) as well, that these 
Plaintiff allegations, which were the very foundation of their Complaint against me, was a 
foundation made of sand: that their case against me must necessarily fall, and fail, once the 
foundational basis crumble and is proven to be false - which it was. 
Now, it is almost laughable for Plaintiff to go backwards and try to clean it up, to switch 
up/change the foundational allegation by now saying (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, @pg. 
9,) "Defendant failed to make the required payment" [singular payment] and "This claim is 
based on the fact that the debt was accelerated by Plaintiff following default and pursuant to the 
Agreement." 
One has to interject the question, here directed to Plaintiff, how is a notarized affidavit 
from Jordan Credit Union Collection Officer Michelle Rogers any more credible than a notarized 
statement from my mothers' bank Vice President, and why, if my Motion and evidence really 
"raises no new issues or presents any new and relevant facts to be addressed," has it required you 
to change your entire story in pursuit of these bogus claims? 
Fortunately, I have faith that this Court will give impartial and even-handed consideration 
to the true facts of this case - will throw the lawsuit out of court if such is the appropriate relief 
and remedy when one party changes their whole story mid-stream, or submits pleadings and 
argument so transparently 'squirming' and disingenuous as has this Plaintiff Jordan Credit 
Union. 
Moreover, since this case at issue also pivots upon this loan contract here at issue, I 
would hope and pray for this Court to furthermore bear in mind the intrinsic 'Big Picture' here at 
stake. That it will reinforce my faith and belief in the fairness of Courts generally, by 
considering the precedent being set if a lender like Jordan Credit Union is allowed to just run 
rough-shod over the rights and legitimate property interests of those who choose to finance their 
purchase of a car. 
Please consider how you would feel, personally, to be so shabbily mistreated by a lender; 
and how nobody in his right mind would dare to finance a car if these kinds of lender behavior 
(as characterized by the words and actions of the Plaintiff themselves,) were the norm. 
Please consider that in big bold all capital letters near the bottom of the Loan Agreement 
and Contract are the words: "NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT is 
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." Also, 
that even though I am, in my stumbling and awkward pro se ignorance, at a loss to know enough 
to specifically invoke what surely must be inherent Consumer Protections written into laws and 
regulations like Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, (Article 9, and elsewhere,) and in 
the Courts' precedent interpretations of same, to be used in my defense - that doesn't make these 
claims, protections and defenses any less real or relevant to this case at hand. Finally, I would 
hope and pray this Court to pay special attention to the Plaintiffs own words in their version of 
the foregoing events, and of Plaintiff s actions that their own words describe with this central 
question always in mind: were they acting like prudent and responsible business people when 
they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand, or could their preceding actions more 
properly be regarded, (and as I would certainly characterize them,) as arbitrary, capricious, hasty 
and reckless? 
Sometimes the truth, or more of it than a dissembling person would choose to tell, will 
inadvertently slip out; I believe Plaintiffs choice of words, (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, 
[and version of events] @ Pg. 12,) "Plaintiff... in the end opted for the less burdensome route" 
is a poignant case-in-point because it is an unintended but succinct self-described summarization 
and revelation of Plaintiff s impetuous and callous disregard of me, and of my own inherent 
property rights in the car loan collateral/asset and vehicle (my car!) here at issue. They made 
absolutely zero effort at any step along the way to treat either me, or my/their collateral asset 
property, with any respect whatsoever on the assumption that I could be made to pay under the 
terms of this contract no matter how irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary and capricious, their own 
actions in regards to it. And that, in my humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious 
"Breach of Contract/' by Plaintiff, to be herein considered. 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Once again, freshly stated anew, these are some of the disputed material facts in this case. 
In plain language, I strongly dispute Plaintiffs allegations regarding my car's condition. I 
believe and assert that my car was kept in reasonably good condition and repair for the 2+ years 
that I faithfully made my car payments on time to the Plaintiff. In Plaintiffs most recent 
rendition of their story, (their latest Memorandum of Points . . .) they allege it was not, and they 
attempt to partially explain their decision to repossess my car from off the impound lot where it 
was being temporarily stored as being based on this disputed allegation that it, (my car) was not 
kept in good condition. Interestingly, Plaintiff in their own latest Memorandum of Points, can be 
seen to contradict themselves: 
"At the time of the initial [only] notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues 
related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known." [Emphasis added] (See Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points... Pg. 5 @ Tfl2; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ K 14). Remember, 
this notice of repossession mailed to my mother's house - the only notice they ever bothered to 
send anywhere, and not received by me until January 17th, the day I got out of jail - was dated 
12/11/07, and it informed me, (See Exhibit C, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers,) "On 
12/10/2007, Jordan Credit Union repossessed the 2003 Mitsubishi used as collateral on the above 
loan." 
However, these statements of theirs are contradicted elsewhere, (See Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points. . . Pg. 3 @ [^4; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ |^7) where they 
allege, "While the Collateral remained impounded... Plaintiff learned that the vehicle had 
extensive body damage and would not start. [Emphasis added] On the good faith belief that he 
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and 
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or 
about December 10, 2007." 
2- What's more, I dispute both parts of this allegation (extensive body damage and 
would not start) regarding my car's true condition of maintenance and repair. And, I assert that 
it can only remain an undisputed material fact - one that directly contradicts Plaintiff allegations 
- that this car was running just fine right up until the traffic stop by S.L. County Sheriffs that 
resulted in my arrest and the impound of my vehicle. This begs the question: Where does this 
falsely alleged and non-existent, so-called "engine problem" come from? 
Were I not so handicapped of resources like unlimited phone calls, or access to legal self-
help and law books that many people not presently incarcerated might tend to take for granted -
particularly were I not so pressured by time restraints in keeping to Court-filing deadlines - there 
are several relevant issues come immediately to mind as screaming for more extensive scrutiny 
by means of discovery. 
3. First, I have previously stated, in my first Defendant response to this original 
Complaint (my Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs [original] Complaint,) 
that there were some admittedly then-pending body damage repairs that needed to be made on 
my car when it was impounded. I also provided this Court an Exhibit C, therein, which was a 
previously obtained formal Estimate for all of these needed repairs, dated October 9, 2007, from 
Mirror Image Body and Paint. It is where I get all of my body damage repairs made - both 
previously on this very same car in question, and on cars that I have owned before this one -
especially my 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse that I sold when I upgraded to this newer 2003 now at 
issue. I go to them because they, (owners Dick and his wife Shannon, who over time have also 
become my friends,) do first-class, excellent showroom quality work at a fraction of the cost 
some other body shops might charge for the same amount of work. As an example, when my 
previous car, (before this one at issue, the 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse,) was "run over" by a large 
semi-truck, crushing a corner of its roof, in turn shattering the front windshield and drivers' side 
window, with extensive door and quarter panel damage, too, the first estimate for body damage 
repairs I obtained was in excess of $4400.00, the second one came in closer to $4800.00, and 
then my very expert auto mechanic (Lynn's Auto, Murray, where all my cars get very expertly 
mechanically-maintained,) recommended I take it to Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint: and 
iere it was fixed for 'good as new' at a cost of only $1500.00 (approximately). We 
ibsequently hung before-and-after photos of my car, and of their extremely professional repairs, 
n their office wall to advertise for future, quality-seeking customers! 
4. Now consider this Plaintiff-submitted "Declaration" of Ken Martinez whose name and 
usiness appear nowhere on any on-line directory, in any capacity as an auto repair business (at 
sast none that my prison caseworker could find when he 'surfed' Google and Dex, and other 
lirectories looking,) and whose credentials are stated to be, "I have been asked on several 
occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair services on vehicles repossessed by 
ordan Credit Union." In this "Declaration" he further asserts, "8. Jordan Credit Union declined 
o have the repairs made because the cost was greater than what the car would sell for at 
mction." Doesn't such a statement seem just a little contrived, and coached, and self-serving, 
;oming as it does from a "several occasions" in the past mechanic for a financial institution like 
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union? - particularly if the sale of a $9,000.00 car for only $200.00 was 
really an "arms-length" transaction, as Plaintiff alleges? 
5. When I contacted the salvage yard owner who ended up buying my 2003 Mitsubishi 
Eclipse in my efforts to try and reverse the outrageously ludicrous transaction whereby my 
$9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car had been sold to him for only $200.00, he refused, not 
surprisingly; and, he asked me to provide him a key for my car because the necessary computer-
chip key, (with codes available only from Mitsubishi: my car had a keyless entry and ignition 
lock system which made duplicate keys very hard to come by, or at least expensive, since by 
personal experience, key duplication cost in excess of $125.00,) - that is, the only key then 
existing, had stayed in my pocket when I was taken to jail. And this, of course, in turn then begs 
the question: what was Ken Martinez using for a key when he was determining my car "would 
not start"? Too, does this help to explain all his confusion about windows supposedly broken? 
6. Moreover, I question, and I dispute, altogether, and most firmly, many more aspects of 
this "Declaration's" assertions as well because I believe it is a deliberate exaggeration and 
distortion of the true condition of my car now belatedly, and at second-hand, alleged by Plaintiff 
solely to strengthen their bogus claims in this matter. 
Next consider this: in his so-called inspection and estimation of repair services, this self-
described "mechanic" [notice: not auto body mechanic] identified my car as a "2002 Mitsubishi 
Eclipse"- and with the model year wrong, (mine was a 2003,) how can he possibly, and 
accurately price replacement parts? 
7. Additionally, there was nothing at all wrong with either headlight assembly, though 
his greatly exaggerated Estimate lists them both as needing replacement at a cost of $265.00 
apiece. His same estimate invoice says a Passenger Window was broken, and a taillight, and that 
a right front tire was "flat." Now, if the car had truly lacked both headlights, and a taillight, 
doesn't it seem likely that the Sheriff who cited me for not having an "Ignition Interlock 
Device," (which I never have been required to have on any car of mine, and who also cited me 
for DUI even though my breathalyzer testing at the time of arrest showed 0.00, and blood testing 
at the scene of arrest also resulted in 0.00 blood toxicology,) - would then overlook such basic 
vehicle equipment violations as these would be? 
8. Now turning back to his written testimony, (See "Declaration", @ 6) he states "body 
damage to the entire right side of the vehicle," in addition to both front headlight assemblies, 
passenger window broken,. . . broken tail light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition, the 
vehicle would not start." (I ask again, what ignition key was he using?) And, here, different 
from the written and itemized Estimate, (See Attachment to his written "Declaration(s)") my 
"driver automatic window" also turns up to be allegedly, unon-operating," and yet, it is the 
Driver Door Glass which he says needs replacement on the left side, bottom, of his formal 
Estimate of Repairs - and it is the Passenger Window broken on the right side of his itemized 
Estimate of Repairs! With window replacements priced at $420.00 this is not an insignificant 
discrepancy, and he has told three differing accounts on only two pieces of paper! Moreover, 
when I last saw my car, no window was broken, and my Exhibit from the Impound Tow Truck 
driver will prove this to be so. 
9. Furthermore, on this "Declaration's" attached itemized Estimate of Repairs, note that 
the gas lid is listed at a replacement cost of $45.00! Additionally, that the alleged replacement 
cost of a bumper support is listed at $95.00: Yet, Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint would tell 
you that we had already replaced the front bumper support preparatory to the complete, then-
pending (at the time of repossession) body shop repairs that would have rendered my car 
cosmetically to a "good as new" state of repair. 
10. In November/October of '07, the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint formal estimate 
of pending repairs (and which I previously submitted to this Court in my most recent pleadings 
as an Exhibit C,) priced all of my then-pending and needed repairs at $511.81 - and these 
included repairs to the front fiberglass bumper, which we 'jerry-rig' and temporarily repaired by 
tying down the old, broken one to the newly-installed bumper support, with arrangements then 
made for a new front bumper cover (already paid for in advance, early October) and that was part 
of the final and complete repairs which we at that time put on hold for the remaining $500.00, 
(earmarked from my Christmas money,) to be paid. Then, and that way, everything needing the 
slightest bit of attention to keep this prized sports car of mine a 'hot' car could all be painted at 
once. Hence, and in short, this temporary, 'jerry rig' repair of the broken front bumper - tied to 
the newly-installed bumper support, so that all adjacent parts could be held in place securely, not 
to rattle around, possibly fall off- could not have been made at all except that the bumper 
support that Ken Martinez has alleged was needed was already installed and in place. 
Here, I suppose I have raised questions by herein admitting that there were, in fact, some 
automotive body shop repairs then pending for this car here in question and that it would have 
been "less burdensome" or more convenient to ignore altogether. Except that I have faith that 
even a simple man telling the simple truth can prevail in our Courts if the unvarnished truth of 
things supports such a verdict. In life, sometimes the truth can be messy, maybe inconvenient, or 
at least complicated. Too, as I write this, I am also now remembering that some of these then-
pending auto body repair charges were being deferred and juggled against other expenses, and 
these other expenses, necessarily put first, included the annual licensing and registration, 
complete with complete safety and emission testing that always has been due on this particular 
car of mine before the end of October. Certainly, anybody who has ever owned a car will 
appreciate the fact that car maintenance is usually a 'work in progress.' I still have a full set of 
service receipts and records on this car which would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that all 
routine and preventative mechanical maintenance and repairs were always made on time for as 
long as I had this car under contract of the Loan Agreement. Similarly, when this credit union 
lender first asked me to ensure that the full insurance which I have always carried on this car -
including comprehensive and collision insurance coverage - was renegotiated with my insurance 
carrier to include a higher-priced policy of less deductible on the comprehensive and collision 
insurance parts of my coverage package, I readily and promptly attended to that responsibility of 
mine, also. 
Still, because the cost of all the then-pending body damage repairs on my car were less 
:han the deductible, it remained for me to do this as I could afford to, ie. with Christmas money 
from my mother. It was by far the more prudent and economical of choices regarding same for 
:hese repairs to the front end (requiring a new fiberglass bumper cover @ $235.00,) and to the 
passenger side front-fender panel (@ $125.00 as itemized by Ken Martinez; $175.00 @ Mirror 
image Auto Body and Paint,) because it is far easier and better to paint everything all at once, 
resides being less intrusive to the car's normal, day-to-day usage. 
One other consideration also played into this minimal delay of mine in getting everything 
Ixed for good as new, with my car restored to an excellent, almost 'mint5 condition of 
naintenance and repair with Christmas money, and that was the circumstances of my apartment 
complex neighbor, next door to me in Apartment 4, having made October arrangements with me 
o compensate me in $50.00 installments out of his weekly paychecks as a means of paying for 
he approximate $250.00 in damages to my right front fender when his drunken and uninsured 
girlfriend hit my car with her own when sloppily parking her car in the stall immediately 
idjacent to my #5 apartment parking stall. I agreed to this arrangement - in the interest of 
teighbor relations - not to file an insurance claim because these repairs were only half the 
mount of my deductible, and thus would have represented an out-of-pocket expense anyway, 
given her uninsured status,) figuring that $250.00 in installments was better than nothing 
oming from her non-existent insurance coverage. They were a purely cosmetic dent damage 
nyway, a dent that did not affect in any way my headlight, nor my wheel. 
I apologize to this Court for all these many words: but at least they have the virtue of 
eing unvarnished truth, even if somewhat complicated to explain - and with the advantage that 
very aspect of these circumstances surrounding the roughly $500.00 then pending to complete 
11 repairs can be completely confirmed and verified by all these other persons, and facts, 
ivolved. 
11. Since obviously, taking all of these facts and circumstances and arguments of mine 
lto consideration, into account, there remains a lot of controverted material facts relative to 
laintiff s allegation that my car was in terrible condition when they arbitrarily decided to 
^possess it - particularly since, depending upon which version of their story one chooses to 
elieve regarding my car's true and actual condition, its condition after impound is being used as 
justification for their capricious decision to accelerate the loan payments and to repossess this 
>an collateral. Perhaps even more importantly, the true condition of my car has a very direct 
taring on my own argument that they failed miserably to mitigate their alleged collateral 
jficiency damages by selling my car - the collateral asset - for a mere pittance of its real and 
ue, actual value. 
12. Because this is a core issue at the heart of this case, I inquire of the Court, "What 
ould it take to depose these 2 witnesses from "Ken Martinez" and from Mirror Image Body and 
lint, respectively? To depose other witnesses I might call in my defense to set the record 
raight regarding my prized sports car service and maintenance records, or the neighbors and 
ends who would not hesitate to confirm my story that this car (regardless some relatively 
inor and pending, purely cosmetic repairs to the front bumper and passenger-side (right) front 
ader,) was always kept in a reasonably good condition and state of repair? How can I, without 
>urt extensions of filing deadlines, introduce into the record photographs of my car to lend 
tter credence to these assertions of mine, and to my side of these very substantial, and 
piificant, disputed material facts? 
13. Meanwhile, I wish to now introduce into the record my Exhibit A, Attached -
which is the Vehicle Impound Report issued by Guillermo Blanco Towing at the date and time of 
my arrest and the subsequent decision by S.L. County Sheriff to impound my car. (Please Note 
that with all or nearly all of my Exhibits herein, including this one here at hand, and previously 
too, I am sending the Original, and not a copy, to this Court.) This Vehicle Impound Report, 
issued by the arresting officer and Guillermo Blanco Towing necessarily addresses the condition 
of the vehicle being impounded with some small thoroughness, lest the owner of the vehicle 
when coming to the impound lot to reclaim the vehicle try to blame them for pre-existing 
damages. This, very sadly for me, turns out to be the last time I ever saw my car, (though I had 
already been hauled off in handcuffs before this Report was ever written,) - and that's because 
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union interjected themselves between myself and Blanco Towing by 
maliciously and capriciously repossessing my car from off the Blanco Towing Impound Lot. 
And, a close examination directly contradicts the greatly exaggerated claims of damage alleged 
by Plaintiff to this car at issue. 
Nowhere does this Vehicle Impound Report's list of pre-existing damages list, for 
example, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids, nor broken headlights, broken taillights -
all of which the itemized Estimate and "Declaration" submitted by Plaintiff- now obviously 
fraudulently - does allege! Furthermore, when one compares the reported odometer reading 
between this Vehicle Impound Report and the Itemized Estimate submitted by Plaintiff, it would 
appear either he or the repossession company drove my "non-starting" car an additional 40 
miles! 
14. Given all of these contradictions that are clearly evident throughout Plaintiffs 
contentions that my car was not kept in an overall and reasonably good condition of repair, as I 
believe, and testify that it was, their contention that $2665.00 would be required to fix my car, 
not including engine repairs (as declared by their affidavits), or "well in excess of $3,000.00 to 
make the car saleable," (See new Plaintiff Memorandum of Points... @ Pg. 11) there probably 
exists right here, alone, grounds adequate enough - if not to throw their case out of Court in its 
entirety - then to at least dismiss their Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of all these 
disputed material facts? 
II. PLAINTIFF IS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Plaintiff is in Breach of Contract: both the 'letter' of the Loan Contract Agreement has been 
violated by them, along with and as well as its 'spirit'. 
-15. I dispute "reasonable notice," as Plaintiff has asserted. Plaintiffs new Memorandum 
of Points.. . places much of the emphasis and focus of their arguments upon the Loan Contract 
Agreement that I signed at the time I purchased my car, and a copy of said Contract is submitted 
by them as an Exhibit A, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers. Then they have repeatedly 
asserted that I "was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action." 
(See new Plaintiff Memorandum, @ pg. 10; also as a so-called Fact #8 @ Pg. 4; and in Michelle 
Rogers' Affidavit @ #11, also.) 
Yet, the letter that they sent to me at my mother's house on December 11 th, (See 
Plaintiff Exhibit C, Attached to Michelle Rogers' Affidavit) and which they freely admit was 
their only outgoing attempt at any kind of communication with me throughout the course of this 
entire fiasco, very clearly says, "Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in cash or 
cashier's check by 12/20/07, the credit union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids. 
We will then sell the collateral to the highest approved bidder... A sale may take place at any 
time without further notice to you. If you need more information about the sale you may write 
us or call us." Finally, from the last paragraph of their letter, "Personal belongings must be 
claimed by 12/02/2007, or they will be disposed of." This last is a pretty telling representation of 
the 'sloppy' work that characterizes Plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious, reckless, hasty and 
arrogant, most of all incompetent, actions for every step of the way henceforth forward - the sale 
of my car, particularly. 
But, anyway, back to the heart of this argument: By far more importantly, turn now 
back to the Loan Contract in question~(See my highlighted Exhibit B, Attached). "You agree 
that if any notice is required to be given to you of an intended sale or transfer of the Property, 
notice is reasonable if mailed to your last known address, as reflected in our records, at least 10 
days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such other period of time as is required 
by law)." Because 12/11 is 9, not 10 days' notice before the intended sale of 12/20/07, Plaintiff 
is clearly in default of their own obligations to this 'two-way street' Contractual Agreement! 
And thus contradicting their very own alleged material facts re. Reasonable notice by the very 
evidence they have themselves provided! Very clearly, "Reasonable Notice" never was provided 
in this case at issue. 
16. Perhaps even more importantly and central to my primary argument, they have 
themselves also breached the essential spirit of this Contract, as well as its letter. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit B, submitted in their newest pleadings, is the Notice of Impounded 
Vehicle sent to Jordan Credit Union as the title holder of my car by the Utah State Tax 
Commission advising them that my car was impounded to Blanco Towing's Impound Yard. 
Note that the only thing 'scary' or irreversible about this notice is the advisement that towing and 
daily storage fees will be required to get the car out of impound, and that "Failure to claim 
vehicle listed above within 30 days may result in the sale of the vehicle at public auction," and 
dated December 3rd. Presumably this letter triggered all of Plaintiff s behavior that followed. 
According to Michelle Rogers, (See her Affidavit @ f7; also, Plaintiffs newest Memorandum, 
Pg. 3 @ f4) "Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's 
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement." 
The Contract Agreement does have a provision that says "You will keep the Property in 
your possession in good condition and repair . . . Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the 
Property will be located at your address..." But, it also says, "By choosing any one or more of 
these remedies, we do not waive our right to later use another remedy. By deciding not to use 
any remedy, we do not give up our right to consider the event a default if it happens again." 
[Emphasis added] In other words, lender, (in this case Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union,) reserves 
the right always to make subjective judgment regarding same, and exercise these rights to default 
and to the full extent of the law and this contract, i/the situation seems to call for such dire 
measures, seems to present a problem that places in jeopardy the lender's security interest in the 
collateral (car) purchased with the proceeds of the car loan they elected to accept. 
People financing a car enter into these kinds of agreements with their eyes open (one 
would assume or hope), certainly: For example, everyone knows that if they fail in their primary 
and most important obligation - namely, their agreement to make all of their agreed-upon car 
payments on time, they will very soon afterward lose the car. Similarly, that the lender's 
security interest in the vehicle collateral must be protected at all times - meaning full insurance 
to the lender's complete satisfaction, and the car commensurately and also kept in good 
condition and repair - or again, they should not be surprised to soon lose their car to repossession 
if they fail in these primary obligations and responsibilities to the lender. 
However, and nonetheless, the Contract is a two-way street, and the borrower, as the 
registered owner of the vehicle in question has his own vested property rights and interests at 
stake in his purchase of it, and thus is surely entitled to reasonable assurance and expectations 
that the lender will accordingly respect his own property rights, and treat him fairly and in 
accordance with, and in harmony with, reasonable and responsible, acceptable and established 
standards of normal business lender behavior - not willy-nilly considering him in default at the 
slightest deviation from the Tine print', surely. In other words, provided he has met all of his 
most important obligations to the lender, the registered owner of the vehicle is surely entitled to 
just a little leeway with regards to where he parks his vehicle: different from his home if he's 
sleeping over at a girlfriend's house, or on vacation out of town, for example. Provided he has 
insurance policy coverage on the vehicle that allows it, (and no jeopardy to the lender,) perhaps 
he's not constantly and technically "in possession" of the vehicle at all times because some other 
licensed driver has been given permission to drive his car; or as another example, perhaps he's 
not constantly and technically "in possession" if the car's been left overnight at the service 
mechanic's shop... Yet, despite these small 'fine print' deviations from the "in possession" 
clause, is there any reasonable-thinking person who would really and truly consider him to be "in 
default" of the car loan contract? And, certainly, if his important obligation to keep his car in 
reasonably good condition of maintenance and repair has been met, if all the important 
mechanical maintenance, preventative maintenance, upkeep and repair has been satisfied, and 
evidences diligent care and concern for the legitimate property interests of the lender, then "in 
good faith" nearly everyone would have an unstated understanding that inevitably sometimes a 
needed repair is on pending status while waiting for parts, money, time enough, etc. and surely 
that person is not then "in default" if his car has been allowed to go unwashed, say - or in my 
case, if pending cosmetic repairs have been temporarily postponed until all the money to make a 
pending repair had become available. (Remember, my car had just finished passing safety and 
emissions testing that were required for the car's annual registration and licensing obligations, 
and that were renewed for another year by State of Utah's October Renewal) 
These are only common-sense exceptions to the rule - but in retrospect, common sense 
has become to seem a very rare commodity in Plaintiffs 'scheme of things' because they have 
used the term "good faith" to mean "we can do anything we want - regardless the vested rights 
and interests of the car loan customer." In Plaintiffs vernacular, the term "good faith" has 
become an oxymoron because they use this term to justify the most arrogant, disrespectful, and 
malicious of behaviors on their own part - and if I ever hear the term from them again, rest 
assured, I'll be holding on to my wallet. Without reservation, I adamantly dispute the so-called 
material "facts" as alleged by them whenever and wherever they have used the term in their 
explanations for all that herein follows the triggering event, which was the car's impound and 
temporary storage at the tow yard. 
Plaintiff tells us, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... f4, Michelle Rogers' 
Affidavit @ |7) "On the good faith belief that he would be unable to make the required 
payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan 
repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about 12/10/07." 
And, (@ Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... f5, Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ |8,) "on the good 
faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be performed is considered a 
default." . . .Except as prohibited by law. [Emphasis added]. 
18. It is not very hard to see that this was a very large assumption {presumption, more 
like,) for them to be making on the basis of so little information. It is also yet one more of their 
so-called "material facts" that I vigorously dispute because on the basis of these flimsy 
presumptions, Plaintiff accelerated the loan's entire outstanding, unpaid balance; and then they 
repossessed my car right out from under me - from my rightful partial ownership, established by 
2+ years of monthly car payments already paid to them, on time, like clockwork, each and every 
month - when they just up and decided, (without one iota of attempted communication with me: 
their December 11th letter, and the only notice they ever even bothered to send, reported my car's 
repossession as a 'done deal' and an accomplished fact; and by then, my car had already been 
repossessed when they mailed this letter to me,) to take it from me and from off the impound lot 
where it was temporarily stored! I believe this decision made by them was entirely impetuous 
and imprudent, as well as malicious, arbitrary, and capricious - coming at me as it did without 
the slightest attempt, or courtesy whatsoever, to try and talk to me first, seemingly with zero 
regards for the uncontroverted fact that I had been for them, up until the impound and their 
subsequent decision to repossess, an entirely trouble-free, steady and reliable with my on-time, 
every-time car loan payments, kind of car loan customer. Talking to me first, or through my 
family, would most certainly have put all their collateral security-based cares and concerns (read 
after-the-fact excuses, more like,) to rest. 
19. I mean, Does it really seem to be prudent business decision-making at work when 
they stoop to say, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum. . . @ Pg. 9) "Plaintiff had no 
knowledge at that the time that Defendant's situation was any different from the many other 
cases in which debtor's [debtors] simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their 
obligations." ? This after 2+ years of making every single one of my car loan payments on time? 
20. Plaintiffs weak, feeble, and ineffectual efforts to communicate with me were 
ineffective and not at all reasonable given that they surely must have by then known where these 
monthly car payments were coming to them from: ie. my mother's bank (U.S. Bank Private 
Client Group). Moreover, there are (and always have been) 2 Salt Lake City telephone directory 
phone book listings for Suniville; both are family members, and both would have immediately 
intervened to protect both mine, and the Plaintiffs interests in my car, if only the problem had 
been in any way communicated to anybody. 
With such momentous news as this to communicate, their single Notice of Repossession 
letter, dated December 11th - and which was their only effort to communicate with me in any 
way whatsoever - sent as a Certified, Return Receipt Requested Mail or even as a telegram, 
would have been far more reasonable. Obviously, even a delinquent car loan customer would 
have received more and/or different mail than did I. 
Moreover, the Impound Notice mailed to them as the title holder by the Utah State Tax 
Commission made it evident, as well very likely, that I was in Salt Lake County Jail - put there 
by the S.L. County Sheriffs Office (the same as my car was impounded,) as a result of an arrest 
for DUI. One single telephone call to the jail would have confirmed this. It would also, by far, 
have saved everyone concerned a great deal of trouble because I, or my family acting in my 
behalf, would have immediately taken steps to protect my car from such dire and unexpected 
response precipitated by Jordan Credit Union. My point bears repeating, I think: even a 
delinquent customer, behind on his car loan payments, would have received more notice than 
was sent to me. 
Plaintiff has tried to argue that it was I who had a "duty to communicate," that I was 
given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action (which is itself 
predicated on false presumptions, and hardly a reasonable amount of notice, clearly contradicted 
even by the terms, and requirements of the Loan Contract Agreement itself, (and as I have 
already shown to be clearly defined therein.) Then, Also: that, "After receiving no 
communication from Defendant," (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... @ Pg. 6, f 13, 
Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ f 15) "Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the 
only offer received which was for $200.00"! How could I possibly be expected to remedy 
what I didn't know was happening? Please consider: I might just as easily been on an 
extended vacation out of town and inaccessible to the reach of ordinary mail. Isn't it far more 
"reasonable" an expectation that before entering into a transaction that obviously represented 
such a "bath" and egregious loss for them, as well as for me, that in the interests of pure common 
sense, as well as prudent business practices, they might have tried just a little harder to contact 
me first? Wouldn't this have been, by their own words, the by far "less burdensome route"? . .. 
if only to explore the potentiality by at least somehow attempting to assure themselves that 
their single letter had actually been received? 
Quite easily, I could have refinanced the accelerated loan balance with some other 
financial institution, (and been done with Jordan Credit Union once and for all,) for the out-of-
pocket additional expense of repossession (stated to be $869.00, according to the one, only, 
Notice of Repossession, which was ineffectually mailed to me after the repossession had become 
accomplished fact) - and which presumably, mostly, represents the charges incurred at Blanco 
Towing which I was intending and prepared to pay anyway. 
Reversing or reconsidering the default decision might have kept me in the loan with 
payments of $226.00 paid to them monthly for a long time afterwards (according to the terms of 
our Loan Contract Agreement.) So isn't it logical then, to at least wonder why they made not the 
slightest effort to somehow at least explore the barest possibility of that before they next 
proceeded to just flush all of mind and their collateral asset straight down the drain by accepting 
a single, one time payment of only $200.00? 
In fact, every other decision and action taken by Jordan Credit Union in response, and 
which, step by step, in turn precipitated all these problems that followed, seems rushed, hasty, 
and ill-considered, (as well as mean-spirited, malicious even) but mostly, reckless, capricious 
and arbitrary... One almost has to wonder whether they already had a pre-conceived agenda 
they were putting into momentum - almost as though they hoped that I wouldn't step up to 
salvage the loan and save my car? 
21. So here I must now ask this Court another critical question: How can a deposition be 
arranged to be taken from whichever Jordan Credit Union loan officer was in charge of my car 
loan when all these preceding and critical decisions were being made? Plaintiff has introduced 
into the record an Affidavit from Michelle Rogers - but was it actually she who was in charge of 
these reckless decisions at the time? Here is why I am starting to speculate and wonder about the 
worst: 
In an earlier pleading to this Court, I once stated that every time Plaintiff Jordan Credit 
Union has filed a new piece of paper, I learn something new about my car. In Plaintiffs newest 
Memorandum..., it is stated that my car was "sold for $200.00 to Midvale All Small Auto, Inc. 
on January 23rd, y08. Plaintiff mailed this Court an Exhibit A on September 18th that was 
attached to the Memorandum in Opposition (before this Court's Decision and Minute Entry that 
set the default judgment aside.) It was a notarized record of S.L. County Jail Records, and it 
shows that I was first released from jail, (following the December 3r arrest that resulted in the 
temporary impound of my car,) on January 17, J08. My own Verizon cellular phone records 
confirm and verify what I also remember: that from my very first communication with Jordan 
Credit Union, (talking to someone whose name I do not exactly remember, except that it was the 
person I was told that I must talk to because she was in charge of my loan account, and car - 1 
wrote it all down, of course, but I do not have those notes with me here,) always, from the very 
first conversation, the sale of my car was being reported as a 'done deal' and accomplished fact. 
I remember asking her incredulously, "You sold my $9,000.00 car to a salvage yard for 
$200.00!" "Yes," she answered, "it had some front end damage and we couldn't get the car to 
start.".. . Incredible! 
But here's my point, which is a huge question: Out of jail, which was not until about 5pm 
on January 17th, which was a Thursday, too late to call anybody then, I began my calls to ail-
importantly retrieve my car, on the following morning, Friday, 1/18/08 - and I was told that the 
girl I needed to talk to at Jordan Credit Union was unavailable to talk with me until that 
following Monday, which would have been January 21, '08. Now learning that the sale of my 
car did not take place, according to Plaintiffs newest Memorandum..., until January 23rd, then I 
was either being lied to when I talked to her, or she avoided all of my telephone calls for three 
days while she made the final arrangements that sold my car for a mere pittance of its actual, real 
and true value! 
Apparently there is a law already in place that is meant to ensure that the sale of a 
repossessed vehicle does not involve any self-dealing (by proxy, or otherwise, presumably.) 
Given the very fishy smell emanating from this transaction, especially in light of my own 
inquiries being stalled and/or avoided for 3 long days before - by Plaintiffs own admission -
this sale had been finalized, completed on January 23rd, I think it would be very interesting 
indeed to get both these parties in Court, or before a Deposition Hearing? . . . 
22. So, here again, I most vehemently dispute everything about the so-called material 
"facts," as characterized and alleged by this Plaintiff, regarding both the "reasonable" and 
adequate Notice provided me, the customer, by Plaintiff- along with nearly everything else 
about the sale of my car by them, and which I, in turn, must instead characterize as arbitrary and 
capricious, especially hasty and recklessly impetuous, as well as mean-spirited and malicious, or 
worse. . . There was no adequate or reasonable Notice provided me, nor was this car of mine 
sold for a fair price. 
23. I have already shown how, by far, the best price Plaintiff could have received for the 
collateral asset would have been simply to have left me in it - kept the loan alive, and thereby 
received every last penny as we originally contracted between us by the terms of the Contractual 
Loan Agreement. It would appear they very arrogantly and cavalierly assumed (presumed) that 
my mother's bank would compensate them for the entire amount of any collateral deficiency 
owing, regardless how reckless and impetuous their own failure to mitigate the collateral 
deficiency damages. It would appear they just didn't care, in their rush to find the "less 
burdensome" route. Unfortunately for them, neither my mother nor my bank has the slightest 
obligation, nor inclination, to continue to help me pay for a car I no longer have. Sadly, I have 
been sent to prison ten times over the last twenty-two years, and haven't a single valuable or 
worthwhile asset to my name, nor do I have any marketable job skills or prospects, either. Still, 
if this Court should decide not to rule in my favor, it will be a shame for my credit to have been 
fruitlessly ruined by the egregiously remiss and unfair treatment of me by this Plaintiff... and 
for the bad precedents being set, to the detriment of everyone else behind me who might be 
considering to finance a car - particularly from this Plaintiff whose bad behavior would then 
have been encouraged, rewarded and protected, no matter that they have demonstrated a callous 
indolence and disregard for my own rights and reasonable expectations in this matter. 
24. It is my contention that Plaintiffs Notice of Repossession, dated 12/11/07 - which 
was their only attempt at communication with me - and which said, (see Plaintiffs Exhibit C) 
"A sale may take place at any time without further notice to you. If you need more information 
about the sale you may write us or call us," was a most inadequate notice which not only violates 
the Loan Contract itself, (and as I have already shown, please see #15, herein,) which required 
10, not 9 days notice between December 11th and December 20th; it also seems to fall far short of 
the 'reasonable notice of the sale' required to be given to the debtor, as proscribed by law. 
25. Neither was Plaintiffs decision to sell my/their collateral asset, (my car!,) to a 
salvage yard for a mere pittance of its real, true and actual value a "commercially reasonable" 
decision. Just now please consider that when the original Loan Agreement and Contract was 
made and accepted by this Plaintiff (October 2005,) my car's retail value was accepted to be 
worth $11,500.00 which was the amount of the loan, zero down payment required, (the amount 
financed being $12,829.00 after fees and sales tax were added on.) This car was also accepted to 
be, at that time, an adequate collateral sufficiently enough to meet their own security in the 
amount loaned to me. 
Now, only 25 months later, (25 monthly payments later,) they 'stretch and scramble' to 
make the sale of this collateral seem more reasonable in their arguments, by purporting that its 
value had sunk to a mere (See Plaintiffs new Memorandum... @ Pg. 11) "wholesale price of 
the vehicle . . . between $3200.00 and $4400.00" However, this is a wholesale Trade-In value 
and it is one year more dated (Kelly Blue Book, 10/28/2008) than when they actually sold my 
car for $200.00, as evidenced by their self-serving Exhibit CD' (attached to Michelle Rogers' 
Affidavit) which, being a year different, newer, of course places less valuation on my car than it 
was worth in December, 2007. 
26. Even still, their own submitted math is wrong, becoming yet one more disputed so-
called material "facts" in this case. First, and primarily because, as I have already shown, their 
allegation that my car needed $2600.00 for enormously inflated and exaggerated costs of repair, 
additional to an undiagnosed engine problem, and as declared by Ken Martinez, lacks credibility, 
(to say it kindly.) 
Moreover, even if this Court were accepting of that testimony despite its contradiction of 
record by both Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, AND by the tow and impound receipt 
showing no broken windows, headlights, taillights, etc.. . the math is still wrong insomuch as 
$4400.00 (disputed) less greatly exaggerated costs of repairs @ $2600.00 (also disputed,) leaves 
a collateral asset amount of $1800.00, not $200.00. Furthermore, what prudent and responsible 
business person would ever loan at retail, and sell for wholesale? Other credit unions sometimes 
park their repossessed automobiles outside the business with FOR SALE signs in the window, 
presumably to best recoup their money in loans gone bad, ie. when a loan customer fails to make 
his promised payments. Jordan Credit Union seems not to care about any of that: it was far 
easier for them to hastily sell my car willy-nilly for any old price so long as it was quick and 
easy, 'less burdensome," and because they figured I could be made to pay for their improvident 
mistakes, no matter how badly they behaved. As such, for egregious and cavalier FAILURE TO 
MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES, one might almost regard this resulting collateral deficiency as 
their just and deserved 'rewards'. Most certainly, this disposition of collateral has not been made 
"in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers," and as Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code proscribes. As the Utah Court of Appeals has previously ruled, the 
vehicle must be sold for a "fair price," (sans self-dealing.) 
CONCLUSION 
Had I been left in charge of my own car, Fd have sold it for its true worth, retail to a 
private buyer, and had money left over after paying off my loan completely, like as not - and this 
more closely approximates what any "reasonable commercial practices among dealers" would 
similarly dictate under these circumstances. Not the "less burdensome" route? Less burdensome 
would have been to take a few extra minutes to try and communicate to me, Plaintiffs steady 
and reliable customer for over 2 years. It was also a courtesy that I had every right to expect. 
They loaned for $12,000.00, then sold for $200.00: no wonder they lost money and there's a 
collateral deficiency let over once the smoke from their rash and hasty, arrogant and arbitrary 
caprices clears the air. 
Accordingly, I pray for this Court's relief from these bogus and unjust claims. And, I 
additionally argue that I should myself be compensated from out of the pockets of this Plaintiff 
(who, in their original Complaint, and in their vehement argument against their previously 
obtained judgment by default against me, too - were seeking to 'slip' a default judgment through 
which would have been a judgment obtained for exactly double the amount they now are more 
modestly alleging their collateral deficiency to bel) 
I hereby seek compensation for the full 2 months car loan payments accepted by them 
after they already had repossessed my car, and also for a fair and modest $250.00 replacement 
costs borne by me when all of my personal property inside the vehicle turned up missing, which 
included a sizeable amount of expensive, as well as sentimentally-valued and irreplaceable 
clothing, (and which included my Flame-In-Go's Prison Firefighter 'Hot Shots' crew sweatshirt.) 
Additionally, I pray this Court's relief for any other punitive cost relief and damages which this 
Court feels it to now be appropriate to award me. This has been an entirely unwarranted 
Complaint since its inception: one neither I, nor this Court, should ever have had to waste its 
time with. Thank You for these considerations. 
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 n m iQ S E C U R r T y A G H E E M E N T 
' o u ha vc boon q»x i n i h . opportuni iy lu amounts if ihe proceeds ol a sale do not P «Y "» °< the imoun.s 
flc .cubed s e r v e s lor tho Cu n Pncc or Ihe
 v o u 1 « 1 
^ The Tol i l «jnlr Pncc a l i e total prce ol , h „ vHh«du Oy choosing any one o. moro o' ihe.0 rorr>od.< s we do nol waive 
j £ c e s .1 youbuy I hem over Hnie Jou uorcod to purchase our nght lo later use another remedy By deeding not to use any 
H n ' E I , , 2 ? * S n , C t K P ^ S h ° W n l n ^ 7 R U T H W remedy we do not give up our nght to consider Ihe event a default if 
DISCLOSURES assumes thai all payment* * « be made as It haooens aoam 
The actual amount you will pay may be more or less you agree Uut tf any notice k roqotrod to be given to you o f » 
on your payment record - . I J O A J I « i « * ? t r a n « f « r n< IHP P/ooortV rtottco Is reasonable^! 
no. . t e n d ,o charge or collect and you do no, agree «o S d t ^ fc^^^^^ " W , T ^ ? 
inane* charge or lee Iha ,s more Irum . . , c „ „ y t t r n u r n S J n S ^ T a r c ^ 
rmittod lor this w l c by state 01 ledcral taw H vou oav a ^ „ l r ™ w r ^ « , \ » c i « V ™ r » d bv law) 
* r o . or joe .ha. is contrary to this prov.s.on' w e ' w V ^ o ^ i n T ^ ^ l W ^ " » * • ' S U C h p r a p e r t y " * 
,p l )MI Ins, to reduce he pnnapol balance and when the ^ ^ 0 ^ 8 ^ pe rso« l property loft m or on the Property 
J ' ^0CnHP, ,!!J m f.h T d rt l ° y ° U s ^ u m t o . » £ C o S S and taken mto possession as provtded above 
cJerstand and ayroc thai some payments lo third oartios ns s e c u n c H J m & v*u"»™« tt' u , o l w »~ 
his Contract may Involve money retained b ^ w ^ r i INSURANCE If required you agree to buy property Insurance on 
as commissions or othei romuncration the Property protecting against toss and physical damage ar>dswbfOCl 
octmn or provision ol thib Contract is nol enforceable Ihc to o maximum deductible amount indicated In the PROPfcH I Y 
s wHI romain part ol IIMU Contract INSURANCE section or as we will otherwise roqu»ro You win name 
IN P A Y M E N T H any payment is more than t w ^ n< h ,™. " s a5 ^ ^ & * * ° " a n * 5 U c h P 0 * ^ , n t h e B V B n < °' toSS °f ^ ^ " ^ 5 ?.£ * * ^TO «» p^?r,jwe m a , r r 8 q u , r e addmon^Tro r r tbyB^^^o™0^oa" 2 
IhSl payment when due You may do so on terms as PaV™n< <"*** * * " J ? " •"»«*««•• P " * * * * 5 , 0 b B US"J *£%"" 
as thJ terms ong.nally agreed to ,n this Contract Tf you « * • * » » » P ' °P* *V Y o " J ^ t h j l « ^ J T ^ X ^ r ^ Y o u 
normal crcd.l standards This right does nol apply ,f your cover the amounts you still owe us you w*l pay the drfference You 
•cliPduto us adjusted lor seasonil lor .rregular income or we may purchase or provide the Insurance through any insurance 
r similar credit at that lime company reasonably acceptable to us You wdl keop me insuiance In 
. . [ - K I T w r* . i . ., J . lull force and effect until this Contruct Is paid in lull 
M E N T You may prepay fins Con.rocl In lull or in pari at
 | ( y o u | a | | to o b , d | n 0 f m j , n l u | p , h l s ,n s Urance 0 f n a r n e us as a 
loss payee we may oblam insurance to protect our Interest in lho 
Pmperty This insunnce may includo coverages nol required o, you 
This in ur nice may be written by a company othei Ihun ono you 
would choose II may be written ol B rate higher Wun u rate you could 
obtain il y >u puichaoed the prooerty inburonco roquued by this 
Contrarl We will add the pmmium lor this insurance to Iho amount 
yon owe us Any nmount we pay will bo due immediately This 
amounl will cum finrincu chaiqes Irom Ihe dale paid at the post 
maturity rale I I L ^ M I M ri in Ihu PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT 
' E K M S iPctior unlil pfnd in lull 
O B L I G A T I O N S I N D E P E N D E N T Earn person who signs this 
Conn i d agrnRs lo pay this Cnnlrart ncrording to its terms This 
mcd/is ihe lollowmg 
A You must pay \hn Contract even il someone else has also 
siuncd il 
B Wc may release any co buyer or guarantor i n d you will still be 
obligaled lo pay this Contract 
C Wo may roleas*» nny socunty and yDU will still be obligaled to 
p i y this Conlraci 
D II we give up any of our right* il will nol affect your duty lo pay 
this Conlraci 
£ If we extend new credit or renew this Conlraci II will nol affect 
your duty lo pay this Conlraci 
W A R R A N T Y Warranty information is provided lo you separately 
WAIVER I D the er lent permitted by law you agrBe to give up 
your r igh ts to requ i re u« to do cer ta in t h i n g * We are not 
required to (1) demand payment ol amount» duo (2) give notice 
that •mounts due have not be«n paid or hBve not boon paid m 
the appropriate amount t ime or mnnneT or (3) give notice thai 
we Intend to make or are making this Contract Immediately due 
Any p irii.il prppaymanl will not excuse any \aloi ndiediAod 
until you pay in lull 
>d ol any prepaid unevnnr i insurnnro promiums may be 
Irom us or Irom Iho msurunce company narnod in youi 
•"fi/lilicjie ol insurance 
SHIP AND DUTIES T O W A R D PROPERTY Oy giving us a 
teresi in Ihc Property you reprr«u»nl nnd agree to the following 
sr*( unty intcrcbl will nol exlpnd lo consume! goods unless 
t arquiio righL ID thorn withm JO d lys nltLr we fmiei mio Ihu. 
rtracl nr thr y are installed in ui rfllued to Iht Vchu I I 
J will delnno our mliirL^ls in the Property iqarnst ci i ims nnrtn 
anyone alsr You will do whatLvLf u ntcr ss iry to kepp out 
rm lo the Pioperty ihead ol the claim ol anyone Hsr 
e spcunty mtr rnst you are qiving us in the P openy cumcb 
ead of the claim of any other ol your ocnoral or secured 
dilors N ou agree lo sign iny addil ioml documents or provide 
with m v additional mlorinalion w*» ma/ rcquia lo ktet) our 
im to It-tn Propprty dln.mJ of Iho claim of anyone else You will 
I do anything to change our Intornsl in thp Property 
u will KLI p the Properly in your po^sussion in good condition 
d repair You will use Ihe Property lor its intended and lawful 
rposts Unless ollwrwise agretd in writing Hie Pioperty will 
located at your address listed on paqe I of ihis Conlraci 
>u will not attempt lo sell the Properly (unless il is properly 
nnl i l iod inventory) or olherwise transfer any rights in tho 
operty to anyone olso without our prior written consent 
)U will pay all taxes and assessments on Ihe Property as they 
come due 
3U will notify us of any loss or damage to the Property You will 
ovide us reasonable access lo the Property lor Ihe purpose ol 
specfion Our entry und inspection must be accomplished 
vvfufly and without breaching the peace 
JLT You will be tn default on this Conlraci if any one of the 
3 occurs (except at prohibited by law) 
ou fan L> portorm BI ) obligation tnal you nave undertaKen in 
Is Conlraci 
to In good faith believe thut you cannot or will nol pay or 
crform Ihe obligations you have agreed to In this Conlraci 
u default you agree to pay our costs lor collecting amounts 
including without limitation court costs attorneys foes and 
t repossession repair storage and safe of fhe Property 
q this Contract 
i even! of default occurs as lo any one of you we may 
e our remndies Hgainsl any or all of you 
DfES II you are In dofauft on this Contract we have all of the 
OE provided by law and this Contract 
Vc may require you lo immediately pay us sub/eel lo any 
elund required by law the remaining unpaid balanro ol .the 
mount financed finonct Lhnrges and all othor agreed charges 
Ve rmy pay hvr»s assessments or olhor liens or make repairs 
o the Proprrty il VDU have nol done J>O We are nol required to 
lo so Any amounl wc pay will be added lo the amount you owe 
is and will be due immediately This amounl wiH earn tinance 
.barge* Irom Ihe date paid al the posl maturity rale described 
n Ihn PHOMISF TO PAY ANO PAYMENT TERMS section unlil 
i nd in lull 
tye may requirr you lo ma.kP Ihe Prnpprty availablp to us at a 
)hce w« dt ngnale Hint is reasonably convenient to you and us 
\i. rruy iirrrodiulGly akr po r r »,nn o h i Pron?rt> hy logrfi 
)rorHSs or sell help but in doing i o we muy not breach Iho 
Miace or unlawfully inter onto /oui piomses Wc may then sell 
hr» Property and apply v lnt WP rnrtMvn as provided by law to out 
casonjble expenses arxf then toward your obligations 
xrept w f i m t)rohibiled by l3w we may sue you foi ndcfiimml 
TH IRD P A P T V AGREEMEH"1" 
By signing bolow you agree tc gfve us a socunty Interest m the 
Property described In Ihe SALE section YDU also agree to the 
lerms ol Ihis Contract including the WAIVER section above 
except thai you will not be liable lor the payments rt requires Your 
interesl in the Property may be used to sa l is ly the Buyer s 
obligation You agree that we may renew extend change this 
Contract or release any party or property wtthoul releasing you 
Irom this Contract We may lake t rese steps without notice or 
demand upon you 
YDU acknowledge receipt of a complalnd copy ol this Contract 
Signature Date 
NOTICE ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT 
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULO ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER 
OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR 
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY 
THE DEBTDR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY_ THE 
DEBTOR HEREUNDER 
IF V 0 U AQE BUYING A USED ^EHIC E THE INFORMATION 
YOU SEE OH THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS 
PART OF THIS CONTRACT INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW 
FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE 
A S S I G N M E N T BY SELLER 
cits ui»d i--»i0ir thes RetjH Inst dlnton! Conunrt and Getunty Agr«>omonl ( f nnlii»a) lo thu Arsti|non lit successors and »8slgns Including all UB rights 
d inloirsl m this Conlnct and any yuHiunlue o*ocutod HI connection wilh HiK Contiuel belter gives Aisigrxie lull pom* otthoi in its uwn nurrw or in 
namr to nko «« lotP* ™ °<h»r actions which Solior could havo t <ken undor Ihis Contract (SFPARATE AGREEMCNT II this. A6»Kjnmont Is m»de under 
ns ol o sofwiHle ugien-nwiil as intfcatud on puye 1 tlw lonns ot the. icaigrwminl o«o dacenbod in a sopirato wnttng(c) and not as prov>ded below) 
or w,irrjnl«; 
, Contract rppreM.Mli, » s^lu by Soller to Duyor on o timt pncc batm. and rwl ot» d casl busts 
r Homnnis ctmlnnmif in this Contract ar« true end correct 
down paynwrt was made by Ihe Buyer in the manner siatod un pagu l ol this Ctjnir<tei dnd exeont tor the ^pptcation ot wry mnmiiacUjter t> rebate no 
nl lho dnwn pn^mrnt wafi lonnr d or pud tolhe Duycrby 5c«or or Sailor's roprosonlalivns 
s ilo wis complated m accordance witti all appticjbk. Itdurui dnd •itulc laws niKi regulations 
> Controet is vulni dtid enlorcnnblo in accordinco with lis lonns 
nomas und signatures on Ihu Conlraci ere nol forged lIclltioiA or usaurned and atr true and correct 
3 COMIMLI IS vo^lud m Hio i>Hter Ireo ol all lions is nol subject to any daims oi dafunses of the Buyor and iruy bn sold or ©signed by the Solior 
amolotoly Oiled m copy ol this Conlrod was dolrvered to HK. Duyor at the Iwm. of onocution 
Vohldc lias bLeti r> Jrvtw06 to Iho Buyor m pood condilion and has been acc«plod by Guyer 
l«r hds or will period o socunly Inttresl in IHB Property In Javor of the /usigrtec 
ny ol tliea" wdrronlioc ts breached or unlrue SA»m will upon Asstgnoc s demand purchnso ihis Conlraci Irom Assignee The purchase shall be in cash 
imounl ol the unpaid balance finclodinq finance charges) plui HH. casts and oxpenscs ol Assignee including attorney; leas 
Icr v l l n JLmriiy A^Mjnr-c in pn) loss Kiislained by il bewuw ol |ud»cial set-oH or BS tho rosutt ol a rocoven/ made againsl Assigneo as a resuH of o 
w Uelense Buyer h is agdmsl Sollcr 
lo wiiivcb nollcp of Ilvr HCcnulnnre ol ihis Ajwignmonl nol ice ol non-paymonl or non poriormanco and notlco o* any other rernedios availablo to 
<s. 
HJMIX may without notice lo Se»r»r ttnd wiHioul tidecting UH* Imbirty of Selloi undor jhis Arwonniont compound oi roloaae any rights against and grant 
lnn<- ol Hmn lor pnymiini lo bo rmdc to Buyer and any othor parson obligated undei Ihis Contruel 
3S OTHTnwi1 E IMI^C^TLO ON PACE 1 THIS ASSIGNMENT l i , WITHOUT FtECOURSE 
Rl C n t j n r r II linn A Mgmnont r muJe wilh re'course' . Indiuitod on p^ya I A^jyuec tjkos lh „ Aswy»««»o(il wdh cudam i»ghuj ol locourse tigamsl 
«i "->"mnn nnrtwnnnrn ndnr tins ronl t^r l Sflllflr will UJMXI demand rnpunJi isn thrs 





$9 -^ - ^ J 3 ^ -
"^t'dnd'us" 
^ ^ n the Solter above ts 
22^ utf'cm, IT Miw 
£***T „nd •vour' mean each Buyer above and 
"
V o U
 B S S S C jointly anditndrviduaUy 
v
« ' loree to purchase t r o r T ^ r T r — — • ^ g g o r e and assigns fesTcSSdart socunly agreement (Contract) Iho 





Year 2 0 0 3 
— £5?* 
V , N
 4 A 3 A * 3 « * * * j 7 * 7 6 
L t No/Year 
D N e w ^ p Used 
nth 
fn*Y To secure vour n^i—' • , TTTh^oTitract you oive us a socunty interest In the Vehicle oil 
>as dtUchrnenls W ^ ™ " 1 a n d P^omunce under the terms * » »
 | 0 ^ , M e r ^ a , , ^ properly and proceeds ol the Property 
; - s i g n to us and & £ ? * £ & S 3 ^ ' ^ ^ A ? ^ ' e f U n d S ° ' " * **"*"* "* " " " C ° n " ° C l S ^ ' ^ " ^ 
SE T O PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS Vou promise to pay us the pnnanal amount ol S _ 1 2 B 2 S L M _ ^ P'us ..nance 
accruing on the unpaid bafdnc I ^ J « « — % P*' y e a f l r , H" t U d d y S Un '" m u , u r r t y F l n a n c e c h a ' 9 « * accrue on o 
day t u s * Aher r n a . l v or niter you defdutf and we d»m„nd payment we will earn fmance charges on the unpaid 
»' 1 3 W . % por yoa/ You auroe lo pay this Contract acrordirxj to the payment .chodule and late charge provisions shown « 
™ IN LENDING DISCLOSURES You TJSO agree to pay any additional amounts according to the terms and conditions of Irus Contract 
IT IONAL FINANCE C H A R G E You agruo \a pav an additional finance charge ol S i / J that will be U paid in cash 
* <> «ho Cash Puce D pa.d proportionally with each payment You agree .ha. I j/A ol the prepa.d l.nance ctMryui, 
mroJunddb«B il you puy th.b Conmci in M before the moturily ddtu 
3 AYMENT YOL ateo agree to pay or apply Hi »» Cash Pnce on u. bolo.o todays date any cash rebate and net trade in value described 
MIZATION OF AMOUNT FINANCED 0 You agrBe to make deterred payments as part ol the cash down payment as reflected in 
monl Schedule 
TRUTH IN LENDING D I S C L O S U R E S 
A N N U A L 
E N T A G E R A T E 
sl ol your credit as 
yearly rale 
5 . 5 & t % 
FINANCE 
CHARGE 
The dollar amounf (he 
credit will cost you 
2 1 * 1 . 3 2 
AMOUNT PNANCED 
The amount ol credit 
provided to you or on 
your behafl 
c 12S29 M 
TOTAL OF PAYMENTS 
The amount you w»H have 
paid when you have made 
oil scheduled payments. 
$ 1493«. 52 
TOTAL SALE PRICE 
Tho total cost of your purcruis« on 
credit, induing your down payment ol 
;—rrosrnc 
nt Schodule Your payment schedule will be 
r ol Payments 
£ 6 
Amount ol Payments 
2 2 6 . 2 2 
When Payments Are Due 
worruLT wanaiw u/i9/*a 
ty You are giving a security interest m tlvj Motor Vehicle purchasod 
Charge M a payment is more than a.- , *—Jla v s ty? v o u * * fa charged 
I o f t b * dslin**^***- * » o u n t o r 93m, HJ d u l l u x * , vk iah *vi trr i j i g r * « t w 
rment If you pay off this Contract early you will not huvo to pay B penalty 
• H you pay oil this Contract early you may be entitled to B relund ol pan ol the Additional Rnance Charge 
ct Provisions You can see the terms ol this Contract lor any additional information about nonpayment delault any required 
ent before the scheduled date and prepayment refunds and penalties 
I N S U R A N C E Credit life credit disability (accident and 
and any other insurance coverage quotBd below Bre not 
to obUun cred/t and we will not provtde them unless you sign 
e to pay the addltora' pror-ium. II you want :>uch insurance 
btaln rt lor you (if you quality lor coverage) Wo are quoting 
V1Y the coveragos you hove chosen to purchase 
ITEMIZAT ION OF A M O W T R N A N C E D 
Vehicle Pnce (mcl sales tax of $ " M . M ) $ 1 Z 2 W ' 




I 2 2 3 9 7 W r 
lo D Joint Prern 3 . 
iaabllity Insured. 
I /A urnr 
Manufadurer's Rebato $ _ 
Cash Down Payment J _ 
Deferred Down Payment S _ 
~xrr 
~mr 
|le D Joint Prem S , / f * T T 
tatuip below nitons you v;nrtt (only) tl>o insurance coverage(s) 
bo e II none dre qixited you have doclmed any coveragos we 
a Total Cash/Rebate Down % _ 
Trade-In Allowance S * ^ 
Less Amount owinq % * 
Paid to (includes I ) 
d Net Trade In (b mmus c) S _ 




d/o/b Buyer d/o/b 
)PERTY INSURANCE You niubl insure the Property securing 
Udd You may purchase or provide the Insurance through any 
e company reasonably acceptable to us Tlw cottision coverage 
>le may not excoed $ " ^ * II you gel insuranco 
tlirough us you will pay 5 _. lor 
f Amount to Finance line e (rt e is negative) 
Down Payment (e disclose as 50 it negative) 
Unpaid Balance ot Cash Price 
Paid to Public Oflictols Filing Fees 
Insurance Premiums 
Additional Finance Charoe(s) Paid to Seller 
fl/A 
imiurn is calculated as follows 
W\ DBdudlbte Collision Covorage S_ 
*
/ A
 Deductible Comprehensive Cov S _ 
Thelt and Combtned Addilional Coverage $_ 
S_ 
_ of covuragu 
M/A 




ty inaurance coverage for bodily Injury a n d motor 
e d a m a g e cauaod to o t h e r * Is not Included in this 
ct unless checked and Indicated 
I G L E I N T E R E S T I N S U R A N C E Y D U must purchase 
nlorest insurance as pari of this sale transaction You may 
>B the coverage from a company ol your choteo reasonably 
ible to us II you buy the coverage Worn or through us you 
5 lor 
. of coverage 
RVICE C O N T R A C T With your purchase of the Vehicle 





This Service Conlruct will be m 
Total Othor Chargea/Amounla Pd lo Othan 
Less PnapBld Finance Charge* 
Amount Financed 
We may retain or recotve a portion of this amount 
NOTICE TO BUYER 
(1) Do not sign this agreement before you read it or if 
It contains any blank spaces (2) You are entitled to a 
completely flllcd-ln copy of this agreement (3) Under 
the law, you have the right to pay off in advance the 
full amount due and undar certain conditions to 
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge 
BY SIGNING BELOW BUYER AGREES TO THE TERMS ON 
FAGES 1 AND 1 OF THIS CONTRACT AND ACKNOWLEDGES 
HECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS CONTRACT 
3 N M E N T This Contract and Secunty Agreement is assigned 
the Assignee phone 
This assignment is made D undor the \eimh 
irwralr agroemtiol D undur tho torms ol Uw ASSIGNMCf/T 
Signature ' J v 
l * / § 3 / « 3 
le/M/ea 
Signature Dale 
Offender* 8481 USP # 17265 SUNIVILLE HARRY F T - SAI T I A K F A n n o l l a t o M 2 0 0 9 0 3 9 8 
&^&<jf£&tiL&/~$&r -adfatfasf $ic#ra/ fitfdji. £ffrr7eF-tc?z)— 
$\%r$'IfwtfyQ tyvwtf?^#-.y^, @(v/r*$jh,y. 1%% mxs^'ff 
j&m-$& fajfrfaw ^c^tfwk^^c^/X^a/-^o^ ^{Wi^ r/s/ fair 
Ruling-3HARRY SUNIVILLE 
Memorandum Decision -Request to Submit 01/05/2009 172 174 
Answer & Memorandum and reply in support of motion to dismiss and opposing 01/05/2009 175-193 
response to pltfs motion for summary judgment HARRY SUNIVILLE 
Sep 4 2009 Page 1 of 2 1 02 PM 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, vs. SUNMLLE, HARRY 
J7AH APPELL^Tcs COUhu 
Appellate #:20090398 
^nrntie^ 
r ^Jnmons & Complaint - Harry F Suniville 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements 
Military Service Affidavit and Order (no bond required) 
Default Certificate 
Information Statement of Judgment Creditor @J 
Default Judgment 
Court's Minute Entry re ex parte communications 
Notice of Entry of Default Judgment 
Notice of Judgment Lien 
Request for Copy; and Motion to Dismiss, or to Restart the Clock Sufficient for me 
to Answer in Defense Against this Complaint; and Memorandum in Support -
HARRY SUNIVILLE 
Petition for Court Appointed Counsel, and Memorandum in Support - HARRY 
SUNIVILLE 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss and/or Motin for 
Relief from Judgment 
Request to Submit for Decision (defs Motion to Dismiss . . . ) 
Court's Minute Entry - defs Motion to Dismiss . . . . denied; judgment is set aside; 
pi to mail complaint to def; def to file answer within 20 days; this ME will stand as 
Court Order 
Memorandum and Reply to Plaintiffs Opposing Memorandum 
Certificate of Service of Complaint 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint - HARRY 
SUNIVILLE 
Motion for Summary Judgment - RICHARD C TERRY 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Deefndant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss 
Affidavit of Michelle Rogers 
Declaration of Ken Martinez 
Exhibit E (submitted in Addendum to Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Answer 
to Plaintiffs Complaint) 
Request to Submit for Decision (defs Motion to Dismiss) 
Reply and Objection 
Second Affidavit of Michelle Rogers 
Memorandum Decision (defs Motion to Dismiss denied) 
Notice to Submit for Decision (pi's Motion for Summary Judgment) 
Notice- Reply memorandum, filed by plaintiff on 12/16/08, was never received by 
me 
Motion for Court Appointed Counsel, and Memorandum in Support - Request for 
Ruling - HARRY SUNIVILLE 
Memorandum Decision -Request to Submit 
Answer & Memorandum and reply in support of motion to dismiss and opposing 



































































Sep 4, 2009 Page 1 of 2 1:02 PM 
v903840 3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, vs. SUNIVILLE, HARRY 
Appellate #:20090398 
^ o c u r n e n t j ^ 
|55Tlc i^FMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN 
Defendant objects to plaintiff's objection 
Notice to Court and to Plaintiff, re Hearing 3/2/09 
Defendants questions to this court 
Affidavit of Ron Hinckley 
Notice to Court and to Plaintiff, Regarding New Evidence 
;opy of Notice to Court and to Plaintiff, Regarding New Evidence with attached 
>ngmal docs, defs request to make copies, his payment on the way, copies 
nade; sent copies to Richard C. Terry, holding defs copies here for hearing on 
./2/0 ' 
jfidavit/declaration from Mirror Image Autobody and Paint 
IINUTES-SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ourt's Memorandum Decision and Order: the Court grants plaintiffs motion for 
jmmary judgment. 
tter to the Court from defendant requesting copies; copies sent 4/17/09 
htary Service Affidavit 
fidavit of Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Dispursement 
>tice of Appeal and Memorandum in Support 
preme Court of Utah-Letter to Mr Suniville Jr. -Notice of Appeal has been filed; 
ase reflect case number 20090398-SC on any future filings 
oreme Court of Utah-ORDER-Effective twenty days from May 14, 2009 this 
tter will transfer to Utah Court of Appeals-20090398-SC 
tificate Regarding Inmate Account 
ion and Affidavit for Waiver of Court Fess (appeal from the 3rd District) -
RRY SUNIVILLE 
T FOUND IN FILE-Request for Transcript 
rt Order on Motion for Waiver of Court Fees Appeal from Third District Civil 
rt (granted) 
" FOUND IN FILE-lnformation Statement of Judgment Creditor @J 
iment and order granting pltfs motion for summary judgment 
•e of Entry of Judgment 
e of judgment lien 
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